Everything You Really Need to Know About "Separability" in Seventeen Simple Propositions by Rau, Alan Scott
Everything You Really Need to Know About 
"Separability" in Seventeen Simple 
Propositions** 
Alan Scott Rau' 
We have a document that purports to be a contract, and which purports to contain an 
arbitration clause. One party, however, takes the position that he simply never agreed to 
anythillf-,1---.--()1~ perhaps, that c1.s a matter ofl.ocal contract law the agrcementcannotl-x: enfOrced. 
Alternatively, he may assert that even should there be an enforceable agreement, the arbitration 
clause somehow never became part of it. Or perhaps, that while he agreed to arbin·atc, he 
didn't agree to arbitrate this particular dispute-or under these particular conditions. What 
happens next? Across a wide specu·umofpossible factual patterns, this much~ litigated question 
implicates the allocation of responsibility for dccisionmakingwith respect to such questions 
between courts and arbitrators. 
Despite its role as one of the conceptual underpinnings of the law of international 
arbitration, the notion of('separability, 11 or the "autonomyH of the arbitration clause, is still 
regularly subject to considerable misunderstanding. 1 In the United States, the occasions for 
enor are multiplied by uncertainty as to what, if anything, may have been added to the picture 
by the Supreme Coures opinion in First Options v. Kaplan} And the Supreme Court has this 
very Term decided three more cases which-if not likely radically to change the terms of our 
discourse-are nevertheless cettain to provide fresh raw material for renewed scholarly effusions.3 
·Robert F. Windfohr & Anne Burnet Windfohr Professor of Law, The University of Texas at Austin School of 
Law. I am grateful to my colleague, Jay Westbrook, as well as to the participants in the Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law's 2003 Symposium on "International Commercial Arbitration," for their careful 
attention to and thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. 
** Artigo recentemente publicado na American Review of International Arbitration, volume 14 p. 1 (2003). 
Article recently published in the American Review of International Arbitration, at volume 14 p. 1 {2003). 
1 The "separability'' of the arbitration clause became a consecrated part of American arbitration law in 
1967 through Prima Paint Corp. v.- Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Later references may 
simply be to "Prima Paint." 
2 First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 {1995). See generally Alan Scott Rau, "The Arbitrability 
Question Itself," 10 Amer. Rev. of lnt'l Arb. 287 (1999). 
3 In Goethe's line, Getretner QuarkWird breit, nicht stark.This is continually stomping around in sour 
cream--certain to spread it around, but hardly likely to make it any firmer. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 
Poems of the West and East 226~27 (bilingual ed. 1998). 
The three cases I am referring to are Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002), discussed 
at text accompanying nn. 261~269 infra: PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL 1791225 
(U.S.). discussed at text accompanying nn. 140-152, 270-277, & n.152 infra: and Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 2003 WL 21433403 (U.S.), discussed at text accompanying nn. 278-282 & n.227 infra. 
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For some time I have been troubled by approaches to the problem of'1separability" which-"-
despite being the work of iJTeproachably respectable academics andcourts~secm to me quite 
wrong-headed indeed. 4 I have always found the notion of 0 separability" abundantly 
unproblematical, but a ftiend whose opinion I have evety reason to value recently suggested to 
me that I might--just possibly~have a tendency to conflate the "selrevident'' with what is, in 
fact, merely (<evident to myself and to nobody else."5 So I have dutifully thought the matter 
through once more. But a number ofsLTaightforward propositions cannot seriously be doubted, 
and if they are accepted, then just al:x)Uteveryconceivable problem simply floats away. Doctlinal 
work does seem in our time to be an increasingly marginalized and denigrated art, lost along 
with the habit of close reading1 the faith in legal argument, and the Sitzf/eL~ch that sustained it. 
Still, i.t hardly calls upon the higher forms of mental activity: To paraphrase Johnson's remark 
about trade 1 how difficult can it be) ifitis managed by those who manage it?6 
In what follows--------in setting out these propositions~ I will assume some familimitywith 
the underlying problem) and refrain from taking you through the background and through 
the holdings of the major cases. I know this is somewhat unusual, but I find the usual convention 
oflega! literature-the pretense that the reader comes to the subject quite unburdened by any 
knowledge \vhatsocvcr-to be tedious. This little piece is hardly the place for a novice to 
begin) and I have myself so often sighed with impatience or frustration as I leaf through the 
apparently obligatory ritual exposition) that I intend to spare knowledgeable readers the need 
to do so. 
4 I will refer constantly to this body of work in what follows. The most interesting examples include Richard 
C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to 
Justice for Contracts With Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. Rev. 819 (2003); see id. at 827, 845 ("separability 
perverts contract law because it assumes away the fundamental principle of contractual consent"; "the 
separability doctrine should be repudiated as archaic [and] unworkable"); Stephen J. Ware, Employment 
Arbitration and Voluntaty Consent, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 83, 130-32 (1996)(the results of applying Prima Paint 
are "simply ludicrous"; "overruling Prima Paint [is a price that] must be paid to make the law well~suited to 
ensure that arbitration is based on significant consent"); Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: 
Autonomy, Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 167, 195-96 (1999)("donning 
their magician's robes, a majority of Justices [in Prima Paint} pretended that the fraud arguably invalidating 
a contract has no effect on the validity of an arbitration clause within the contract"; however, "to compel 
arbitration prematurely would trample the aggrieved party's freedom of contract"); Leo Kanowitz, Teachers 
Manual to Accompany Cases and Materials on Alternative Dispute Resolution 75 (1986)(Prima Paint "is 
a mind-boggier"; if a contract is induced by fraud "it would appear that none of the provisions of the contract 
would be valid, including the arbitration provision"). There are more abundant citations to the literature 
critical of Prima Paint in Reuben, supra at 841-42 n.131. 
Professor Reuben, whose work I have found challenging, is kind enough to refer to one of my earlier 
discussions of this problem as "often brilliant," Reuben, supra at 874. I am truly grateful for this generous 
reference to my work~to the point indeed that I intend to dwell only on the adjective and not on the 
adverb. 
5 I have since discovered that this is actually attributable to Ambrose Bierce~and so give the appropriate 
credit here. Ambrose Bierce, The Unabridged Devil's Dictionaty 213 (Schultz & Joshi ed. 2000). 
6 John Wain, Samuel Johnson 356 (1974). 
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I. Touching Up Prima Paint 
1. Under any sensible reading of Prirna Paint, a person is only bound to arbitral£ a disput£ if he has 
agreed to do so. It is nothing less than perverse to suggest that the Supreme Court has nied to pass off 
some notionof"impliedH or "imputed" consent,"7 or of'fictitious consent, "8 to arbitration as the real 
thing~ and no need at all to have recourse to any such fanciful constructs: "Mutual manifestation 
of assent, whether by written or SfX)ken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of contract" and thus 
of arbiLTationY 
l11e asscttion that consent to arbitration is a necessary condition of enforcement is a ttuism 
reinforced by the language ofboth § 410 and of the savings clause of section 2 of the FAA 1'; there 
is certainly nothing in the Supreme Court's re~_=eated~indeed hypnotic-invocation of the concept 
of"agreement11 to call it into question. TI1e obvious corollaty is that it must be a court that ultimately 
makes the requisite finding: For one must enter into the system somewhere, and "the notion of an 
arbitration clause that can be entirely self~ validating-the product, apparemly, of some curious 
process of autogenesis" 12 .......-.-js completely alien to our jurispmdence. 
That an arbitration clause, in isolation fiDm the remainder of the contTact, is itself rarely 
subject to challenge, 13 would be a trivial proposition--even ifit were tme. But the point should not 
be overstated: For there ism abundant ~md humdrum case~law in which courts are routinely asked 
to apply the tnostprosaic homlxxk analysis to detenninc whetherconnncting pa11ies have effectively 
"agreed" to be bound by an arbitration clause. They may be called on, for example, to tell us 
7 Reuben, supra n.4 at 849; see also Davis, supra n.4; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: 
Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931, 965 (1999)("\he 
separability doctrine of Prima Paint also permits courts to depart from actual consent in cases involving 
arbitration clauses"). 
8 Jeffrey J. Mayer & Theodore W. Seitz, Recognizing and Understanding Consent Issues in Arbitration, 
79 Mich. B.J. 504, 506 (2000). See also Stephen J. Ware, supra n.4 at 131 ("the separability doctrine is 
a legal fiction" which "deprives arbitration of its basis in voluntary consent, because the fictional contract 
lacks a basis in voluntary consent''); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 Tul. L Rev. 
1377, 1458-59 (1991)("When a litigant contends that either that there is no contract or that the contract 
may be avoided ... there is effectively no genuine consent to commit any issues in the dispute {for 
example, fraud in the inducement ... ) to an arbitrator"; "the claimed lack of contract formation, by 
definition, includes a claim that the resisting party aiso did not agree to the arbitration clause"). 
s Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002). 
10 
"The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
11 
"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
12 Rau, supra n.2 at 303 fn.42; see also Alan Scott Rau, "Arbitration as Contract: One More Word About 
First Options v. Kaplan," Mealey's Int. Arb. Rep., March 1997. 
13 See Reuben, supra n.4 at 851 ("despite the presumably millions of arbitrations conducted under [the 
FAA], there are few reported cases invalidating arbitration agreements on traditional contract grounds 
other than unconscionability"); Davis, supra n.7 at 196-97 ("Rarely will predatory conduct, such as duress 
or overreaching, focus specifically on an arbitration provision");. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the 
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury 
Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 Tulane L. Rev. 1, 24 (1997)("\f a party wants 
to defraud or use duress on its opponent, why not go after something big like the price or quality of the 
goods or services at issue?"). 
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·whether an arbitTalion clause constitutes a "material alterationn of an offer-so that it does not 
become part of an agreement under the "battle of the forms" provisions ofUCC § 2~207; !4 
· whether an arbin·ation clause that anives, with other contractual tem1S, in a box at the time the 
product is delivered, is binding on the consumer who decides not to ship the product back; 15 
·whether acredit<ard holder is bound to arbitrate when the card issuer has sent him a notice 
to the effect that a provision for mandatory arbitTation wc1..s to become a partofbis agreement 
unless he rejected the change, and the cardholder did nothing; 16 
· whether one has assented to arbin·ation merely by dovvnloading fi-cc software fi_·om a web 
site-without having first been asked to express agreement through the click of a mouse; 17 
·whether an at~ will employee has expressed his agreement to his employees new "dispute 
resolution program" by continuing to report for work; 18 
· whether parties who have begun to pe1fonn under a supposed con tract are bound to arbitrate, 
where their respective drafts contain inconsistent and incompatible arbitration provisions; 19 
14 See generally Alan Scott Rau et al., Processes of Dispute Resolution: The Role of Lawyers 685-689 (2002); 
see also Aceros Prefabricados, SA v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92 (2"d Cir. 2002)(defendant "submitted 
unrebutted evidence that arbitration is standard practice within the steel industl)l, thereby precluding [plaintiff] 
from establishing surprise or hardship"; therefore "the arbitration provisions proposed in [the defendant's] 
confirmation orders became part of the contract"). 
15 See generally Rau, supra n.14 at 644, 708-710; see also Bischoff v. OirecTV, 180 F.Supp.2d 1097 (C.D. Cai. 
2002)(service provider mailed customer a "Customer Agreement," containing an arbitration clause, after he had 
begun to receive services; "practical business realities make it unrealistic to expect DirectTV, or any television 
programming service provlder for that matter, to negotiate all of the terms of their customer contracts, including 
arbitration provisions, with each customer before initiating service"). 
16 See generally Rau, supra n.14 at 643, 707-708; see also Beneficial Nat'l Bank, U.S.A v. Payton, 214 
F.Supp.2d 679 (S.D.Miss. 2001). 
17 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2"d Cir. 2002)(held, "the district court properly 
decided the question of reasonable notice and objective manifestation of assent as a matter of law on the 
record before it"). 
1B In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002)("on this record we conclude that Halliburton's offer was 
unequivocal and that Myers' conduct was an acceptance of that offer''). 
19 AT. Cross Co. v. Royal Selangor(s) PTE, Ltd., 217 F.Supp.2d 229 (D.R.L 2002)("performance indicates a 
willingness to do business with a party, but not necessarily a willingness to submit to arbitration"; "the parties had 
a relationship, but there was no objective c!ear written expressJon of a mutuality of obligation to abide by the 
same arbitration clause"); see also Lea Tai Textile Co., Ltd. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F.Supp. 1404 
(S.DN.Y.1975)(since "the arbitration clauses are in hopeless conflict," "no contract to arbitrate was made" at all); 
Opals on Ice Lingetie v. Body Lines Inc., 320 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2003)(documents drafted and signed by one party 
called for arbitration in New York but documents signed by the other party called for arbitration in Ca!ifomia; 
"[t][his difference is significant and indicates that there was no meeting of the minds as to an agreement to 
arbitrate"). But cf. Linea Naviera de Cabotaje, CA, v. Mar Caribe de Navegacion, CA, 169 F.Supp.2d 1341 
(M.D. Fla. 2001)(parties signed separate agreements, each providing for arbitration in New York, although "on 
somewhat different terms"; held, "variance between the two arbitration provisions is an ancillary logistical 
concern which is not integral to the underlying agreement, and does not preclude arbitration"). 
This problem--where there appears to be an agreement to arbitrate in some form or other, but where 
it remains unclear precisely how, or under whose auspices, the arbitration is to proceed--can arise in any 
number of other contexts. For example, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 
109 (2no Cir. 1990), a customer of a brokerage house attempted to arbitrate before the AAA by invoking the 
"Amex window" provision of the American Stock Exchange Constitution; the court, however, held that this 
provision had been superseded by a more spedfic customer agreement in which the parties had "closed the 
Amex window." Whether the broker had consented to arbitrate before the AAA was undoubtedly a question for 
the court-and "under ordinary contract principles," the customer was deemed bound by the arbitration 
provision of the agreement he had signed. But cf. 2 lan R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration Law § 15.3.3.3 
(1994), which suggests, inexplicably, that "had the court applied Prima Painf' it would "have left to the arbitrator" 
the power to decide whether the customer had surrendered his right to proceed under the Amex Constitution. 
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·whether a party is bound to arbitrate disputes mising out of a sale when he has failed to object 
to a i'sales noteH~ontaining an arbitration clause-issued by an independent broker 
who has negotiated the deal for both buyer and sel.ler; 20 or 
·whether a hospital that has issued invitations to bid on a construction contract~and whose 
announced "General Conditions" included an arbitration clause for any disputes between 
"ownerandcontractor"-is obligated to arbitrate with the lowest bidder, who claims that 
he should have been, but was not, awarded the contract?21 
11lis is the f~1miliar stuff of the classroom "offer and acceptance" hypothetical. 
2. "At,rreement'' here has no meaning that is in any way different from ~he use of the tcnn every 
day in the reahn of contract. 
TI1is is clear enough with respect to the paradigm case of the negotiated commercial 
transaction (with which I am primarily concerned). However, even in the highly~ fraught 
world of adhesion contracts, we may think a similar approach warranted by the exigencies of 
mass contracting, by the efficiencies of standardized forms, and by the practical commercial 
need to control agents and to rely on written instrumcntsP Here the call for '(sufficiently 
genuine consent"23~by which is apparently meant some vague variant of "knowing and 
20 Irving R. Boody & Co., Inc. v. Win Holdings lnt'l, Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)("ratification 
by failure to object ... serves as the equivalent of prior authorization"; defendants "failed to object to the 
sales notes, and therefore the sales broker ... was in effect authorized to negotiate on their behalf')_ 
21 St. Luke's Hospital v. Midwest Mechanical Contractors, 681 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. App. 1984). 
22 See Northwestern Nat'! Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (71h Cir. 1990)(Posner, J.){"Ours is not a 
bazaar economy, in which the terms of every transaction, or even of most transactions, are individually 
dickered; ... [f]orm contracts . . enable enormous savings in transaction costs, and the abuses to which 
they occasionally give rise can be controlled without altering traditional doctrines, provided those 
doctrines are interpreted flexibly, realistically"); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic 
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev, 529 (1 971 )("The predominance of standard forms is the 
best evidence of their necessity"). 
23 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1377, 1426 (1991). 
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voluntary" or "infonned" consent24-scems quixotic.25 It is now, after all, almost half a centUJy 
since Karl Llewellyit pointed out the obvious: 
24 Some examples~not particularly extreme as these things go in the present climate-are Mark E. 
Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to 
Consumer Protection, 10 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 267, 334 (1995)("Without a brochure explaining 
the consequences of signing the agreement, a consumer cannot intelligently and knowingly waive his 
or he right to access to the judicial process"); Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary 
Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 
90 Calif. l.Rev. 1205, 1251-55 (2002)(proposlng a regime of "informed consent" through "federally-
mandated disclosures," listing "the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory arbitration from an 
applicant's perspective"); Stempel, supra n.23 at 1426-1427(a "major indicia of true consent would be 
the degree of disclosure of the arbitration provision and its impact on the resisting party's knowledge 
or access to knowledge of the differences between arbitration and its alternative forums"). For an 
argument that takes the notion of "consent~ considerably further-beyond mere acquiescence, to the 
point that it simply becomes impossible for the drafting party ever to insist on arbitration as a pre-
condition to contract-see Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem 
with Arbitration (J. on L. & Contemp. Problems, forthcoming 2003)("the democratic concerns about 
consent to arbitration may be alleviated" by a "check-off or opt in system" in which parties to adhesion 
contracts "elect at the time of contracting whether or not they want to arbitrate claims"). 
Professor Shell also urges that by "requiring that special clauses be highlighted, or perhaps separately 
consented to, special default rules add a measure of dignity to the contracting process that may 
enhance the parties' subjective feelings of fairness," G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern 
Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 431, 521-22 (1993). Nevertheless even he does not appear to be 
particularly sanguine about the cognitive ability and capacity for rational choice of the average 
consumers who are the putative IJeneficiaries of the disclosure requirements of regulatory legislation; 
see id. at 512 n.505 ("remote risks" will be "heavily discounted" by consumers who will "systematically 
underinsure"). 
25 It is now, after all, almost half a century since Karl Llewellyn pointed out the obvious: 
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the 
specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered 
terms, and the broad type of the transactlon, and but one thing more. That one thing more is a 
blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have 
on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. 
Karl llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370 (1960). See also Randy E. 
Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 Fordharn L. Rev. 627 (2002)("The consent that legitimates 
enforcement is the [overall] consent to be legally bound"; "the law does not, and should not, bar all 
assumptions of risk"); cf. Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Northwestern L. Rev. 49, 63 
(1995)(if the terms for Carnival cruises were given to passengers before they paid for their tickets, and 
the pamphlet was written in plain language and readable type with bold captions, it would not "really 
make a difference with respect to the question of meaningful assent. Assent is not in fact a useful way 
to look at the question of when to enforce contingent terms in long forms"). 
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The notion apparently is that an adherent's acquiescence--in the usual form of his 
signature or petformance~must somehow be legitimized by transcendent insight or inten1al 
transformationY' At the very least this seems quaintY 
Legislative attempts to insure "knowing consent" by requiring conspicuous notice of 
arbitration dauses28 have succumbed to challenges on grounds of federal preemption29~but 
such notice requirements could equally well be jettisoned on the simple ground of fatuousness. 
In most cases, after all, a number of things must be pretty clear by now: 
26 See Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9'h Cir. 1994)(plaintiffs were "not bound by any 
valid agreement to arbitrate these employment disputes, because they did not knowingly contract to 
forego their statutory remedies in favor of arbitration"). The holding in Lai "has been rejected by 
nearly every court that has had an opportunity to pass upon it.'' 
But see American Heritage life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533 {5 1h Cir. 2003). Here an illiterate 
borrower signed a "stand-alone" arbitration agreement, but later claimed that he "did not understand 
the term arbitration or what it involved" and "would not have signed an arbitration agreement if [he] 
had known what arbitration was." The trial court denied a motion to compel arbitration, and the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed: For one thing, "ordinary contract principles require a 'meeting of the minds' between 
the parties," and the borrower's alleged "ignorance of the fact that he was signing arbitration agreements 
signifies that he may not have consented to them and a meeting of the minds may not have existed." 
One could weep-for it is as if Holmes and Williston had never lived. A separate point was that the 
lender was aware of the borrower's illiteracy, "which indicates !hat the alleged failure to identify and 
explain the arbitration agreements may constitute fraud in the inducement." But to say that the 
lender uknew of the borrower's ignorance" is hardly the same thing as to say that he "knew the borrower 
vvould not have consented," cf. Restatement, Second, Contracts, § 211 cmts. b, f. 
Along the same lines, however, see also Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 
2002)(Trieweiler, J.)(arbitration provision by which customer of brokerage house "waived her right of 
access to this Stale's courts, her right to a jury trial, her right to reasonable discovery, her right to 
findings of fact based on the evidence, and her right to enforce the law applicable to her case by way 
of appeal were clearly not within [her] reasonable expectations"; [broker] "should have explained the 
arbitration clause, a clause which effectively waived the constitutional rights of a 95 year old widow 
with no bargaining power and a relative lack of sophistication in such matters"). Professor Knapp has 
termed Justice Trieweiler's "forthrightness" in arbitration cases "a remarkable example of principled 
courage or pigheadedness, depending on your point of view." Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts 
Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contact Law, 71 Fordham L Rev. 761, 777 fn.61 {2002). I suspect~ 
given this choice~that my own characterization would be somewhat different from his, cf. Alan Scott 
Rau, The UNCITRAL Model Law in State and Federal Courts: The Case of "Waiver," 6 Amer. J. of lnt'l 
Arb. 223, 246 & fn.88 {1 995) (referring to the "obtuseness" and "know-nothing ism" of Montana arbitration 
urisprudence). 
17 
'The idea that a contract has to be completely consensual and knowing is a 191n century concept." 
Alan Rau, quoted in Hal Davis, Banks Follow Brokerages: Arbitrate Yes, Litigate No, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 
12, 1994 at B1, 83. Cf. Jeffrey Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse 
at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 
297, 395 (1996)("Rau's observation is generally correct, although one can argue that the forum and 
means of resolving disputes is an aspect of contracting that requires greater solicitude for consent"}; 
Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 So. Tex. L Rev. 485, 512-513 n.105 (1997)("1 find it 
!)aradoxical at best to suggest that the substantive terms of a contract should be deemed somehow 
ess 'fundamental' than the question of just who-court or arbitrator-is charged with the task of 
enforcing them"). 
'
8 Rau, supra n.14 at 688-690; see also Jean R Sternlight. Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking 
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wa$h. U. LQ. 637, 705-707 (1996)(states 
should be allowed to enact legislation-requiring, for example, that arbitration provisions "appear in 
a particular point size" or "be prominently displayed"--"designed to ensure that arbitration agreements 
are entered knowingly and voluntarily"). 
29 
"All such statutes are now presumably dead letters in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)." Rau, supra n.14 at 689. 
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·Any adhering party is highly unlikely to see or to read even a conspicuous notice of 
arbitration. 30 
·More fundamentally: 'TI1e adhering party is unlikely to possess necessary infmmation 
or analytical skills--ot; more charitably, is unlikely to be willing to invest necessary cffort31~ 
that would allow him to understand its meaning or to appreciate its practical significance. 32 
''To the extent that one does not understand the terms of the agreement, requiring the same 
to be printed in bold letters ls Hke yelling at a deaf man."33 
00 See Todd 0. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Ha!V. L Rev. 1174, 1179 
(1983) ('Virtually every scholar who has written about contracts of adhesion has accepted the truth [that the 
adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard terms before signing the document], and 
the few empirical studies that have been done have agreed"); William Whitford, The Functions of 
Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wise. L. Rev. 400, 423-27 (1973)(precontract 
disclosure regulation is unlikely to affect the shopping behavior of ''the vast majority of consumersH; 
"[s]ellers have long known that it is precisely in the contract, and only in the contract, that information 
consumers are not supposed to notice is to be put"). 
31 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 436 (2002)("The consumer, engaging in a rough but reasonable cost-benefit analysis 
. understands that the costs of reading, interpreting, and comparing standard terms outweigh any 
benefits of doing so and therefore chooses not to read the form carefully or even at all"); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L Rev. 211, 247 (1995}("rnost form 
takers will be rationally ignorant of most preprinted terms. Accordingly, it should not matter whether a 
preprinted term is clearly written and conspicuous"); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway; The Law 
and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Northwestern U. L Rev. 700, 
717 (1992)(same). 
32 The results of the National Adult Literacy Survey suggest that few American adults could "understand 
and use contract documents and disclosures" even "if they actually chose to read them": "While design and 
readability experts could improve contracts and disclosure forms, the terms of modern consumer contracts 
are so complex that legal mandates to make contract forms readable may be futile." Alan M. White & 
Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 Stanford Law & Policy Rev. 233, 234, 242 (2002}. See 
also Goldman, supra n.29 at 730 (discussing why "disclosure requirements [are] insufficient in the context 
of forum selection clauses in consumer form contracts"; "a lengthier form reciting the meaning of the 
provision in greater detail or insisting that the terms have been read would not change that result"). 
Professor Budnitz proposes that banks in their contracts with customers be made to include "a copy 
of the AAA rules," Budnitz, supra n.24 at 304; see also id. at 276-77 (criticizing a bank contract because it 
''does not discuss the circumstances under which a court may review an arbitrator's order"). I do not believe 
that this is intended as a parody of the case for increased "disclosure," although I would be happy to be 
proven wrong. Aiso in the interest of "securing informed choice by consumers," one student note suggests 
federal legisiation that would condition the enforceability of arbitration clauses on a merchant "provid(ing] 
information to the non-merchant describing the procedural differences between, and all other factors 
which may distinguish the outcomes of, the arbitration process and litigation," Note, Consumer Arbitration 
and Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers' Informed Consent to Arbitration Clauses in 
Form Contracts. 32 Colum. J.L & Soc. Probs. 275, 302 (1999). 
Might J suggest instead that we indulge in a little exercise of the imagination? If you subscribe 
to cable television, you might spend half an hour one evening slowly moving from channel to channel 
while considering what is on offer and to whom. Afterwards, you might ask yourself whether it seems quite 
as plausible as it did before that conspicuous disclosure of an arbitration clause is likely to lead either to 
informed and meaningful choice, or even to "shopping" behavior. 
33 Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Patient's Perspective, 61 Wash. U.L.O. 123, 148 n.198 (1983). 
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· .A.ndin an_y event: A standardized fonni'S typically presented to the acfucringpmtyso late in the 
n<.-u1Saction-after he has Cecomc }"l'>Ychologicallycommitted to thedeal-tlrat as a practical matter his 
capacity to adjust his bd1avior, in. such a way as to take any "notice" into account, L" likely to imp;rfcct.34 
·And finally: Any possible "exercise ofjuclgment" on cl1e pmt of cl1e adhering party is hkelyto te 
deeply flawed by systetnatic cogni rive bi8.S-----whctl1er m1 inational underestimation of the magnitude of 
the risk, or aper.sofktl discotmt ra.te rh.atminimizes the shadow of t11e future.35 
At best, then, any such "notice" may serve merely to convey dmt there is something indefinably 
suspxt al::out the entire notion of arbitration. 36 h l have said elsewhere, it seems to make £1rmore sense 
fmus not to dweU unduly on the presence or absence of this ineff·able sometltingcalled "real'' assent--but 
instead to focus on the unexciting taskofincremental regulation1 paying dose attention to how fairly the 
process actually works in practice, 37 
M See Whitford, supra n.30 at 426: In nearly all consumer transactions-and to a very great extent in all 
contractual transactions-the effective agreement, an oral one, is made before the buyer ever sees the written 
contract. To the parties, the signing of the written contract is usually only a ritual, roughly equivalent to a 
handshake. . Even in the rare case in which a consumer actually reads the contract before signing, it must be 
remembered that he usually views himself as already morally committed. If he comes across information in the 
written contract which ordinarily would persuade him not to sign, it puts him in a conflict situation and one 
which, in accordance with the theory of cognitive dissonance, he may resolve by discounting the disclosed 
informalion.See also Hillman & Rachlinski, supra n.31 at 447-450 ("social forces" that constrain consumer 
behavior and reduce consumer willingness to read standardized forms), 453 (because consumers usually 
encounter standard terms after they have decided to purchase the goods, "they will process the terms in the 
boilerplate in a way that supports their desire to complete the transaction"}. 
"Jo See Eisenberg, supra n.31, which canvasses recent empirical research on the cognitive limits relevant to 
contracting behavior-for example, limits based on bounded rationality and rational ignorance, limits based 
on disposition (such as "undue optimism"), and limits based on defective capability (such as "faulty telescopic 
faculties" and defective risk~assessment). See also Christine Jolis et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1542 (1998X"We emphasize that these problems are not ones of insufficient 
information per se; they are ones of insufficient ability to process accurately the information one possesses 
insofar as that information bears on one's own risks"): Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives 
in Contrac..i and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Temls and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. 
L. Rev. 563, 627 {1982)(consumer tendency to underestimate risk "goes far beyond mere misinformat!on" and 
"amounis to a cognitive bias, a systematic tendency to misinterpret or ignore information, to generate fantasies 
of safety, to repress unwanted information. lt has to do with babyishness, not ignorance"). 
",Is Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An Argument for Limited Enforcement of 
Consumer Promises, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 815, 845-46 (1987)(required disclosures, even "if not adequate to allow 
most consumers to make rational choices, at least may be a red flag to them that the offered deal is suspecf'); 
see also Whitford, supra n. 30 at 438 (disclosure regulation is often based on normative models---reflecting uno! 
so much a prediction that consumers would make substantial use of this information in making buying decisions 
as a belief that they should make use of this information"). To counter this effect, Professor Freshman suggests 
that "one might require disclosure not just where there was an arbitration clause but also where there was nof'-
for example, "This contract does not include an arbitration clause. Jn the event of a dispute, you agree instead 
that you may go to court. "! Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving 
Perspective to Informed Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. 909, 946 (2002). 
37 See Alan Rau & Edward Sherman, Arbitration in Contracts of Adhesion, Proceedings, 22"0 Annual Conference, 
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution [SPIDR] at 75, 82-83 (1994). We question here whether "it is 
really productive to worry too much about the existence of true 'consent' to arbitration," and suggest that 
"insisting on pre-agreement disclosures and warnings [may not] respond to real consumer interests-or to the 
realities of the contracting process." We then urge that it might be better instead to tum to "ihe unexciting task 
of incremental reform," an approach that places a higher priority "on regulating the arbitration process itself, to 
devise safeguards to insure the quality of the dispute resolution procedure." To the same effect, see Richard 
Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1335, 1362-63 
(1996)(in securities arbitration, "[s]ince it is unlikely that informed consent ... can be easily restored, the answer 
points toward a more overtly public system of dispute resolution"; we "cannot rely upon consent as a primary 
method of regulating the federal contract to arbitrate"). 
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3. (Now fOr the requisite inquiry into the presence of"agreement."). Obviously, where 
a container contract is alleged to be invalid, it will frequently be the case that the validity of the 
agreement to arbitrate must also be affected. 
'(ll1ere is simply no agreement to anything, for example, where a signature has been 
forged, or where an authentic signature was obtained at gunpoint."38 Precisely the same thing 
is true where a party resists arbitration with the claim that he has been deceived as to whether 
he was entering into any sort of contractual obligation at all-the problem raised in the so-
called "fi·aud in the factum'' ca.<>es.39 And, of course, where a "party" to the contract is a minor. 
In such cases, it is clear that it will be for the court to determine whether the defense is 
a good one. 40 It should go without saying that such a rcsttlt~which is not remotely contestable-
rests in no way on the "nonexistence'' of the main contract, something which is not in itself 
38 Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 Am. Rev. lnt'l Arb. 213, 253 n.173 
(1996). To the same effect, see Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (Th 
Cir. 2001)(Easterbrook, J.) ("A person INhose s'1gnature was forged has never agreed to anything"). 
See, e.g., Gregory v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 188 F.3d 501 (4:h Cir. 1999). Here a 
brokerage firm moved to stay a customer's suit against it in favor of arbitration, and the customer claimed 
that her signatures on the agreement were forgeries, The district court nevertheless granted the stay, 
"reasoning" that the customer "can raise all of her arguments regarding forgery in arbitration." This of 
course is preposterous-and the Fourth Circuit had little trouble reversing: "[l]f the dispute is over the very 
existence of the agreement to arbitrate, a district court, and not the arbitrator, must decide if the 
arbitration clause (indeed, the entire agreement) is enforceable against the parties.'' Other forgery cases 
include Dougherty v. Mieczkowski, 661 F. Supp. 267 (D. Del. 1987)("Basic contract principles require 
some manifestation of assent"; [d)efendants cannot rely on a contract which plaintiffs never signed and, 
on the record, never saw. to establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate"); Jolley v. Welch, 904 
F.2d 988 (51h Cir. 1990)(forgery issue referred to magistrate for an evidentiary hearing on whether "the 
issue involved ... is referable to arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA). Unfortunately, I cannot 
produce any arbitration cases that involve the actual or threatened use of weapons. 
39 Such cases are exemplified by Strotz v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 227 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Cal. App. 
1990), in which a party resisting arbitration claimed that at the time she signed the contract, "defendants 
told her that the contracts simply were documents necessary to open her account, that they did not affect 
her legal rights and that it was not necessary to read them." The court found these allegations sufficient 
to justify denial of a motion to compel arbitration: "[l]f a party is unaware that he is signing any contract. 
obviously he also is unaware he is agreeing to arbitration." To the same effect is lynch v. Cruttenden & 
Co., 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 636 (Cal. App. 1993)("the representation that the documents did not affect the 
Lynches' rights is equivalent to a representation that the documents are not contracts, a deception as to 
the nature and effect of the documents"). 
What seems like a sensible extension of this principle is represented by Cancanon v. Smith Barney, 
Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998 (11 1h Cir. 1 986){brokerage firm's customers, who could not read 
English, claimed that an employee of the firm had misrepresented to them that they were merely 
opening a money market account rather than a securities trading account; "[w)here misrepresentation of 
the character or essential terms of a proposed contract occurs, assent to the contract is impossible. In such 
a case there is no contract at all"). To the same effect is Hetchkop v. Woodlawn at Grassmere, inc., 116 
F .3d 28 (2rtO Cir. 1997)(claim that there had been a «surreptitious substitution" of terms; although both 
documents were collective bargaining agreements with some provisions in common, "the defense is 
applicable if the party did not know and had no reasonable opportunity to know that a page with 
materially changed terms had been substituted"). 
4° For this reason I am exceedingly puzzled by Professor Ware's assertion that where an employee signs 
an agreement "with a gun to her head," "preserving the separability doctrine imposes upon 
Employee a duty to arbitrate whether a gun was in fact used as alleged." Ware, supra n.4 at 134. 
192 Alan Scott Rau 
particularlyrelevantY Such a result rests instead on the simfJle "nonexistence" of ~he agreement 
to arbitrate itself It is perfectly compatible with Prima Paint~as the need to find a legally 
enforceable assent to submit to arbitTation is a conceptual comers tone of that decisionY 
Failure to perceive this simple point-thatPrimaPaint is grounded on the existence of 
an agreement to arbitrate-leads regularly to what I have called "bizarre and inexplicable 
misreadings" of the caseY Now I write this after having finished a set of my first-year C'..-ann·acts 
exams, and sol should only be astonished, to paraphrase La Rochefoucauld, that I still remain 
capable of astonishment. But I was indeed astonished by the recent opinion of the Fifth Circuit 
in Primerica. 44 Here a borrower brought suit against a lender for breach of contract1 and the 
defendant moved to compel arbitration.TI1e district court denied the motion after determining 
that the borrower "lacked the mental capacity to execute a contract under Mississippi law." 
The court of appeals 1 howcver1 reversed~holding that this dcfen.se "is a defense to [the 
bonower1s] entire agreement with [the lender] and not a specific challenge to the arbitration 
clause. It followed then that the defense oflack of capacity1 as "part of the underlying dispute 
Cetween the parties1 11 must be submitted to the arbitratm: 45 
41 I will have more to say about that notion later, see text accompanying nn. 91ff infra. 
42 For this reason \ am also exceedingly puzzled by the assertion in our leading arbitration treatise that 
unothing in the language of the FAA or of Prima Paint logically permits distinguishing any of the no-
contract-was-made examples from fraud in the inducement or the many other bases which have been 
held to be under the Prima Paint rule," Macneil et al., supra n.19 at § 15.3.3.1("the Prima Paint 
conclusion that an issue going to the making of the entire contract, rather than one going to the making 
of the arbitration clause itself treated separately, is not an issue concerned only with the making of the 
arbitration clause") .. See also id. at § 15.3.3.2 (introducing the distinction between "fraud in the factum" 
and "fraud in the inducement" is "unfortunate" and "has no foundation in the reasoning" of Prima Paint"; 
in Cancanon v. Smith Barney, supra n.38, "even if the court were correct that the allegations were that 
there had been no agreement, Prima Paint dictates that the arbitrator decide the issue"). 
43 Rau, supra n.2 at 333-336. 
<M Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469 (51n Cir. 2002). 
45 An equally boneheaded holding on similar facts is In re Steger Energy Corp., 2002 WL 663645 (Tex. 
App.)(seller of mineral rights sued for rescission of the contract claiming that he "was incompetent at the 
time he signed the contracts-in the early stages of Alzheimer's"; held, motion to compel arbitration 
granted; "the defense asserted relates to the contract as a whole," and does not "specifically relate to the 
arbitration agreement itself'). 
More recently, though, the Tenth Circuit got it right in Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (101h 
Cir. 2003)("[u]nlike a claim of fraud in the inducement, which can be directed at individual provisions in 
a contract, a mental capacity challenge can logica!ly be directed only at the entire contract"). 
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Nor is this an isolated bit oflunacy. Consider, for example, the Alabama case in which 
the buyers of a mobile home claimed that the seller had "held all the documents ... in one 
hand" and "pointed to where they needed to sign," without giving the agreement to them or 
allowing them to ask any questions about it. Since this allegation of fraud was that the seller 
had uconcealed all portions of the agreement, not merely the arbitration clause" contained in 
it, the court pointed out that this was "in reality an attack on the entire" agreement. And since 
their challenge was ''not only" to the enforceability of the arbitration clause, it was necessary 
under Prima Paint for the buyers too to make their arguments to the arbitrators.46 Green Tree 
Financial Corp. of Ala. v. Wampler, 749 So.2d 409 (Ala. 1999); see Rau, supra n.2, at 333-336. 
A~ a matter of fact the Alabama courts seem to get things wrong with some regularity. In 
46 Green Tree Financial Corp. of Ala. v. Wampler, 749 So.2d 409 (Ala. 1999); see Rau, supra n.2, at 333~ 
336. As a matter of fact the Alabama courts seem to get things wrong with some regularity. In Johnnie's 
Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 790 So.2d 956 (Ala. 2001 ), Melvin Holt bought a mobile home; "[a]lthough Melvin 
had six years of education, he is illiterate.'' The court first wrote (correctly, 1 think) that Melvin could not 
avoid enforcement of the arbitration provision ''merely on the basis that he could not read what he was 
signing," 790 So.2d at 960~61. But instead of stopping there the court-inexplicably-went on to hold 
that since Melvin's illlteracy "bears upon his comprehension of the entire contract, not just the arbitration 
agreement," Prima Paint dictated that the question whether he agreed to arbitrate his claims by signing 
the contract "should be decided by an arbitrator, not a court." ld. at 963; see also Anniston Lincoln 
Mercury Dodge v. Conner, 720 So.2d 898, 900-02 (Aia. 1998)("the critical question is whether Conner 
can attack the validity of the arbitration clause itself without attacking the validity of the contract in its 
entirety")(emphasis added). 
A Fifth Circuit opinion to the same effect is Villa Garcia v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, 833 F.2d 545 {51r. Cir. 1987)(customer argued that arbitration clause was unenforceable because 
he had signed the customer agreement "believing it to be only a signature exemplar" and that "his 
inability to read the English language prevented him from reading" it; held, claim should be submitted 
to arbitration since it goes to "the formation of the entire agreement" rather than to the arbitration clause 
alone). And see also Coddington Enterprises, Inc. v. Werries, 54 F. Supp.2d 935, 942 {W.O. Mo. 1999), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083 {8'h Cir. 2001)(plaintiffs 
claimed that defendant "falsely represented to them that the new agreements they were signing were 
identical lo the old agreements that had with [defendant]"; held, these allegations of fraud "cannot fairly 
be limited to the making of the arbitration clause"; since they "would go to the entire agreements and 
not just to the arbitration clauses," the issue is one to be decided by an arbitrator); Houlihan v. Offerman 
& Co., Inc., 31 F.3d 692 (81n Cir. 1994)(customer claimed she was misled into believing that her signature 
was necessary only to verify the information she had given on her application and to provide IRS with 
"updated" account information; held, her claim is subject to arbitration because her "factual allegations 
of fraud cannot fairly be limited to the making of the arbitration clause. Indeed [sic], Agnes Houlihan 
stated that she was misled into believing that she was not executing a contract at all. 
In addition, I find traces of the same error in any number of doctrinal academic comments. 
Professor Ware writes that if an arbitration clause is included in an employment contract, "only if 
Employee argues that she did consent to the container contract, but did not consent to the arbitration 
clause, will the court decide the consent issue itself." Ware, supra n.4 at 132. Professor Walt writes that 
since "claims directed at the entire contract" "are for the arbitrator to decide," then "in deciding, the 
arbitrator passes on the enforceability of the arbitration clause as well as the main contract," Steven 
Walt, Decision by Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 
369, 420-423 {1999). Professor Macneil and his colleagues similarly write that "even though challenges 
are nominally made to the validity both of the arbitration clause and of the underlying contract, there 
must be ailegations of at least some defects pertaining specifically to the arbitration clause itself' in 
order for a court to pass on a challenge. Macneil et al., supra n.19 at § 15.3.4. But where the same 
forgery-or the same weapon~induced signature-or the same fraud in the factum-or the same lack of 
authority or capacity-or the same mental incapacity-necessarily impairs the validity of both the 
container contract and the arbitration agreement, all of these statements become fundamental 
misreadings of current law. 
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Jolmnie's Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 790 So.2d 956 (Ala. 200!), Melvin Holt bought a mobile home; 
Hla]lthough Melvin had six years of education) he is illiterate." The court first wrote (correctly, 
I think) that Melvin could not avoid enforcement of the arbitration provision "merely on the 
basis that he could not read what he was sigrting," 790 So.2d at 960~6 t. But instead of stopping 
there the court-inexplicably-went on to hold that since Melvin's illiteracy "bears upon his 
comprehension of the entire contTact, not just the arbitration agreement," Prirna Paint dictated 
that the question whether he agreed to arbitrate his claims by signing the contract "should be 
decided by an arbitrator, not a court.'' IcL at 963; sec also Anniston Lincoln Mercury Dodge v. 
Conner, 720 So.2d 898, 900-02 (Ala. 1998) ("the critical question is whether Conner can 
attack the validity of the arbitration clause itself without attacking the validity of the contract 
in its entirety") (emphasis added). 
Is it necessary to point out the flaw in the reasoning here? Despite casual assumptions 
to the contrary) Prima Paint does not merely preserve fur the courts challenges that arc "restricted" 
or "limited" to "just" the arbitTation clause alone-this would be senseless; it jYreserves for the 
courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an agreement lO arbitrate into question. To send a 
dispute to arbitration where "nor onli) the arbitration clause itself) but ((also," in addition, the 
((entire" agreement is subject to challenge, is to lose sight of the only important question-
which is the existence of a legally enforceable assent to submit to arbitration. Someone lacking 
the requisite mental capacity to contract cannot, I dare say, assent to arbitrate anything at all. 
And isn't there something terminally silly about an analysis which permits arbitration just 
because the respondent has taken the pains to cover with his hand~not merely the arbitration 
clause-but aU the other provisiom in t.he contract as weH? Doctrine may certainly facilitate 
folly-but it rarely renders Idly absolutely obligatmy. 
4. However, it will frequently be the case rhat the unenforceability of the container ag,JYeement 
need 1wt affect the validity of the consent to arbhrate at all. 
Here is the main thrustof(separability.n Let me start with an (admittedly tendentious) 
retelling of the Prima Paint story. Once upon a time, Prima Paint and the F & C Company 
entered into a "consulting agrecment 11 that fOllowed closely upon Prima Paines purchase of 
F&C's paint business. A number of representations had inevitably been made by F&C on 
which Prima Paint relied by ente1ing into the deal~representations, fOr example, conceming 
the current list of F&C customers whose patronage was to be taken over by the successor 
company, and the financial ability ofF&C to perfonn its contractual obligations. Both parties, 
represented by counsel, certainly understood that these representations were material to Prima 
Paint; they also understood that should any of them turn out to be false, Prima Paint might 
ultimately be entitled to seck rescission and perhaps even the recovery of damages. The parties 
might also have been aware that the falsity of any representations~and whether any falsehoods 
were intentional-might turn out to require difficult factual inquiries. Is it not peri-Cctly 
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plausible under these circumstances that they might have chosen to submit ro arbitration-not 
only questions with respect to the quality ofF&C's performance-but also questions with 
respect to whether F&C had misrejJresented the quality of its perfom1ance?f1 
Or might contracting parties plausibly be willing to arbitrate, for example: 
·Not only the existence of a breach of contract--but whether the terms of the alleged 
contract were wo indefinhe to give rise to a breach in the first placc?48 
·Not only whether contractual duties had been complied with--but whether any 
such duties had been discharged by supervening impossibility or f1-ustration? 49 
47 See also Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P2d 251 (Cal. 
1983)("the claim of substantive breach-that the air conditioning did not perform properly--is tota!ly embraced 
within the claim of fraud-that the lessor knew, at the time of the lease, that the air conditioning wou!d not 
perform"). 
Occasionally a drafting party will go to the trouble of making explicit in a contract what the Prima Paint 
court presumed was there implicitly: See, e.g., Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Early, 776 
So.2d 777 (Ala. 2000)(arbitration clause called for the arbitration of "all claims and disputes including, but not 
limited to all contract disputes, claims of fraud, misrepresentation .. .wantonness and all torts of every type and 
nature in any way arising out of the sale and purchase of the mobile home"). 
48 I note in passing that if this defense is a good one, no contractual obligation at all ever "came into existence"-
and yet l see no reason why the parties might not have chosen arbitration as a means for making that 
determination_ 
See, e.g., Compagnie Noga d'Jmportation et d'Exportation SA v. Russian Federation, Mealey's Jnt'J Arb. Rep. 
Oct. 2002 at p. 0~1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2002)(parties signed a document that one party contends "was no more than 
agreement to agree and that the parties intended to negotiate further"; held, "the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate"-.-.--the parties "actively negotiated the choice of law and arbitration clause," which was not "inadvertently 
slipped in"-and so the arbitrators ''will determine all questions including the meaning, effect, validity or 
enforceability of all other contract terms"); Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9111 Cir. 
1991 )(in determining whether a "Memorandum of Intent" was a "binding contract for the purchase and sale of 
bananas, or merely an 'agreement to agree' at some later date,'' the trial court "improperly looked to the validity 
of the contract as a whole" and "ignored strong evidence in the record that both parties intended to be bound 
by the arbitration clause"; court should instead have "considered only the validity and scope of the arbitration 
clause itself'); W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 165 {3d ed. 2000) 
{discussing case in which a "contract would have been null under French law if the price had not been 
specifically fixed or determinable by objective reference," but arbitration clause was unaffected by the alleged 
nullity; the arbitrators then went on to determine that the contract was invalid because the price was indeterminate). 
49 See Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Amer. v. Beneficial Ufe Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524 (1'" Cir. 1985){frustration 
of purpose; defendant "never argued ... that the arbitration clause itself was invalid because of either mutual 
mistake or frustration of purpose"). But cf. Borck v. Holewinski, 459 So.2d 405 {Fla. App. 1984)(general contractor 
sought rescission because of "allegedly unforeseeable difficulties encountered in construction"; held, since 
rescission would mean that the contract was "of no force and effect from the beginning," "there can be no 
arbitration clause"). 
For a court struggling with these issues a quarter-century before Prima Paint, see In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 
43 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1942). Here, although federal price-control regulations fixed a maximum price for goods, 
the price set in an earlier contract between the parties was higher. The court held that "by act of Government 
there was complete frustration of performance excusing the seller"; since the arbitration clause "was only an 
incidental part of an indivisible contract of purchase and sale," ''when the contract was at an end the arbitration 
provision no longer existed or had any force whatever." Dissenting, Judge Lehman urged that "the controversy 
as to whether the principal contract has been terminated by impossibility of performance in exact accordance 
with its terms falls within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate"; the parties '·agreed to abide by the judgment 
of business rnen in all disputes concerning the interpretation of their contract or the scope of the obligations they 
have assumed." ld. at 496~97. 
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Now if we can imagine reasons why the parties might have wished to extend arbitral 
jurisdiction so far--and if we think they did so~then concerns about the ~"validitl) of the 
underlying agreement become completely iiwlevant. In such a case, deference to the parties' 
choice means that the defense-whether of misrepresentation, or indefiniteness, or fi:ustration--
is not something with which a court need concen1 itself. 
One could multiply examples indefinitely: 
·A manufacturer of radar sets was awarded a Govcmment contract containing a rigid 
delivery schedule and a liquidated damages clause for late delivery. It awarded a subcontract 
R;r precision gear components needed to produce the sets. A year later, the subcontractor told 
the manufacturer that it would cease dclivety unless a substantial increase in price--even for 
parts already delivered~was agreed to. Being unable to find alternative sources of supply that 
would enable it to meet its commitment, the manufacturer consented to the price increases in 
a "substitute" contract that contained an arbitration clause. Is it plausible that in this contract 
the parties might have prefcned that an arbitrator hear the later~inevitablc--claim that this 
new contract was not in fact a "good faith" modification, sought for a "legitimate commercial 
reason"50~butwas instead "unenforceable" on the f:,YJ:'Oundof''economic duress"?5' 
·A contract for a substantial sale of goods-a contract written, but unsigned-is 
agreed to by the parties. 1l1c Statute of Frauds tell us that as a general matter such a contract 
is "not enforceable"~although there is a serious question in this case whether the goods "were 
to be specially manufactured for the buyer," or whether they were "not suitable for sale to 
others in the ordinary course)! of business, or whether the seller had "made a substantial 
beginning of their manufacture"-aH facts which would altow the agreement to escape the 
ban of the Statute. 52 Are these issues that the parties might plausibly entrust to an arbitrator 
farniliarwith the trade? (There is, of course, no requirement that the arbitration agreement 
itselfbe signed.). 
so ucc §§ 2-209, cmt 2. 
51 This fact pattern is based on Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971), 
although the contract there did not contain an arbitration clause. Cf. Republic of the Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1989). The Philippine Government claimed 
that ·1ts contract with Wesf,nghouse was a result of "duress or coerc'ion," in that former President Marcos 
"allegedly received payments in return for which he used his power and influence" to force the NPC, the 
government agency responsible for electric power generation, to "assent to an oppressive, one-sided 
agreement." The Government argued that "coercion through bribery is a form of coercion so different 
in degree and kind that it rises to the level of fraud in factum." The court was not persuaded-although 
it noted that "if plaint\fffs could demonstrate that the coercion or duress were directed specifically to the 
arbitration clause, this would satisfy Prima Paint and it would be appropriate to have a hearing on this 
issue." The ultimate holding was that any payments received by Marcos could not in any event be the 
basis for invalidating the contract-since "as the ultimate authority of the nation," he had full power to 
commit the government and all its agencies to the contract. 
"UCC §§ 2-201(1). 2-201(3)(a). 
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· An agreement is signed, but it so happens that the parties attach utterly inconsistent 
meanings to some clitical tenn. Perhaps the gulf is wide enough to prevent any ''meeting of the 
minds"-so that, as a doctrinal matter, there is "simply no agreement to which the parties could be 
bound."53 Perhaps the parries suspect, but repress--or at any rate would rather defer-any 
consideration of this ambiguity. Might they nevertheless plausibly gamble that they will be able to 
persuade the ultimate decisionmaker that theiro\Vl1 intcqJretation is preferable-and might they 
plausibly prefer this decisionmaker to be an arbitrator ?54 After all, "if they have agreed on nothing 
el<;e .. they have agreed to arbitrate."55 
· A husband signs an agreement to buy a new Ch1ysler Sebring. Part of the price is to LIE:' in 
the fonn of a trade~in of a BMW convertible owned jointly by him and his wife; the agreement <llio 
contains an arbit1·ation clause.1l1e BMW is surrendered to the dealer, who sells it; however, the 
wife later refuses to sign over the title. It will inevitably be argued here that the wife's approval 
of the trade~in was a "condition tnecedent to the very existence of a contract to purchase the 
Sebring"~and if the condition precedent "never occurred, there was no contract and 
53 See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts 35 (3'd ed. 1998). 
54 See Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chicago Graphic Communications lnt'l Union, 20 F .3d 
750 {71~ Cir. 1994). An employer and a union disagreed over the meaning of the term "4C 60 inches Press-
3 Men" in a collective bargaining agreement; the employer believed the language meant-in contrast to 
past practice--that only 3 men would be required to man any of its 78" wide four-color presses; the union 
interpreted the language to refer only to presses 60" and under. The employer sought a judicial declaration 
that no contract existed "because the parties never agreed on an essential term"; the union counterclaimed 
for an order to arbitrate. The court affirmed an order of summary judgment in favor of the union. In an 
opinion by Judge Posner, the court of appeals held (1) that the ambiguity in the agreement was "patenl"-
that the employer, as a '·reasonable person," should have realized that its interpretation might not coincide 
with that of the union and could not, therefore, simply walk away from the contract if its own meaning were 
not accepted. In the alternative, the court held (2) that "even if' there was no "meeting of the minds" on the 
meaning of this critical term, at the least "there was a meeting of the minds on the mode of arbitrating 
disputes between the parties." 'We would have a different case if the ambiguity were over the whether the 
parties had agreed to arbitrate their disputes." 20 F.3d at 754~755. 
The latter point is the real holding of the case-the former merely an opportunity, characteristically exploited, 
for intriguing speculation and the display of erudition. For the court emphasized that it would still be open 
for the employer to argue before the arbitrator that "there really was no meeting of the minds over the 
manning requirements and therefore that the contract should be rescinded after all"-the court did not mean 
"to bind the arbitrator'' as to this issue, or "deprive" him of the important remedy of rescission. ld. This is clearly 
correct-for (1) the effect of misunderstanding on contract formation, and (2) the interpretation of contractual 
language, are so closely linked-are so essentially indistinguishable-that it only makes sense for the same 
decisionmaker to be entrusted with both questions. Note how Restatement, Second, Contracts § 20 ("Effect 
of Misunderstanding") and Restatement, Second, § 201 ("Whose Meaning Prevails") are identical; see also 
the concurring opinion of Judge Cudahy in Colfax ("By framing this question as one of a 'meeting of the 
minds,' [the employer] tries to turn an ordinary question of interpretation into one of formation, and thereby 
get out from under the arbitration clause"). 20 F.3d at 755. 
In Bratt Enterprises, Inc. v. Noble lnt'l Ltd., 99 F.Supp.2d 874 {S.D. Ohio 2000), the contract provided that the 
purchase price of certain assets would be adjusted following the closing as a result of certain later expenditures, 
and ''due to the uncertainty associated with this post-Closing adjustment, the Parties included an arbitration 
clause in the Purchase Agreement to resolve any disputes associated with this adjustment." One party later 
asserted a defense of "mutual mistake" regarding the drafting of this portion of the agreement; nevertheless 
the court pointed out that there was no claim at all "that there was any 'mutual mistake' in the negotiation of 
the arbitration clause itself." 
55 Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591-92 (71h Cir. 2001). 
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consequently no arbitration agreement."56 But when the question tuiscs whether the husband's 
obligation to go through with the sale survives his wife's refusal to ab-rree to the trade~in, isn't it 
plausible that he and the dealer might both have been willing to submit this question to 
arbitration? 
· One party claims that an aE,:rrccment (containing an arbitration clause) has subsequently 
been terminated, or canceled, or superseded, or abandoned---or that it has simply expired. 
The claim, in other words, is that the contract is no longer ''in existence.'' This allegation is 
vigorously contested. Yet might the parties plausibly have chosen ex ante to have any 
disagreement of this sort-that is, any dispute as to whether substantive rights have been 
extinguished-submitted to their arbitrators?57 It is even easier to reach such a conclusion in 
those cases where it is the alleged breach of a once~ valid contract that has given rtse to a claim 
that the contract has been rescinded: Here too the substantive provisions of the contract may 
indeed no longer be in force-but an arbitration clause held not to survive in such circumstances 
56 Bahuriak v. Bill Kay Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 2003 WL 105310 (Ill. App.). The court found that a remand 
was appropriate to determine whether "any conditions precedent to the formation of the contract to purchase" 
existed and were satisfied, so that the trial court could "determine if a contract and its ancillary arbitration 
agreement were ever formed." Of course, a much more accurate way of posing the proper question would 
be to ask whether his wife's consent was "a condition precedent to the husband's duty of performance under 
the contract"-but this distinction is not critical to the point I am making in the text. 
57 E.g., ACE Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Central United Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 24, 34-35 (2nd Cir. 2002) 
{the original agreement contained specific provisions as to the required manner of termination or 
modification; "[w]hether these and other requirements of the Agreement were properly complied with 
[in the subsequent termination agreement] wilt require interpretation of the Agreement-a matter 
specifically commended to arbitration"); Ambulance Billing Systems, Inc. v. Gemini Ambulance Services, 
Inc., 103 S.W.3d 507, 514 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003) {a claim that the parties had "mutually 
cancelled the contract" was contested; held, "a dispute regarding whether a settlement agreement was 
reached replacing or canceling" the original agreement is an issue "within the scope of the arbitration 
clause"); In re Koch Industries, 49 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001)(plaintiffs claimed that an 
easement had been "abandoned' so that the defendant's actions in digging up a pipeline also constituted 
a trespass; held, since the plaintiffs "only challenged the validity of the easement, not the validity of the 
arbitration clause contained in tile easement," the issue of abandonment is subject to arbitration"); 
Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Mabro Constr. Inc., 383 F. Supp. 192, 195 (D.D.C. 1974)("1! seems beyond 
dispute that the parties are entitled to agree, should they so desire, that one of the questions referab!e 
to arbitration is the question of whether the contract had been terminated, abandoned, or canceled"). 
Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Metropolitan Transport. Auth., 1996 WL 137587 at *12 (S.O.N.Y.) 
(arbitrators' finding with respect to what the court called "duration arbitrability~ should be treated with 
"deference"; the parties have "considered and chosen arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution, and 
neither can be taken by surprise when conflicts allegedly arising from their underlying agreement are 
brought before a panel"). 
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has obviously been deprived of any efficacy whatever; its primary purpose after aH was to 
monitor perfonnance and to compensate for breach. 58 
·An agreement is signed on behalf of a corporation by an "agent," whose authority to 
do is disputed. On the face ofit, a claim that I am not a party to the main contract~because 
the incHviductl puqx~rting to sign it on my behalf was not 8UclLorized to do so--seems equally to 
affect the arbiLTation clause, and should therefore require judicial detennination. "No amount 
of insistence upon the autonomy of the arbitration cl8use can make it valid if the respondent 
was not a party to it."59 Not quite, though. Questions of('authority" need not be so seamless 
58 E.g., Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8 (1'1 Cir. 2003){policyholders claimed that Alistate's "undue delay" 
in payment constituted a "total breach" preventing Allstate from taking advantage of any other provision of 
the contract, including the arbitration clause"; held, no; "[a]rbitration clauses are often invoked precisely 
because one side claims, and the other denies, that a contract has been violated"); Large v. Conseco Finance 
Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49 (1s1 Cir. 2002)(untillhe arbitrator decides "whether the conditions for rescission 
have been met," the borrower has "only advanced a claim seeking rescission"). Cf. Hanover Ins. Co. v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 586 A.2d 567 (Conn. 1991 ){plaintiff argued that defendant's "denial of the existence 
of a binder was a breach of contract that excused its [own] subsequent noncompliance" with a provision 
requiring suit to be brought within one year; held, plaintiff was not excused from compliance with the one-
year suit provision; "even after a repudiation ... the provision continued to govern the time, and mode, of 
resolving disputes"). But see Rolling v. Ohio State Home Services, Inc., 1993 WL 261568 {Ohio App.){holding-
incorrectly-that a consumer's claim for rescission must be submitted to a court because "if rescinded, the 
contract becomes ineffective ab initio, and no rights can be predicated upon" it). 
In any of these cases, of course, the teaching of Prima Paint is that it must always be a task for the 
court to pass on the continued existence of the arbitration clause itself. When a dutiful parsing of language 
fails, we can often find recourse to a simple preDumption of survival. See, e.g., Transcore Holdings, Inc. v. 
Rayner, 104 S.W.3d 317, 323 (fex. App,-Dallas 2003)(subsequent termination agreement provided that "any 
action arising out of. or relating to, this letter" may be "brought and prosecuted only in the courts" at Texas; 
"[o]nly if [the buyer] is released of its obligation to arbitrate could it have the option to file a lawsuit against 
[the seller] in Texas"); compare Valero Energy Corp. v. Teco Pipeline Co., 2 S.W.3d 576 (Tex.-App.-Houston 
1999)(court rejected the assertion that an arbitration clause had been revoked by a subsequent settlement 
agreement between the parties: "while the Settlement Agreement may have modified some select terms" of 
the original agreement, "there is nothing to indicate that all the terms of those previous agreements have 
been superceded by the Settlement Agreement. If this were the case, then nearly all material aspects of the 
relationship between the parties would be left undetermined"). Cf. Continental Ins. Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 52 
Fed. Appx. 557 {2~° Cir. 2002)("the parties clearly entered into an arbitration agreement that remained valid 
and enforceable at all pertinent times"; "even if' the later releases cancelled the original agreement "we find 
no express rescission of the arbitration provision"). 
59 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration :77 {2d ed. 
1991 ); see Pierre Mayer, "The Limits of Severability of the Arbitration Clause," in International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration, Improving the Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application 
of the New York Convention 261, 265 (Congress Ser'1es no. 9, 1999)("When the person who signed the 
agreement lacked authority to enter into agreements in another person's name . .the entire agreement 
would also be null and void," as "his lack of authority also extends to the arbitration clause"). 
See also Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., supra n. 55 {"An agent's lack of authority is a ground 
that prevents the enforcement 'of any contract'; does it not follow that judges must determine whether the 
agent had authority?"); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat'llns. Co., 263 F.3d 26 {2d Cir. 2001){"Because 
Sphere Drake has presented some evidence that Euro had neither actual nor apparent authority" to enter into 
the contract, "it has put the making of the agreement, including the agreement to arbitrate, in sufficient \ssue 
as to warrant a trial on the question"); Three Valleys Municipal Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 
1136 {9th Cir. 1991 ){"By contending that they never entered into such contracts, plaintiffs also necessarily 
contest any agreements to arbitrate within the contracts"); Sandvik AB v. Advent lnt'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3'a 
Cir. 2000){affirming the denial of a motion to compel arbitration; "[t]he validity of the arbitration clause as a 
contract . . derives from [the agent's] authority to bind Advent" and so "there does not appear to be any 
independent source of the validity of the arbitration clause once the underlying contract is taken off the table. 
If [the agent's] signature is not binding, there is no arbitration clause"). 
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and monolithic, and there is one small missing step in the reasoning here: The proper precise 
inquiry is whether the j)utative agent possessed authority to submit corporate dis[Jutes to arbitration; 
such an agent might plausibly entrust arbitrators with the power to determine whether his 
authmity was adequate to bind the corporation to the underlying transaction.60 
There are many other classes of cases-cases which are somewhat less intrinsically 
interesting than these, but which also tend to support my earlier analysis. I omit detailed 
consideration of them here so as not to be accusedofrunningup the score.61 
60 Here's an example: Heather Cross, a minor, appeared on the Sally Jessy Raphael television show, and 
(who would have thought it possible?) was humiliated in the process: The show was entitled MTeen Girl 
Bullies" and Heather was portrayed as such a bully, subjecting her to "ridicule, hatred and contempt." 
Before the show her mother had signed on her behalf a "consent and release," which released the 
producers from any defamation or other claim arising out of Heather's appearance, and which obligated 
her to arbitrate any disputes. Heather's fraud and defamation suit was stayed pending arbitration. For the 
court, the only question was whether a parent had authority "to bind a minor child to settle his or her claims 
through arbitration": Analogizing this to a parent's right "to bring and conduct a lawsuit on behalf of the 
child," the court answered "yes." However, this "only specifies the forum" for the resolution of the claim~it 
was thereafter for the arbitrator to determine whether the mother had the authority to enter into any 
"release" on Heather's behalf that would actually extinguish her substantive claims. Cross v. Carnes, 724 
N.E.2d 828 (Ohio App. 1998). 
Here's another: Under Soviet law, "foreign trade transactions" entered into by state Foreign Trade 
Organizations had to be signed by two authorized persons. A contract for the sale of crude oil between a 
FTO and a Bermuda company was signed only by the FTO's chairman-and thus, under Soviet law, might 
well be "invalid." A court determined, however, that this provision of Soviet law "had no application to the 
arbitration clause" found in the contract, because the clause was not itself a "transaction in foreign trade" 
within the meaning of the relevant decree. If "an arbitration agreement does not require two signatures" 
then the chairman at least had authority to bind the FTO to submit all future disputes to arbitration. 
Sojuznefteexport v. Joe Oil Ltd. (Bermuda), XV Yrb. of Commercial Arb. 384, 406, 421 {Ct. of App. 
Bermuda 1989). See generally Robert H. Smit, "Separability and Competence-Competence in International 
Arbnitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Corne from Nothing?," paper presented at the 
Research Conference on International and Domestic Arbitration, The Institute of Judicial Administration, 
New York University School of Law, Sept. 19-20, 2002 )("not all claims that the contract is 'void' because an 
agent tacked authority ... to bind a party to the underlying contract necessarily also call into question the 
existence of the arbitration agreement," "so long as the agent had authority to enter into the arbitration 
agreement" itself). 
In Sandvik AB, supra n.59, the defendant claimed that the agreement was invalid because its purported 
agent lacked authority-but it nevertheless moved to compel arbitration. Between this willingness to 
arbitrate, and the plaintiff's continuing insistence that the overall contract was binding, the court could 
easily have found that there was effective assent at least to the arbitration clause itself. However-while 
finding the question raised by this uanomalous situation" to be a "close" one--the court declined to do so: 
MFor there to be a binding contract, it is not enough that [plaintiff and defendant] each agree at independent 
points in time that arbitration would occur; there must be a contract to do so." 220 F.3'd at 109. 
61 For example, there are cases where it is alleged that the container contract is invalid for "lack of 
consideration," e.g., Cline v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 79 F. Supp.2d 730 {S.D. Tex. 1999)(employee claimed 
that the employer's unilateral right to amend or terminate its occupational injury plan made its promises 
"illusory," but that "attack on the [plan] as a whole" is "properly referable to an arbitrator''); Matter of Exercycle 
Corp. v. Maratta, 174 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 1961)(an employer opposed arbitration, arguing that since the 
employee had the right to quit at any time, the employment contract was "lacking in mutuality" and 
therefore unenforceable; held, "the question whether the contract lacked mutuality of obligation" "is to be 
determined by the arbitrators, not the court"). 
Claims of "lack of consideration" tend to be largely frivolous anyway. Any mutual promises in the arbitration 
clause itself should lend adequate support to the rest of the agreement, just as mutual undertakings in the 
container agreement should support even an arbitration clause that is drafted so as to be "unilateral." See 
the text accompanying n.170 infra. 
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5. Now if you are with me so far-if we cm agree that the pmties might wish to entTust such 
matters to the arbitrators) mLd if any such choice would 1:e respected-d1cr1 surely the cmly remaining 
question is, did d1eJ in fact do so? "TI1c ultimate-and only interesting---question is whether such 
was in fact the agreement of the parties. "62 
1l1at I pose this as a factual inquiry suggests that one would be more than usually ill~ 
advised to be dogmatic about anything here. It is just as facile to assume a [Jriori that defects 
in the main agreement must vitiate the arbitration clause, as to assume that they cannot. In 
other words) "logic"~as usual-will take us precisely nowhere. A"" the preceding discussion 
shows, it is simply not true that ''a claimed lack of contract formation by definition includes 
a claim that the resisting party also did not af.,:rree to the arbitration clause."63 And there is 
nothing unthinkable or inherently "ludicrous"64 in the proposition that the parties might 
have wished to make a binding submission to the arbitrators of this issue of the enforceability 
of the container contract. An arbitral determination of validity made under a subsequent 
ad hoc submission---or even under a separate written agreement executed at the same 
time-would presumably pose little problem, "logical" or othcrwise; 65 a physically separate 
arbitration agreement might also, for that matter) conceivably be entered into before the 
overall contract.66 The question of assent is not conceptually different where the agreement 
is instead one clause physically "embedded'' in a broader document.67 In this country we 
G2 Rau, supra n.38 at 253 n.173. 
63 Stempel, supra n.B at 1459; see also J. Gillis Wetter, Salient Features of Swedish Arbitration Clauses, 
1982 Y .B. Arb. In st. of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 33, 34 (1 983)(the doctrine of separability 
"militates against strict reason'} Professor Ware writes that "[i]f Prima Paint's consent to the consulting 
agreement was fraudulently induced then its consent to the arbitration clause, and every other clause, 
in that agreement was fraudulently induced." Ware, supra n.4 at 131. I guess this peremptory ipse dixit 
must also be true "by definition," since it is presented to us as axiomatic. 
64 Ware, supra n.4 at 132. 
65 See Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Kansa Generallnt'llns. Co. Ltd., [1992] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 81, 
85-86 (Q.B. 1991) (Steyn, J.), rev'd on other grounds, [1993] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 455 (C.A.) ("That is 
something which happens not infrequently in business practice. The logical problem raised by the 
proposition Ex nihilo nil fit does not arise"). 
66 In Aste v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 728 N.E.2d 629 (Ill. App. 2000), an investor executed an ''account 
profile" contemplating future securities sales and providing for arbitration. Arbitration was "the only 
contractual provision" in the profile. The account representative was not a registered salesman, and the 
Illinois Securities Law required registration for any "solicitation" of securities. The court he!d that the 
"account profile" itself constituted a "solicitation" within the bar of the statute-and thus that the failure 
to register rendered the agreement invalid. However, the statute could easily have been read otherwise-
the trial court, at least, believed that registration was not required for the formation of an arbitration 
agreement that did not itself actually authorize any particular transaction. On such an alternative 
reading, arbitrators appointed under the "profile'"s arbitration agreement would presumably have had 
jurisdiction to decide whether any future sales were in compliance with state law. See id. at 637 ("There 
is no dispute that an arbitrator may determine if the [Securities Law] was violated once arbitrability has 
been established"). 
67 See Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd., supra n.65, [1992]1 Lloyd's L. Rep. at 92 ('The exclusion of 
such cases is underpinned solely by the argument in logic" rather than by any argument ''referable to the 
interests of users of the arbitral process or the public interest"); Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd., [1 993} 
1 Lloyd's L. Rep. at 467 (Hoffmann L.J.)("[counsel for the plaintiff] calls this logic. I call it oversimplification"). 
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have not treated legal conclusions as matters of "definition'' since the time of 
Lang dell. 68 
6. In the inevitable absence of any direct evidence going to the intent of the parties, \:Ve 
are as usual forced back on default rules. The proper choice of a background rule is of course 
a familiar problem in the law of contracts--"without default rules, no contract could have 
legal effect. )j69 And Prima Paint is ~hus one more default rule with resfJect w the likely boundari-es 
of contractual consent. 
The working presumption is that in Prima Paint itself--and indeed in all the cases 
discussed at "poim # 4" abovc~~the parties did indeed wish the matter of contractual 
validity to be entrusted to arbitrators. TI1is rule of thumb in the absence of explicit articulation, 
this allocation of the burden of proof, is no more a lifiction•no than is our usual assumption that 
a seller has promised to deliver merchantable goods. 71 
Professor Reuben has written that Prima Paint jjrequires courts to presume that the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate merely by entering into the larger contract, regardless of its 
validity"; ~<by assenting to the tcnns of the container contract, a party is also implied by law to 
6B A few years ago, J gave a short talk in Paris on the "contractual" model of American arbitration law. In 
the discussion period that followed, some members of the audience took exception to our apparent 
predllectJon for what they termed "opportunisme" over "rationalite." I am not sure whether I managed to 
emerge from this Cartesian netherworld with any credit. See Alan Scott Rau & Catherine Pedamon, La 
Contractualisation de !'Arbitrage: Le Modele Americain, 2001 Rev. de !'Arb. 451. I was reminded of this 
episode in reading Adrian Baron, The Australian International Arbitration Act, the Doctrine of Severability 
and Claims for Restitution, 16 Arb. lnt'l 159 (2000). The approach here is strikingly similar to what I had 
encountered earlier: Courts that apply the doctrine of "separability" are characterized by the author as 
preferring "to elevate commercial considerations over logic." [I had to read this passage tvvice in order to 
grasp that the characterization was actually intended to be pejorative: But then, I was similarly slow to 
understand that the Contracts student, who began his year~end evaluation of my course by writing that 
"I had to think for myself in this class," did not intend to be particularly flattering.] For "as a matter of logic" 
"it follows" that where one party alleges that there is no enforceable main agreement, "there can be no 
agreement to arbitrate." ld. at 184. 
J find it hard, though, to understand this rigid moral certitude~this formalistic disdain for "policy 
considerations in the form of commercial expedience"--and this a priori assumption that "it is inconceivable 
[sic] that a party should be bound by an agreement to arbitrate in circumstances where the main 
agreement is void ab initio." It is-on the contrary-precisely those "policy considerations" that properly 
form the basis for crafting an appropriate default rule in cases of uncertainty. 
69 David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1815, 1819-20 (1991 ); for an application in the law of arbitration, see Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. 
Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 Tex. lnt'l L.J. 89, 108-118 
(1995)(multiparty disputes). 
70 Ware, supra n.4 at 131; Baron, supra n.68 at 183; Mayer & Seitz, supra n.8 at 506; E. Gary Spitko, 
Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majorltarian Cultural Norms through 
Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 275, 303 (1999); Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration 
Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U.L. Rev. 255, 267(1998). 
71 Cf. UCC § 2-314. Of course sales law consists of little else but an abundant off-the-rack stock of 
background presumptions·, see, e.g., UCC §§ 2-303 through 2-312. 
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have assented to the tenns of the arbitration provision."72 I am afTaid that this seems to me to 
get the pointofPrirnaPaint precisely backwards: Any supposed difficulty completely evaporates 
once one understands that the doctrine's presumjJtion ofintent~for example, its presumption of 
a willingness to entrust a fraudulent inducement claim to arbitration---has no role a~ all in the 
absence of a t'>rior finding of an {<agreement" to arbitrate. It is always a court) acting at the 
threshold as a gatekeeper) that passes on this requisite to arbitral jurisdiction. And this is 
precisely the authority that was exercised by the Court in Prima Paint, whcn"--on the facts 
before it~it allowed the arbitrators to make a final determination of the claim of ffaudulent 
inducement. 
So, to review the bidding up to this point: 
·In the (relatively inhcqucnt) cases where the party resisting arbitration calls into 
question his assent to arbitrate, it will always be for a cou'rt to verify whether there has in fact 
been such assent. These cases will include 
0 the cases raising contract formation issues such as those discussed at point # 1 alx)Vei 
0 the cases \vhere "the particuLar chatlcngc to the existence of the contract is such as 
to necessarily also put the existence of the arbitration agreement in issue."73 These are the 
cases discussed at point #3 above; 
0 the cases where the party resisting arbitration makes some attempt to identify ua 
defect in the arbitration clause itself." The core concept here is fairly easy to grasp.74 Howcve1; 
this is a category that is hardly self defining, and so it is one that is inevitably somewhat fuzzy 
72 Reuben, supra n.4, at 824, 874; see also id. at 849 ("the 'separated' arbitration 'contract' recognized 
by separability is not created according to traditional contract formation principles of manifestation of 
independent assent and considerationff). To the same effect, I think, see Ware, supra n.4 at 135 fn.270 
(''the separability doctrine ... specifies what constitutes an enforceable contract to avoid the default rule 
that disputes are resolved by litigation, not arbitration"). 
73 Smit, supra n.60 at p, 15; see also Tanya J. Monestier, "Nothing Comes of Nothing" ... Or Does It? A 
Critical Re-examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration, 12 Amer. Rev, of lnt'l 
Arb. 223, 230 (2001 ). 
74 E.g., Richard L. Deal & Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 299 S.E.2d 346 (Va.1983)(within 
the meaning of the local arbitration statute the state is not a "person" authorized to enter into arbitration 
agreements, and "is not bound and cannot be bound by the arbitration provision" agreed to it by the 
"legally unauthorized acts of its agents"); Hearthshire Braeswood Plaza Ltd. Partnership, SMP v. Bill 
Kelly Co., 849 S.W.2d 380, 388-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993) (contractor alleged it was 
fraudulently induced to enter into the arbitration agreement because the property owner had represented 
that all disputes between the parties were to be resolved by the project manager; held, though, that 
there was "no evidence" to support a finding of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration provision, since 
there was no claim that the owner "knew the statement was false when it was made " or that he then "had 
no present intent to petiorm"). 
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around the cdges. 75 I also readily concede that it is subject to manipulation in response to any 
number of prudential or functional considerations. 76 
·In aU other cases-and these are the interesting ones--courts will be asked to monitor 
the ambit of coment to arbitration, by determining how far the parties' agreement extended: 
Did they, for example, choose to grant to their arbitrators the power to rule on the validity of the 
container contract? TI1.ese are the cases discussed at point #4 above. A rebuttable preslllnption 
that they have indeed done so is the default rule at issue here; how such a rule is chosen and 
applied is the subject of points #7 and8 below. 
75 Compare Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Jns. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2001), with 
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 221 F.Supp.2d 874 {N.D. Iii. 2002). In the first stages 
of this litigation, an insurer claimed that its policy was unenforceable because its alleged "agent" had 
exceeded the dollar limit of policies that it was authorized to issue on the insurer's behalf. This claim 
of "lack of authority" was held to call into question the existence even of the policy's arbitration clause~ 
and thus required a judicial determination. See text accompanying n.59 supra. The complaint was 
later du!y amended to allege that the "agent," ~acting with the knowledge of or in conspiracy" with the 
insureds, had "breached its fiduciary duty by issuing policies on [the insurer's] behalf that were commercially 
unreasonable and/or designed to benefit ... the alleged coconspirators." The court found this complaint 
analogous to a claim of fraud in the inducement-and held that it was therefore a matter for the 
arbitrators. See generally the text accompanying nn. 152~156 infra. 
76 Cf. Allied Sanitation, Inc. v. Waste Management Holdings, Inc., 97 F. Supp.2d 320(E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
This suit was brought as a class action alleging that the defendant had misrepresented its financial 
statements in the course of acquiring the plaintiffs' assets for stock. In the course of negotiations, the 
arbitration clause in the contract had apparently proven to be a stumbling block: Affidavits indicated 
that the plaintiffs' reluctance to agree to arbitration had been overcome by assertions that the defendant 
was "rock solid," with "a long and consistent record of reported earnings," that there would be "nothing for 
us to litigate over," and that a $200 million deal should not be "ruined" over "a standard clause like 
arbitration." The Court held that for Prima Paint purposes, such statements could not "fairly be viewed 
as a discrete attack on the validity of the arbitration clause" "in particular"~rather they "relate to the 
contract in general" and were "based upon the same alleged misrepresentations which underlie the 
[plaintiffs'] general attack on the contract." 97 F. Supp.2d at 334. The plaintiffs' petition to enjoin 
arbitration was therefore denied. The alleged misrepresentations do certainly seem to have played a 
role in inducing assent to arbitration. But even if the court proper!y understood how to apply Prima 
Paint, it might reasonably have been reluctant to do so~influenced both by the obvious dangers of 
attempting to reconstruct the bargaining history through self*serving testimony, and by the desire to 
avoid prejudging the more "substantive'' issues in the case. Characterizing the challenge as one to the 
arbitration clause itself would after all have required the court to adjudicate the fraud claim in its 
entirety. 
Many similar results cannot be viewed quite so charitably. In Gutierrez v. Academy Corp., 967 
F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Tex. 1997) an employee, six months after starting work, was asked to sign a document 
entitled "Waiver, Release of Claims, Indemnification and Arbitration." She later challenged tr.e agreement 
as "unconscionable," claiming that she had not been given time to seek legal advice and that there was 
an "inequality in bargaining positions" between the parties. As the court saw things, this was "not simply" 
the case of an arbitration clause contained in a broader conlract~the arbitration clause was instead the 
major event in an agreement "the whole subject of which is arbitration, release of claims, and 
indemnification." It seemed to follow-somehow~thai since the challenge was made to this "entire 
agreement," it must be decided by the arbitrator-for only where the challenge was "directed at 
particular clauses" would the matter be for the court. It is likely that the court had fallen victim to the 
fallacy (common in the Fifth Circuit) that under Prima Paint only defenses that are "restricted" or "limited" 
to the arbitration clause "alone" are for judicial determination---even where the challenge to the overall 
agreement would necessarily implicate the arbitration clause as well. See text accompanying notes 39~ 
45 supra. If not, the case is simply inexplicable. 
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7. The default rule of Prima Paint is an unremarlwble and eminently sensible one. 
Here is what follows from the argument to thi.s point: In the line of cases flowing from 
Prima Paint, courts resort to the slogan o[!'separabilit/' in order to treat an issue like "fraud in 
the inducemenf' as just one more discrete controversy between the JJarties~that is, in precisely 
the same way as other issues going more conventionally to "the merits." This way of seeing 
things inevitably leads them to summon up the familiar background rule---dictated by federal 
common law-to the effect that such issues are routinely presumed to fall within the scope of 
the conventional bro;-:td arbitration clause.n A consent to arbitration, then, allows thcnl to 
infer a willingness to <J.rbitrate any challenges made to the main agreement. Tite presumption 
is certainly reinforced here by a concern to avoid collateral litigation intended to delay or to 
derail the arbitral process. The FAA itself pennits this reading-although, as a relic fi·om a far 
more innocent age of drafting, the statute can hardly be said to make it obligatory. 78 
What is far more compelling than all. of that, though, is the extent to which Prima 
Paint's default rule seems justified as a rule ofintcrpretation. It should be obvious how fi-equently 
the issue of contract validity will be intertwined with the substantive issues underlying the 
"me1itsu of the dispute: Tite arbitral deterrnination that the parties unquestionably bargained 
for--say, the merits of a buyer's claim that goods were defective---could readily be preempted 
by a prior judicial decision-say, that the seller intentionally misrepresented that the goods were 
merchantable. A trial court that is allowed to pass on the latter issue would almost certainly 
have to determine the claim of substantive breach as well, leaving "virtually nothing left for the 
77 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)("any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration"). 
This usually goes under the rubric of "the presumption of arbitrability." See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 
Communication Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643,650 (1986)("where the contract contains an arbitration 
clause, there is a presumption of arbitrabilily in the sense that '[a]n order to arbitrate the particular 
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause 
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor 
of coverage"')(quoting from Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)); 
see also Rau et al., supra n. 14 at 718-720. 
18 The «savings clause" of§ 2 can (! guess) be read to mean that an arbitration clause is enforceable oniy 
if it forms part of an otherwise "valid contract," and § 4 can (I guess) be read to require a judicial decision 
as to the umaking"-not just of the arbitration clause taken in isolation~but also as to "a contract 
containing an arbitration clause." See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wise. L. Rev. 33, 83-
84. A more natural reading, though-perfectly consistent with the syntax-would instead see the 
"savings clause" as referring to the validity only of the agreement to arbitrate (a court being authorized 
to withhold enforcement in those cases alone where some neutral and generally applicable ground 
exists to challenge "the provision" for arbitration). Professor Reuben writes that Prima Paint renders the 
"savings clause" "inoperative" because "principles of law and equity to do not apply in arbitration 
proceedings"; the "rule against surplusage" compels a construction that would give the "savings clause" 
meaning "by holding that contractual defenses to the validity of the container contract would be 
decided by a court of law or equity." Reuben, supra n.4 at 842-43. This does not follow. The "savings 
clause" would certainly have meaning if ''contractual defenses to the validity of the container contract 
would be decided by a court of law or equity"-but it would equally have meaning if (as the Court held 
in Prima Paint) only claims of fraud inducing the arbitration clause itself were to be resolved by such 
courts, with other fraud-based challenges being decided by an arbitrator. That "principles of law or 
equity do not apply'' in the actual proceedings before arb.rtrators is simply irrelevant on e'rther reading. 
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arbitrator to decide. "79 In this sense our presumption may well be chosen for the same reason 
that most default rules are chosen-in order to "rnost closely mimic the hypothetical bargain 
that the parties themselves would have chosen in a completely spelled-out agreement" --or 
perhaps, the bargain that most similarly situated parties would have chosen--{)r at least, the 
bargain that it would be rational for such parties to have chosen ex ante.00 Here we can say how 
abundantly sensible it would seem to impute to contracting parties a preference for what has 
neatly been termed '\the practical advantages of one-stop adjudication.ll81 
The thrust of the doct1ine of''separabiliLy,'' then, is to recognize the probable competence 
of the arbitrators) by presuming that they have been entrusted by the parties with the power to 
make a virtually non~ reviewable decision on the issue of validity,82 As the Supreme Court has 
79 See Ericksen, supra n.47, 673 P.2d at 258. See also RCM Technologies, Inc. v. Bn"gnik Technology, Inc., 137 
F.Supp.2d 550 (D.N.J. 2001). The clause here provided only for the arbitration of disputes thai "arise as to 
interpretation" of the contract.........a clause the court characterized as "substantially narrower than the clause in Prima 
Paint." The court nevertheless compelled arbitration, because the claims of fralJd...--.based on misrepresentations of 
the net operating income of the company being sold---"almost undoubtedly will require interpretation" of the 
agreement; "the parties may calculate [net operatir.g income] differently based on different understandings of what 
constitutes an appropriate balance sheet accrual or deferra!," or ''vv'hether a particular accounting practice confonns 
with generally accepted accounting prindples"). Cf. Window Concepts, Inc. v. Daly, 2001 VVl. 1452790 (R.!. Super.). 
A reorganization agreement provided that when a shareholder ceased to be an employee or officer of the company, 
the company "shall promptly call alr' of the shareholder's common stock. It was possible that enforcement of these 
redemption terms was beyond the financial capability of the corporation--and a corporation is prohibited by state 
law iTom using its own funds to purchase its ONn shares ~ this woold cause an "impairment of capitaf' to the company. 
Did this defense of "corporate impairment" make the agreement "void ab initio"----and thus make the dispute 
"inarbitrable".........as the plaintiff claimed? Or was it simply a "defense to the merits of the dispute" available to a 
defendant after the plaintiff rests, as the court u~imately held? And is there any real difference between these two 
characterizaiions---other than in the consequences that flow from them? 
For the same reason, courts wili prefer to stay the litigation even of claims clearly not subject to arbitration, in order 
to preseiVe the primacy of the bargained-for dispute l"bSOiution process. In The Original Calzone Co., Inc. v. Offidani, 
223 F.Supp.2d 353 (D. Mass. 2002), a franchise agreement was so drafted that any dispute over money owed by the 
franchisee to the franchisor, or arising out of the franchisee's use of trademarks after tetTnination of the agreement, 
were to be decided by a court. "All other matters---including the validity of the Frandlise Agreement itself--shall be 
dedded by an arbitrator." The matters reseNed for the court were the subjeci of Counts 1-111 of the complaint, but "it 
would make no sense for this Court to deckle Counts I-HI until the arbitrator has decided that there is indeed a valid 
agreemenf'; litigation on these counts was therefore stayed pending the results of the arbitration. 
BD Rau & Sherman, supra n.69 at 115. 
81 Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd., supra n.67, [1993]1 Lloyd's L. Rep. at 469 ('or in other words, the inconvenience 
of having one issue resolved by the Court and then, contingently on the outcome of that decision, further issues 
decided by the arbitrator")(Hoffmann L.J): see also id. at 470 ("I would be very slow to attribute to reasonable parties 
an intention that there should in any foreseeable eventuality be two sets of proceedings"). 
82 Professor Reuben seems to assume that if the underlying contract is not valid, then the dispute is simply not 
"arbitrable" (by which is meant, I suppose, that the arbitrators should have no jun"sdiction). See Reuben, supra n. 4 at 
825, 838, 875 (under Prima Paint '~he traditional short answer, often shocking to initiates to the doctrine, is that the 
arbitrator decides this question of arbitrability"; by contrast, under First Options v. Kaplan, 5"14 U.S. 938 {1995), "the 
validity of the container contract would have io be allocated to the courts" because First Options "sets the default on 
the 'who decides' question with the courts, not the arbitrators"; "[a]fter all, an arbitration provision is just another tetTn 
in a contract, which, like any other, can only be enfcrced if the contract itself is enforceable"). But to characterize things 
in such a manner is the clearest case of begging the question. Naturally, once one assumes a priori that the 
enforceability of the underlying contract must determine the enforceability of the arbitration clause, all sorts of desired 
conclusions follow from the premise. But again, the true inquiry-to be resolved by the terms of the contract, context, 
and policy---is, what was the forum preferred by the parties to make this def:nitive determination of validity? lf it is 
agreed that the question of fraud is to be resolved by arbltrators, then an arbitral award granting rescission or damages 
may properly follow. Worse yet, Professor Reuben continues, the party resisting arbitration will find it ''virtually 
impossible" to have his contract formation challenge "heard and decided by a court of law," and so his challenge is 
"rarely l~eard and decided under the law, as (his] 'day in court' never, in fact, arrives." ld. at 850-51. Let me try to restate 
this somewhat more dispassionately in the form of a trcJism: "The 'fraud claim' is treated as one more discrete 
controversy between the parties, one that can be arbitrated to a final award in precisely the same way as the 
underlying merits." The grounds for treating this as self-evidently undesirable elude me. 
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recently rernindcd us in Howsam, it 011ly makes seme "for the law to assume an expectation that 
aligns (1) decisionmaker with (2) comparative expertise. "83 
8. Nevertheless the rule afPrimaPaint,just W<e any default rule, can still be reversed by the parties. 
There will inevitably be cases where an arbitration dat.k'lC is so nmTowlyor unusually written 
thatitis possible to convince a court that the Prima Paint presumptionh.-15 been rebutted- that it 
is fair to hold that there was no intention at aU to submit to arbitrators the question of fraudulen-t 
inducernt'nt.84 The tedious Battle of the HBroad" and "Nanow" Clauses-which has led federal 
83 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2002 WL 31746742 (U.S.). 
By contrast, I am not sure what would justify a contrary presumption. Professor Stone writes that "normally," if a 
contract is void or voidable, ''then its terms have no legal effect because there is not the requisite contractual 
intenf'; "presumably," then, any arbitration clause in the contract "is also void." Stone, supra n. 7 at 965. But of 
course, no background rule can simply be posited in this way without being articulated and rationalized and 
defended. The notion I am advancing here--of "separability" as a signpost to the likely scope of an arbitration 
clause--is also c.riticized (somewhat more cogently) in Craig et al., supra n.48 at 49-50: 
One might well retort, to the contention that the parties should be presumed to have intended that validity 
issues be finally determined by the arbitral tribunal, that it is more plausible to presume that the part1es intended 
to create a valid contract, and if that was not the case all bets are off. 
But "all bets are off' is an unfortunate metaphor that leads nowhere at all. Our search is for the appropriate 
background rule with respect to the proper forum for determining if a contract was valid. And in trying to find 
it, it makes most sense to assume what is most consonant w"1th the other undertakings of the parties, and with the 
overall structure of their deal-in the interest of minimizing the number of cases in which parties have the 
burden of "contracting around" an inefficient default rule. 
84 See, e.g., Welbom Clinic v. MedQuist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634 (7rn Cir. 2002)(Med0uist agreed to perform medical 
transcription services for the clinic, and after the clinic tiled suit for breach of contract and fraud, MedQuist 
moved to compel arb~ration; "the parties here did not ... employ the nearly universal language recommended 
by [the AAA] and referred to in coundess court decisions that would obviously have encompassed all of [the 
clinic's] claims in this case. Instead, the parties restricted the use of arbitration to the narrow question of tile 
amount of money [the clinic] owes MedQuist under the invoices": held, the clinic's claim of "misrepresentation 
of the amount [MedQuist] charged for its services" may constitute "constructive fraud" or a violation of the state 
Deceptive Sales Act, but "the district court is free to proceed to the merits"). 
208 Alun Scott Rau 
courts into semantic exercises of such exquisite subtlety, avidly pursuing distinctions invisible to the 
naked eye-is nothing more than a hapless judicial attempt to address this possibility.85 
It is therefore quite incorrect to say that Prima Paint "significantly restricted the ability of 
parties to have the merits of their disputes decided according to the rule oflaw. "86 ] ustice Fortasj 
unfortunate Language-which built on § 4 to conclude that the "statutory language does not 
pennit the federal court to consider claims of il-aud in the inducement of the conn·act generallyjj37 --
can hardly be taken literally. Surely we all realize that nothing said in any judicial opinion can be 
understood in abstraction fi-om the precise factual context, and fi·om the precise problem the coutt 
thought it was faced \Vith. So, we can try this mental expetiment: Imagine that parties happen to 
prefer that their arbiLTators not be empowered to decide claims of fraudulent inducement, and so 
they expressly provide that if the question is raised, it should l::e allocated to the coutt. Is it conceivable 
that a court could compel arbitration under§ 4 \\~thout first passing on the validity of the underlying 
contract? Would that be ((in accordance with the agreement of the parties"?88 
TI1at such arguments are rarely made can hardly be atnibutcd to a dearth ofincompetent 
or unusual drafting. It is) in part, a function of the ve1y strength of the presumption89 ~and in part 
also, a reflection of the fact that the "Prima Paint inquiry" has become so routine, so mechanical, so 
much a question of second nature to us, that we rarely notice the process we are going through. 
85 See Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458 (9m Cir. 1983) (clause mandated the 
arbitration of disputes "arising hereunder''; court accepted plaintiffs argument that this means "arising under the 
contract itself' and was not intended to cover "matters or claims independent of the contract or collateral 
thereto"); Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services Co., 42 F.3d 1292 (91h Cir. 1994)("any 
controversy or claim arising out of this Agreemenf'; held, misappropriation of trade secrets claim against former 
licensee "does not relate to interpretation or performance of this contracf' and is not subject to arbitration). 
Corrpare the variant language relied on in the following cases: Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Biystad Shipping 
& Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218 (2r" Cir. 2001)("any dispute arising from the making, performance or tennination" 
of this agreement: held, this clause is a "broad" clause, and '1o the extent a distinction exists between the present 
language of 'arising from' and [language in other cases of] 'arising under', we believe the distinction is more 
than just a semantic one, and only the latter phrase limits arbitration to a literal interpretation or performance 
of the contract"): Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress lnt'l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639 (71h Cir. 1993)("any 
disputes arising out of the agreement": held, a claim that challenges the validity of the agreement "is 
nonetheless a result of the Agreement and has its origins in if'): S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah 
lnt'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984)("whenever any question or dispute shall arise or occur under this" 
agreement; defendants successfully argued that a 'question ' may 'occur' under a contract even when a 
'dispute' does not 'arise' under" it); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840 {2d Cir. 1987)("all 
claims and disputes of whatever nature arising under this contract"; held, the phrase "of whatever nature" 
"indicates the parties' intent to submit all claims and disputes arising under the contract to arbitration, 
whether they be tortious or contractual in nature," including claim of fraudulent inducement). See 
generally Tatsuya Nakamura, "The Distinction Between 'Narrow' and 'Broad' Arbitration Clauses Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act-----Still Problematic in the United States," Mealey's lnt'l Arb. Rep., Aug. 2002 
at p. 20. 
w Reuben, supra n.4 at 849. 
87 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). 
88 Cf. id. at 406 ("no claim is made that Prima Paint ever intended that 'legal' issues relating to the 
contract be excluded from arbitration, or that it was not entirely free so to contract"). 
89 See Stateside Machinery Co., Ltd. v. Alperin, 591 F.2d 234, 239 (3'd Cir. 1979): 
[A]ppellants read Prima Paint as permitting evidence to be introduced in the district court that the 
parties to the contract did not in fact intend the arbitration clause to cover claims of fraud in the 
inducement of the contract generally. Assuming arguendo that the Arbitration Act and Prima Paint do 
permit a court to consider evidence that arbitration of such claims was not intended by the parties, we 
rule that appellants have failed to satisfy their heavy burden of proving an intent not to arbitrate. 
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While most presumptions tend to be "sticky, ''90 this seems even less likely than other "scope of the 
arbitration clause" questions to lise to the level of consciousness. To court.~, attomeys, and academics 
alike, Prirna Paint does not really seem to be just a "presumptionn~stillless does it seem to be an 
individualized factual inquity~itrather has the feel of a "doctrine/' a "rule oflaw. 11 
9. Void, Schmoid 
I do like using the phrase 11void abinitio."91 I like the gravitas that it impart<; to an argument, 
and I like the way it makes me feel-like a substantial person, a keeper of the sacred mysteries, a 
lineal descendent of Coke and Blackstone. I only ""sh I could do so ""th a straight face. I orJy ""sh 
it had some relevance to this (or indeed any) problem. But alas it doesn't. 
It's not as if this L'l generally recognized. TI1e distinction between container contracts that 
arc "void," and those that are merely "voidable"-the latter supposedly bcir:1g the true domain of 
Prima Paint--has settled comfortably into our Gl<>e law; the inevitable corollmy secm5 to be that ifby 
contrast a court can find the container contract to l-x: "void," "there is obviously no valid arbitration 
provision.''9Z At times one runs across other classifications that seem to l:e getting at the same thing) 
90 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism," 99 Yale LJ. 611, 625-626 
(1989)("legal Rules Often Have Flypaper Effects"); Rau & Sherman, supra n.69 at 116~117 (for many 
reasons, "where the law initially places a presumption will be critical in determining whether a reallocation 
of contract rights is possible"). 
91 See Baron, supra n.68 at 181-184; Note, Has Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act Gone Too Far?: 
Enforcing Arbitration Clauses in Void Ab Initio Contracts, 86 Marquette L Rev. 581 (2002). 
s2 Silver Dollar City, Inc. v. Kitsmiller Construction Co., Inc., 874 S.W.2d 526, 537 (Mo. App. 1994). See 
also Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26 (2"d Cir. 2001)(!he "distinction 
between void and voidable contracts" "may have a metaphysical ring, [but] it is a useful distinction for 
present purposes"; a party afleging that a contract is "void" "need not specifically allege that the 
arbitration clause in that contract is void, " and is "entitled to a trial on the arbitrability issue"}; Sphere 
Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 221 F.Supp.2d 874, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2002)(claims that a 
contract is "voidable" go to an arbitrator, but "if a contract containing an arbitration provision is claimed 
to be void ab initio, the issue of voidness is to be resolved by the court before the arbitration clause can 
be enforced"); J.C. Bradford & Co. v. Vick, 2002 WL 538999 (Aia.)("the question whether a valid contract 
exists between the parties is to be decided by the trial court, not an arbitrator"; "we follow the reasoning 
of other courts that limit the holding in [Prima Paint] to 'voidable' contracts"); Local Union 1253, Weis 
Builders, Inc. v. Kay S. Brown Living Trust, 236 F. Supp.2d 1197, 1203 (0. Colo. 2002)(since "the 
doctrine of severability presumes a valid underlying agreement," we must distinguish between "contracts 
that are asserted to be 'void' or non-existent" an those that are "merely voidable"). 
In Borck v. Holewinski, supra n.49, a general contractor sought rescission "on the ground of mutual 
mistake" "because of allegedly unforeseeable difficulties encountered in construction," and the court 
enjoined arbitration: Since rescission would mean that the contract was "of no force and effect from the 
beginning," then it necessarily followed that "there can be no arbitration clause 'of the contract."' With 
some bluster and bravado-----or perhaps defensiveness-the court announced that it "[chose] the path of 
simplicity," "a by-product of the continuing search for consistency of result and simplicity of application 
of the law." 
As for the scholarly commentary, see Ware, supra n.4 at 133-134 (a "narrowed" separability doctrine 
would allow courts to hear arguments "that the parties' agreement is not a 'contract' because it is void"); 
Stephen R Goldberg et aJ., Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes 235 (41h 
ed. 2003)(distinguishing Prima Paint and First Options v. Kaplan, supra n.2, on the ground that "where 
a contract is void ab initio, an arbitrator does not decide the arbitrability question, but that where there 
is an agreement, even if it is voidable, the question of arbitrability should go to the arbitrator"); see also 
n.91 supra. 
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although! can1t quite be surc~-thc line dra\Vtl, for example, between a contract that is invalid 
and a contract "that has never existed at alL"93 
However sensible particular results may happen to be, all this-as an attempt to create a 
framework for dealing with the question of separability-seems sadly abstract and conceptual. 
1l1at the distinction between "void" or "non~existent" transactions on the one hand, and those 
that aremerely"voiclable" on the othet; is a time,honored one, has after all hardly prevented most 
of us from using these terms interchangeably-in most ca_<;es, in conunon usage, "voidable" 
implies little more than "the rlght of someone to declare void. n94 
A'1 we have already seen, even conLTactual defenses that are usually assumed to make an 
obligation merely "voidable" will sometimes clearly and necessarily taint the arbitration clause as 
well: Such is the always~convenicnt gun to the head; such also is the obligation assumed by a 
minm: 95 In both cases the party with the power of"avoidancen will presumably be able to resist 
go E.g., Societe Pia Investments v. Societe L & B Cassia, 1990 Rev. de I'Arb. 851 (Cour de Cassation 
1990)(agreement was neither signed, sealed nor dated, and was therefore invalid under the law of both 
Pakistan and France; "'in international arbitration, the indeoendent existence of the arbitration clause finds 
a limitation in the non-existence of the container contract");. id. at 860 (note Moitry & Vergne)("from the non-
existence of the [contract] as a source of contractual rights and obligations, the court inferred the non-
existence of the arbitration clause as well"); Eric Loquin, Note, 1992 J. du Droit lnt'l 170, 173 (in the Societe 
Pia case, "the arbitration clause could have no existence when the contract, which contains it, was itself non-
existenf'; "it is dtfficult to see how the parties could have bound themselves to arbitrate over a contract to 
which they had never consented"): Pieter Sanders, "L'Autonomie de Ia Clause Compromissoire," in Hommage 
a Fred8ric Eisemann 31, 34~35 (ICC 1978) (one must distinguish between the "invalidity" [nullit8] of the 
contmct and the "complete absence [inexistence] of the contract," where "the very existence of the contract 
is called into question"). 
See also Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136 (9"' Cir. 1991)(1ack 
of authority; "we read Prima Paint as limited to challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a contract-not to 
challenges going to the very existence of a contract that a party claims never to have agreed to"); Sphere 
Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587,591 (711 ' Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.)(lack of authority; "as 
arbitration depends on a valid contract an argument that the contract does not exist can't logically be 
resolved by the arbitrator"); Borck v. Holewinski, supra n.49 (mutual mistake; choosing "the path of simplicity," 
the court holds that "if there is no contract, there can be no arbitration clause 'of the contract"'): Sojuznefteexport 
v. Joe Oil Ltd. (Bermuda), supra n.57, XV Yrbk. of Commercial Arb. at 430 ("Borrowing Prospera's language, 
was the sale contract the baseless fabric of a vision, insubstantial (i.e., non-existent) or was it in the more 
prosaic language of the law, something which mundane lawyers describe as an invalid contract?"); Stephen 
M. Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems 11 (1987)("There is a distinction between 
the nullity of a contract-ab initio or, certainly, ex post facto-and its never having existed at all"). 
Cf. Carl Svemlov, What Isn't, Ain't: The Current Status of the Doctrine of Separability, 8 J. of lnt'l Arb. 37 (Dec. 
1991). The author asserts that "it is important to distinguish between agreements which have been validly 
entered into, the continuing validity of which is disputed, and agreements that have never been entered into 
... If the agreement was valid up until the dispute, it makes little sense to disallow it at that point." This may 
be an attempt to propose an extremely constricted view of separability-one which merely allows arbitrators 
to rule on whether post-formation events, like material breach or frustration, have given rise to a discharge of 
contractual obligations. If so, it is uselessly narrow; if not, I have no idea what it could posslbly mean and do 
not propose to spend a lot of time worrying about it. 
S1 See Abraham J. Levin, The Varying Meaning and Legal Effect of the Word "Void," 32 Mich. L. Rev. 1088, 
1108-1109 (1934). 
ss Deputy v. Stapleford & Willis, 19 Cal. 302 (1861)(owner of real estate was "imprisoned, chained to the floor 
by the leg, manacled, hung two or three times, whipped with a raw hide ... and threatened with death by 
hanging unless he executed the deed": held, the deed, "though procured by fraud and duress, was only 
voidable"); Guenter Treitel, The Law of Contract 375 (101h ed. 1999); cf. UCC § 3-305 comment 1 (for 
purposes of determining the rights of a hoider in due course, duress "is a matter of degree"; an instrument 
"signed at the point of a gun is void, even in the hands of a holder in due course," while one signed "under 
threat to prosecute the son of the maker for theft may be merely voidable, so that the defense is cut off'). 
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having his case sent to arbitration. At the same time, contracts entered into without authority-
or tainted by misunderstanding, mutual mistake, or excessive uncertainty of tenns----or that do 
not satisfy statutory formalities-would all most naturally be termed "void," or at least ''non-
existcnt.96 See text accompanyingnn. 48, 59-61 supra. See also 1ieitel, supra n.95 at 2 70, 342 
(fundamental mistake may render a contract "void ab initio"). In a number of states oral 
contracts coming within the local statute offnmds are declared to be "void," e.g., N.Y. Gen. 
Oblig. §§ 5-701, 5-703; Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 241.02; c£ Roberts v. Tennell, 19 Ky. 247 (1826): 
And yet here the parties still might reasonably have prefened to see these defenses-
and thus the existence of the underlying contractual obligation-resolved in arbitration, and 
their choice to do so would certainly be respected.97 
So for our present purposes "void" or "voidable" arc words of no explanatory power 
whatever. ·ntis is simply alxmt the contractual allocation of decisionmaking authority. Returning 
to point #1 above: If we can merely find-unburdened by any a priori baggage-a willingness 
to arbitrate, we can draw the usual inferences about the agreed scope of arbitral power.98 
Now choosing whether to place ;,1 transaction in the proper pigeon-hole-whether of 
uvoidness" or of"voidability"-is often assumed to be the proper way to go about resolving 
certain concrete problems: For example, the classification has traditionally been thought 
helpful when one is trying ro strike the proper balance with respect to 
96 See text accompanying nn. 48, 59-61 supra. See also Treitel, supra n.95 at 270, 342 (fundamental 
mistake may render a contract ''void ab initio"). In a number of states oral contracts coming within the 
local statute of frauds are declared to be "void," e.g., N.Y. Gen. Oblig. §§ 5-701, 5-703; Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 241.02; cf. Roberts v. Tennell, 19 Ky. 247 {1826): 
In many cases coming within the purview of the statute against frauds and perjuries, the legal effect will 
indeed be the same as if it had declared the promise or contract void. This wiil be the case in all 
instances where the promise or contract remains executory on both sides, and an action is brought to 
enforce the contract, and in such a case, although it is not strictly correct, that the contract is void; yet as 
the same legal consequences would result from it, as if it were void, it would not be erroneous for the 
court to decide it to be so_ 
97 See generally point #4, text accompanying nn. 47-61 supra. 
98 An Ohio court got it almost exactly right in Roberts v. Bank of America NT & SA, 668 N.E.2d 942 (Ohio 
App. 1995): Here the plaintiff asserted a lack of consideration-and argued that since this "is a defect 
which prevents formation of a legally binding agreement between tile parties," the defense was one for 
the court. Disagreeing, the court noted that "the decisive factor is not whether the asserted contractual 
defense prevents formation of a legally binding agreement or renders the principal contract void ab 
initio ... but whether the defense attacks the effectiveness of the assent." (The opinion is however 
flawed in one respect-in that the court seemed to have in mind "the effectiveness of assent to the entire 
contract." As we have seen, assent to arbitration may be present even where a defect like lack of 
authority, misunderstanding, mutual mistake, or uncertainty of terms calls into question the quality of 
assent to the contract generally.) In Roberts, there was no doubt that the contract containing the 
arbitration clause had been "voluntarily signed"-presumably, although we are not told this explicitly, 
with mutual promises to arbitrate-and so the conclusion was justified that "a presumption arises" that 
"the parties intended to submit all disputes to arbitration, including those regarding the validity of the 
contract in general." 
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·the allocation of the Ii)k ofloss l:etween the victim ofvvrongdoinganclinnoccnt t}Urd parties,%! or 
·the allocationoftl1e burdensoflitigationl::etween tl1econn"actingparties tltemselves. ;co 
99 See, e.g., Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property§ 9.6 (3'0 ed. 1975){"the exception of voidable 
as distinct from void titles"; one who acquires personal property through fraud can convey to a bona fide 
purchaser a title superior to that of the ''true" owner--but not one who has acquired the property through theft); 
see also UCC §§ 2-403, 3-305(a), (b) (the right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation to pay an 
instrument is subject to certain defenses of the original obligor such as fraud in the factum, "lack of legal capacity, 
or iilegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the obligalion of the obligor"); Treitel, supra n.95 
at 274 ("mistake as to the person" as completely "negativing consent"); Benson v. Brower's Moving & Storage, 
Inc., 907 F.2d 310 (2"d Cir. 199D)(employee benefit plans are placed by ERISA in a position "analogous to a 
holder in due course": the employer can still raise the defense that a collective bargaining agreement is "void" 
on the ground that he "was not aware he was signing a collective bargaining agreement," but he cannot raise 
the defense that it is "merely voidable"). Cf. Deputy v. Stapleford & Willis, supra n.95 (held, since the deed "was 
only voidable," a third-party vendee, "purchasing in ignorance of the facts, can hold the property"). 
100 There are two related points here: The supposed victim of fraud or duress will normally bear the burden of 
raising and proving the defense in order to "avoid" the contract. And in addition, his power to "avoid" or 
"disaffirm" the "voidable" contract may often be lost through unreasonable delay in asserting it. Restatement, 
Second, Contracts § 7 comment d. ("Voidable Contracts"; "Promptness of Election"); Restatement, Second, 
Contracts § 381 (power of a party to avoid a contract for duress "is iost if, after the circumstances that made it 
voidable have ceased to exist, he does not within a reasonable time manifest to t"le other party his intention to 
avoid it"); Lively v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 2002 WL 1380384 (Ga. App.)(insurance company "could be 
estopped from asserting the defense if it did not act promptly, upon learning of the fraud, to rescind the contract 
but instead treated it as valid and enforceable"). See also John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of 
Contracts 284-286 (4'h ed. 1998)(minors; "failure to make a timely disaffirmance" amounts to ratification). 
By contrast-where it is asserted that an agreement is "void" or "nonexistenf'-the burden of proof will apparently 
be on the party seeking to enforce the contract. ld. at 342; Boxberger v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 142 N.E. 
357 (N.Y. 1923)(plaintiff alleged that a "release" of liability was signed by him, "under misrepresentations of the 
defendant, as a receipt for wages"; held, since such fraud in the factum would "render the writing void at law," 
the burden of proof as to the validity of the release was on the proponent, the defendant). And, at !east in theory, 
there should be no need to promptly "disaffirm" obligations under a contract that never existed. See Ford v. 
Shearson Lehman American Express, 225 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. App. 1986)(fraud in the factum; if "the promisor 
actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual assent 
is lacking, and it is void. In such a case it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission"). 
However, even this dichotomy must be qualified almost to the vanishing point: For "void" or "nonexistent" 
agreements too can usually be ratified or affirmed-for example, in the case of an agent lacking authority, or 
a failure to comply with statutory formalities. And even a failure of mutual assent through mistake or a lack of 
a "meeting of the minds" can be cured by the willingness of one party to carry through with the transaction on 
the understanding of the other. See Cady v. Gale, 5 W.Va. 54"1 (1871)(agreement by husband and wife to 
convey the wife's land, void as to the wife, will be enforced as to the husband's life estate; "the doctrine has been 
long and firmly settled by the authorities in England, that where a vendor contracts to sell a larger interest in the 
real estate than he has title to," a court will compel him to convey such an estate or interest as he may have, if 
the vendee "is wiiling to accept such title and interest ... in full discharge of the contract, without remuneration 
or abatement"); 3 Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 698-699 (1960)(when a defendant successfully defends on 
the ground of mutual mistake, a court may say that the transaction was "void," and yet "if the defendant had been 
content with the agreement as made, in spite of the mistake, it is believed that he could have enforced it against 
the other party'); cf. 1 Basil Markesinis et al., The Law of Contracts and Restitution: A Comparative Introduction 
205-206 (1997)("right to 'save' the contract by agreeing to those terms which the mistaken party had in mind 
when initially agreeing to the cOntraci"): Restatement, Second, Contracts, § 33 iii. 2 (indefiniteness). And one 
can expect that in the normal course of things, continuing to perform or retaining benefits after being made 
aware of potential "voidness" will amount to a ratification, or raise an estoppel, or at the very least will make 
rescission unavailable. Cf. LCC v. Henry Boot & Sons Ltd., [1959]1 W.L.R. 1069 (H.L.)(despite possible lack of 
"consensus ad idem," contract treated as binding in the course of performance). It is on!y in the case of 
transactions actually in violation of positive law that such waiver or ratification may be impossible, e.g., Long 
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529 (3'a Cir, 1997)("Congress did not intend that the ratification doctrine be 
invoked" to enforce the terms of a release that is inadequate under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act to 
waive federal ADEA rights; court reached this conclusion without "address[ing] the void/voidable distinction"); 
accord, Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998)(~Courts cannot with ease presume ratification 
of that which Congress forbids"). 
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But this classificatory scheme is not functionally rela.ted in any way to the problem of 
separability: \Vhat courts have done over the generations~ when responding to the need to 
sort out the inevitable shambles that accompany aborted transactions--does not advance any 
policy that I can think of that touches on the division of authority between courts and arbitrators. 
1l1e familiar proposition that an arbitration clause may be governed by a different body 
oflaw than the container contract is presumably just a corollary-rather than a cause--of the 
doctrine of separability. 101 Still, there would appear to be no reason why parties may not so 
providc~and in intemational arbitrations, it seems to be generally assumed that this is precisely 
what they have done. 102 T11e law governing the arbitration agreement may be that of the 
arbitraL forum--often, after all, chosen preciseLy because it is perceived as having little or no 
connection with the parties or with the underly'ingtransaction103 --oritmightL:esome "intcmatiotk11" 
standard spun out directly fi·om the New York C' ...onvcmion. IC4 In any c:1se, it should seem petfectly 
natural th~1t tl1e validity of an mbitTation asl'l·eemcnt (under it~ proper law) need not at all b:: affected by 
the supr:xJsed invalidity or "non~exi"itence" of a container contTact that L<; subject to a qt tit.e different lcgctl 
wl See Schwebel, supra n.93 at 6 fn.4: cf. id. at 22¥23 & fn. 37 (the rules for determining the law 
applicabie to the arbitration agreement contained in art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention may "by 
implication" "sustain severability"). 
102 Thus the usual, and sens':ble, presumption is that the ord'1nary choice-of-law clause-a stipulation of 
the "substantive principles" to govern the merits of the dispute-should not be construed as a selection 
of the law determining the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, or "ihe State's allocation of 
power between alternative tribunals," Rau, supra n.26 at 247-261, discussing Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
103 
"Parties' freedom of choice includes freedom to choose different systems of law to govern different 
aspects of their relationship." XL Ins. Ltd. v. Owens Corning, [2000]2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 500, 506 (Q.B. Com. 
Ct.). Here a choice-of-law clause called for the application of New York iaw, but the arbitration was to be 
held in London. It was argued that under American law, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable 
because it was not "signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters"-a requirement that 
some American courts (I believe incorrectly) have found in the New York Convention. The English court 
concluded nevertheless that "the parties chose English law to govern . the formal validity of the 
arbitration clause and the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal"-noted that the arbitration clause in 
question 'undoubtedly satisfies" the "less stringent" provisions of English law-and issued an injunction 
restraining the plaintiff from proceeding with litigation in Delaware "at least until the outcome of the 
arbitration." 
See also Craig et al., supra n.48 at 52-54 ("Given the fact that the law applicable to the arbitration clause 
is rarely the subject of a specific stipulation, it is hardly surprising to find that most national court 
decisions under the New York Convention have applied the law of the country where the award was 
rendered"): Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration: Commentary and Materials 110-111 (2"" 
ed. 2001 )("explained as an implied choice of law by the parties (through their selection of the arbitral 
situs")); cf. Redfern & Hunter, supra n.59 at 75-80 ("The validity of the arbitration agreement ... [may well 
be determined under a law that is] different from that which governs the substantive issues in dispute; 
and it may also be different from the law which governs the arbitration itself-the lex arbitri"), 
104 See Ledee v. Ceramiche Rag no, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1 '1 Cir. 1982)(the New York Convention commands 
states to enforce an arbitration agreement unless it is found to be "null and void," and that "clause must 
be interpreted to encompass only those situations-such as fraud, mistake, duress and waiver-that can 
be applied neutrally on an internationa! scale"); see generally Paul D. Friedland & Robert N. Hornick, 
The Relevance of International Standards in the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements Under the New 
York Convention, 6 Amer. Rev. of lnt'l Arb. 149 (1995)(the New York Convention "sets forth an autonomous 
international standard for assessing arbitration agreements": several American courts "have applied 
international law principles either directly or indirectly through application of an 'internationalized 
federal law"'). 
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regimc. 105 So it is barely worth a second though.t--itisnotcvcnapmadox-to find th1.t arbin-atorsmight 
well have the final word to the effect that the overaU contract-in which the arbitration clause is 
emL"edded-Ls m1.d h.:.ts been fium the beginning under it<i OWitproper lavv; a nullity. 105 
10. 171£ suptosed "illegality" of a contract, too, docs orrle more tlum preseru the u:;ual problem of 
1
'se[xtrability." 
TI1e deal entered into by thepartiesVvillofi:en mn afoul ofSCJmercgulatory statute-to L::'lke wh,tt 
are perhaps the most common examples in tb.e rep:xts, a consumer loan may be chcillenged as usrnious, 
or a contractor may have neglected to obtain the requisite state license. Here too it will tc routinely 
assetted that the failure to complywithstate law renders d1e entire mms:.'ICtion 1'void' '107 or ''nonexi':itent.'' 100 
And here too such epithets will prove spectacularly unhelpful. Here, as before, it seems quite possible to 
presume a \villingncss toenu·ustsuch detennination<; to m-bi11c1tors chosen by the parties cl>emselves. 1m 
ws Sanders, supra n.93 at40-41; ICC Award No. 1507 (1970), reproduced in 101 J. du Droit lnt'/913 (1974} (even 
if it is conceded that the substantive law applicable to the merits was the law of Germany, "it does not in any way 
follow that the validity of the arbitration clause should be judged on the basis of the formal requirements of 
German law"; instead, the validity of the arbitration clause is governed by "the law in force at the arbitral situs," 
which was France); Loquin, supra n.93 at 172 (in the Societe Pia case, supra, the law of Pakistan should govern 
the container contract "on the grounds that this was the place both of execution and performance"; however, by 
contrast the arbitration clause "could escape the application of Pakistani law'' and, "taking into account the place 
where the award was rendered, French law should apply to govern the clause's validity")(my translations). 
\OO See Bam, supra n.103 at 68 ("a Catch-22 tum"). 
'
07 E.g., Nature's 10 Jewelers v. Gunderson, 648 N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 2002)(franchise agreement, which was 
entered into several months after the franchisor's registration with the state Division of Securities had expired, 
was ''void, not voidable," and so the franchisor cannot "benefit from the arbitration clause in the illegal contracf'); 
RP.T. of Aspen, Inc. v. Innovative Communications, Inc., 917 P.2d 340 (Colo. App. 1996)(defendant argued 
that "there was no agreement to arbitrate because the Contract violated Colorado antitrust laws and was 
therefore void"; held, case remanded ''for an express determination of whether the Contract violates the 
Colorado antitrust laws"; ''while antitrust laws may, in appropriate cases, be determined by an arbitrator, when the 
legality of a contrac.:t is under scrutiny, that issue must be decided by the court''); Green v. Mt. Diablo Hospital 
Dis!., 254 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. App. 1989)(allegations of illegality, if proved, "would render the entire contract 
void" and so the petition to compel arbitration was properly denied). 
108 E.g., Alabama Catalog Sales v. Harris, 794 So.2d 312 (Ala. 2001)(plaintiff alieged that the defendants had 
violated state law by making "i!legal payday loans" and charging usurious interest; held, since the plaintiff 
"challenges the very existence of the contracts," Prima Paint is "inapplicable" and the trial court "must decide the 
ultimate question relating to the legality and enforceability of the contracts"). 
Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So.2d 121 (Fla. App. 2000), also held that it was error for the trial 
court to stay litigation without ''first determin[ing] whether the contract was illegal under· the usury statutes": "A 
party who alleges and offers colorable evidence that a contract is illegal cannot be compelled to arbitrate the 
threshold issue of the existence of the agreement to arbitrate"; a court's failure to decide the question of illegality 
"cou!d breathe liTe into a contracf' that violates state law. However, a convenient alternative rationale could be 
found for this holding--the narrow arbitration clause at issue, limited to "any controversy arising under this 
Agreement," was thought to be simply "not broad enough to encompass a usury violation." 
109 See, e.g., Nuclear Electric Ins. Ltd. v. Central Power & Light Co., 926 F.Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Texas 
Insurance Code rendered "unenforceable" any contract of insurance entered into by an unauthorized insurer; 
held, since "the claim of unenforceability does not specifically relate to the arbitration provision" but to "the 
entire policy," any claim that the policy is rendered unenforceable under Texas law "must be submitted to the 
arbitrator"): Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11 1h Cir. 2002)(ptaintiff claimed that "check advance" 
transactions were "void ab initio" under state law because the defendant had made ''loans , . without the 
requisite license and at usurious rates of interesf'; held, since these "allegations of illegality go to the deferred 
payment transactions generally, and not to the arbitration agreement specifically, it would appear that, under 
Prima Paint, an arbitrator should decide those questions"). 
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a. To begin with, the question of the ulegaliL-y 11 of the underlying contract (like many 
questions of contract validity) will often be closely entangled with or even indistinguishable 
frorn the "merits"-to the point, indeed, that even posing the question in term'l of"illegality" 
is likely to seem tendentious. Here are a few telling examples of this point: 
· The parties entered into a contract for the sale of gas belonging to the state of 
Louisiana; the seller, naturally, wanantecl title to the gas. The buyer later resisted arbitration of 
a dispute: It argued that the seller h<1d failed to comply with Louisiana law requiring that 
contracts to sell the state's gas be approved by certain state officials and that public bid procedures 
be fOllowed-and that this failure made the parties' contract ''void as never having been 
entered into." But the court found this assertion "indcvant" to "the fTeely agreed arbitration 
provision''-after aU, "the worst result" of any defect in the agreetnent would simply be the 
seller's "inability to perfonn," in breach of contract. 1 w 
·The parties entered into a time charter for a vessel, which the disponen.t owner had 
himself originally chartered from the registered owner. The charterer accepted tender of the 
vessel, but it later turned out that the registered owner \vas controlled by the govemment of 
Cuba. The charterer resisted arbitration, atleging that the charter was jjnull and void" under 
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations-and that "since the charter agreement is void ab 
initio, the arbitration agreement contained therein must also be voidab initio"; the charterer 
also claimed that he had been unaware of the vessel's Cuban connection, which the disponent 
owner had fraudulently concealed. A rhetorical question: Who is best qualified to unravel 
this aborted venture and to reconstruct the parties' allocation of risks-to pass, for example, on 
the disponcnt owner's claim for restitution or the charterer's claim for breach of warranty or 
fraud? 111 
·The parties entered into a franchise agreement involving a license of the franchisor's 
trade name for use in the franchisee's accounting practice. The franchisee later learned that 
the state Board of Public Accountancy had taken disciplinary action again ... 'it other hanchisees 
for operating an accounting practice under a trade name, in violation of state law. After the 
franchisor unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a favorable ruling from the Board, the franchisee 
stopped using the trade name, and notified the franchisor that he would not continue under 
the agreement. Litigation ensued-the fi:anchisor claiming recove1-y for services it had provided, 
and the franchisee seeking a judgment that he was free frorn any further liability under the 
agreement. The franchisee argued that to compel arbitration would be "improper" since it 
no Mesa Operating Limited Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238 (511' Cir. 1986). 
111 Belship Navigation, Inc. v. Sealift, Inc., 1995 WL 447656 (S.D.N.Y)(held, motion to compel arbitration 
granted; the charterer "does not dispute the fact that the parties reached an overall agreement containing 
an agreement to arbitrate, nor does it argue that it was deceived or coerced into agreeing to the 
arbitration clause"). Cf. Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters 22 {1993)("Where the contract is prohibited 
by statute a party ignorant of the facts which give rise to the prohibition may be entitled to recover 
damages for breach of a collateral warranty that the contract is legal"). 
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would amount ''in essence)) to the court "effcctuat[ ing] an illegal agreement.)' 112 But isn't it 
clear that what is masquerading here-for strategic or rhetorical purposes-as (!illegality," 
amounts to little more than the issue of whether contractual obligations have been discharged 
on the ground of a failure of consideration? 113 
·A health insurance policy imposed an additional $2000 deductible for maternity 
benefits. Claiming that this provision constituted (I illegal discrimination against women11 in 
violation oflaw, the insured claimed additional pregnancy ancl 1'wcll baby care benefits" from 
the insurer; she later brought suit alleging a violation of various state statutes as well as a breach 
of the con traces implied ucovenant of good faith and fair dealing." 114 Under the contract any 
dispute as to benefits or coverage had to be submitted to binding arbitration. Understandably 
enough, the insured did not actually urge that the insurance policy itself was "void" or "illegal"-
but at the same time she tried to assert that arbitration should not be compelled because the 
allegedly discriminatmy deductible provided (in the words of the local arbitration statute) 
''grounds [that] exist, . , to revoke" the agreement. 1 15 
·A company cormacted with a city to install its equipment at one of the ciLy's wastewater 
treatment plants. The city later took the position that the contractor was required to have a 
state contractor's license to petform this work-and rlY1tsincc it wa<; an "unlicensed contractor,)) 
the contract "wa<; void as against public policy." On this basis the contractor's motion to compel 
arbitration was denied. 116 Note, though, that in addition to this: 
112 Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Services Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5'h Cir. 1987)("The f1aw in the 
argument is that the legality of the contract has not yet been decided"; held, district court's order staying 
litigation and compelling arbitration affirmed). 
m Cf. 13 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1255 (interim ed. 2002)("if the promisor has not 
received and is not going to receive the agreed equivalent of his own performance, he will not be 
required to perform at aiL There is a failure of consideration, even though there is no breach of contract 
... for the reason that performance has become impossible without fault"); First Nal'l Bank of Belfield v. 
Burich, 367 N.W.2d 148 (N.D. 1985)(defendant did not plead failure of consideration as an affirmative 
defense; however, his "defense of and counterclaim for breach of contract were so similar in substance 
to the affirmative defense of failure of consideration as to provide adequate notice of these issues and 
prevent any surprise at trial"). 
114 Wolitarsky v. Blue Cross of California, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 631 (Cal. App. 1997). The plaintiffs claim 
was for the amount of the $2000 deductible, plus treble damages as provided in the state's Unruh Civil 
Rights Act, Civ. Code§ 51. The plaintiff had also relied on §1365.5(b) of the state's Health and Safety 
Code, which provided that "the benefits or coverage of any contract shaH not be subject to any" 
limitations, exclusions, or deductibles because of gender, except for "premium, price, or charge 
differentials" "when based on objective, valid, and up-to-date statistical and actuarial data." 
115 ld. (held, when "the alleged illegality goes to only a portion of the contract (that does not include the 
arbitration agreement), the entire controversy, including tile issue of illegality, remains arbitrable"); Cal. 
Code Civ. Proc. § 1281. 
116 Micronair, !nc. v. City of Winter Haven, 800 So.2d 622 (Fla. App. 2001 W1f the trial court finds [the 
contractor] was required to have a contractor's license and it did not have one, the contract is void as 
against public policy. In that case, the trial court should lift the stay of litigation and allow the suit to 
proceed"); cf. Fla. Stat.§ 489.128 ("As a matter of public policy, contracts. performed in full or in part 
by any contractor who fails to obtain or maintain a license in accordance with this part shail be 
unenforceable in law or in equitytt). 
l~verytl.ing You r~enlly Need to Know About "Separablity" 217 
0 the agreement obligated the contractor to have "a!l required licenses and pcrmits"-
so that his failure to do so was also a failure to comply with contractual commitments, and 
0 in negotiating the agreement, the conrractor had allegedly "fraudulently represented 
to the city that it was licensed to perform the work when it was not." 
Here then is another rhetorical question: Is it really quite sensible to have all these 
questions resolved by different dccisionmakers? 
b. More generally, the fact that performance of a contract may implicate a local 
regulatory statute hardly means that all obligations of the contracting parties arc necessarily are 
at an end. The ways in which a transaction may be tainted by possible "illegality" are infinite 
in their variety...--.--especially, as Lord Devlin wearily remarked, "in these times when so much of 
commercial life is governed by regulations of one sort or another, which may easily be broken 
without wicked intent." 117 In many instances the policies underlying a prohibitory rule may 
actually best be served by preserving the right of one party to the deal to assert a claim; 118 in still 
other cases, the strength of such policies may be outweighed by the harshness of forfeiture.: 19 
117 St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd., [1957]1 0.8. 267, 288 (1956). 
116 See Restatement, Second, Contracts,§ 179 comment c ("When refusal to enforce may frustrate 
policy"). See also Yuba Cypress Housing Partners, Ltd. v. Area Developers, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 273 (Cal. 
App. 2002)(real estate contract was unlawful because developer had violated the state Subdivided 
Lands Act; the buyer sought to rescind the contract but also sought attorneys' fees pursuant to a clause 
in the contract; held, since "the contract is voidable not void," "it is not one which neither party may 
enforce such that an attorney fee clause contained therein also is unenforceableH; in some cases 
"effective deterrence is best realized by enforcing the plaintiff's claim or allowing some other remedy," 
and to deny plaintiff attorneys' fees "would permit defendant to benefit from the illegality thai it 
created"); Cohen v. Mayflower Corp., 86 S.E.2d 860 (Va. 1955)(owner brought action against contractor 
and surety for breach of contract for waterproofing of buildings; held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed 
even though contractor was not licensed as required by statute; "to deny relief to the innocent party in 
such cases would defeat the purpose of the statute and penalize the person intended to be protected 
thereby"); Hedta v. McCool, 476 F.2d 1223 (91h Cir. 1973)(parties entered into an agreement for architectural 
services in connection with the construction of a building, although architect was not licensed by the 
state as required; after the owner terminated the contract "because of the disparity between the estimated 
cost and the low bid" received, the architect was denied recovery for his fees~but the owner was 
permitted to recover damages for the loss of expected use of the building use due to delay). 
119 See Restatement of Contracts, Second, §§ 178, 181 ("weighing the interest in the enforcement of a 
term" and the "public policy against enforcement of a term"); see also Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's 
Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic, 980 F.2d 449 (7111 Cir. 1993)(suit for the recovery of unpaid hospital 
bills for kidney transplants; plaintiffs did not have the required state "certificate of need' to operate a 
renal transplant center but "propoprtionality is the cornerstone of a rational system of sanctions," and a 
"forfeiture of $200,000 is an excessive punishment for an offense punishable by a fine of only $10,000 
and so lightly regarded by the state that it has not sought to impose the fine"); Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 
A.2d 113 (D.C. App. 1990)(breach of an agreement to share the proceeds of a winning lottery ticket; 
"permitting the unscrupulous holders of winning tickets to renege on their agreement and keep the 
winnings for themselves ... would only reward those who convert the property of others"); Citaramanis 
v. Hallowell, 613 A.2d 964 (Md. 1992)(1andlord failed to obtain license for premises as rental property 
as required by local housing code and so lease was unenforceable; court nevertheless rejected the 
claim by the tenants that ~they were entitled to obtain restitution of the rent they paid during their 
occupancy ... because the rent was paid pursuant to an illegal" lease); Gates v. Rivers Construction Co., 
Inc., 515 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1973)(contract of employment was entered into in violation of American 
immigration and nationality laws, and trial court held that the plaintiff alien was barred by the illegality 
of the contract from claiming recovery of wages due; held, reversed; the purpose of the law, to safeguard 
American labor from "unwanted competition," "wou!d not be furthered by permitting employers knowingly 
to employ excludable aliens and them, with impunity, to refuse to pay them for their services"). 
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<(Our cases warn against the sentimental fallacy of piling on sanctions unthinkingly once an 
illegality is found. "120 
So, for example, while an unregistered home~improvement contractor may generally 
not claim anything from a homeowner, recovery is nonetheless fi·equendy allowed when the 
defendant had also been holding himself out as the general contractor for the project. (And 
close scrutiny of the practical arrangements between the parties~to determine whether a 
defendant had in fact been Haering as a contractor or as a homeowner11~might be thought 
peculiarly within the province of an arbitrator). 121 Even in usury cases a blanket rule of 
contract invalidity is often replaced by a nuanced adjustment~in which, for example, the 
usurious interest alone is forfeited, a penalty imposed upon the creditor, and that amount then 
set off against any principal owed in addition to interest at a permitted rate. 122 The only 
interesting question, then, becomes the familiar one-whether there has been assent to have 
all one's rights and obtigations detennined by an arbitrator. 123 
120 Town Planning & Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Amesbury Specialty Co., Inc., 342 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Mass. 
1976)(Kaplan, J .)(plaintiff, who was not a registered professional engineer, sued a client for the wrongful 
termination of a contract under which the plaintiff was to prepare plans and do other engineering and related 
work toward the construction of an industrial building for the defendant; "if there was a violation here, it was 
punishable as a misdemeanor under the statute," and ''we have to ask whether a consequence, beyond the one 
prescribed by statute, should attach, inhibiting recovery of compensation"; held, no). 
121 E.g., Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 2001 WL 1705117 (S.D.N.Y.). affd, 306 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 2002)(held, 
petition to vacate arbitral award dismissed as arbitrator did not act "in manifest disregard of the law''). 
The contractor here agreed to fabricate and insta!l a "cast iron wrought iron and glass greenhouse" on the roof 
of Ms. Goldman's home for a price of $158,000, (To Mrs. Goldman, though, this was not a "greenhouse" at all 
but an "orangerie"-to be modeled on the "magnificent conservatory at the Essex House Hotel in New York 
City"). The arbitrator-who was an architect-was apparently influenced by the facts that Mrs. Goldman was 
herself a principal in a design and contracting company, and that she had acted as a general contractor for 
additional and extensive renovations of which the greenhouse was but one element. 
122 
"The arbitration panel found for Pitcaim on its usury claim, and meticulously calculated its set-off under the 
relevant Texas statutory and case law," Pitcaim Enterprises, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting, Inc., 45 Fed. 
Appx. 183, 185 (3rO Cir. 2002). Cf. Town Planning & Engineering Associates, supra n.120 at 712 ("In a case of 
illegality, serious but not so serious as to defeat the actkm, the plaintiff, though permitted a judgment, might be 
made to suffer a sanction through the reduction of his recovery to a quantum meruit less than the contract price"). 
123 See Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (41h Cir. 2002)(there is "a distinction between 
entering into a loan agreement with an unlicensed lender and not assenting to a loan agreement at all"; since 
plaintiffs allegations "of usurious rates of interest and non-Hcensure do not relate specifically to tile Arbitration 
Agreement," nor "do they underlie a claim that [plaintiff] failed to assent to the terms" of the agreement, they 
cannot justify the denial of a motion to compel arbitration); Siderurgica del Orinoco (Sidor), CA v. Linea 
Naviera de Cabotaje, CA, 1999 WL 632870 (S.D.N.Y.){that a contract of affreightment "was not the subject of 
a public bidding process applicable to state~owned companies as required under Venezuelan law" "may be 
relevant to the ultimate validity of the contract," but it does "not bear upon the understanding and intention of 
the persons who negotiated" the contract; IT'Dtion to compel arbitration granted); Lawrence v. Comprehensive 
Business Services Co., supra n.112, 833 F.2d at 1162 ("the Lawrences do not contend that the agreement 
did not allow the arbitrator to decide purely legal questions"). 
A student note concludes that where lenders or contractors are unlicensed or unregistered, they 
necessarily lacked any "signatory power"-and thus "the power to compel the arbitration of their 
transgressions"; it appears to reach such a result by reasoning from the cases that deal with an agent's 
"lack of authority," see text accompanying nn. 59-60 supra. Has Expansion of the Arbitration Act Gone 
Too Far?, supra n.91 at 606-607. I need hardly point out that this classic example of mistaking words for 
reality widely misses the mark-since "authority" is never anything more than a surrogate for consent, 
and does no work at all where it is the "unauthorized" party who is seeking to compel arbitration. 
Everything You Really Need lo Know About "Separahilily" 219 
c. \X!hat seem5 to underlie so many of the 11illegality)) cases is the unarticulated notion that 
the enforcement of statutory policy is far too important to be left in the hands of mere arbitrators. 
But no rule that purports to govem "contract formation" can serve any longer as an illicit suiTogate 
for the exploded idea that arbitral competence does not extend to matters of'public policy"-
that ship sailed a long tin1e ago. 124 And where the relevant "policy" is that of a state, reserving 
adjudication for the courts obviously runs into the further problem of preemption-given that 
any presumption against arbitral julisdiction is impennissiblc as a matter of fcderallaw. 125 If there 
124 The Supreme Court has made it tediously clear that the FAA "provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to 
arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbttrability"; the standard rhetorical move 
is now the assertion that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submtts to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Mitsubishi Motors 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). The S4)reme Court in Mitsubishi "did not remotely 
suggest that some substantive issues are inheren~y outside the ambtt of arbitration, but only that an arbitrator cannot 
decide an issue rf there is a limitation in jXJSitive law-statutory or, of course, oontractua!--ujXJn his p.:mer to do so," 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1070 (D.C. Or. 1990)(a court therefore 
cannot "bypass the arbitration process simply because a public policy issue might arise'). See also W. lavvrence Craig, 
Uses and Abuses of Appeal from Awards, 4 Arb. lnt'l 174, 215 (1988)("1! is rare that as a defense to an alleged breach 
of contract tt cannot be claimed that the other party was guilty of a RICO conspiracy or has violated some other statute 
or mandatory effect, all with the intent of defeating arbitral jurisdiction'). It is extremely common to see fee disputes 
between attorneys and clients resolved in arbitration---even though lawyers' fees "are to an exceptional degree 
subject to public regulation and supe!Vision," so that "excessive" or "unreasonabte" fees are proscribed by disciplina!)' 
rules. The parties may come to arbitration through a pr&dispute agreement in the initial contract, through voluntary 
submission after a dispute arises, or in a few states, by rule or statute actually making such arbitration mandatory for 
the attomey. While it appears that rrost of the time arbitration is begun at the initiative of the client, this is by no 11"'€ans 
invariably the case. See generally Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attomeys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 
S.M.U. L. Rev. 2005, 2022, 2046 (1993):1n many cases, when allegations af attorney misconduct (perhaps inserted 
for rhetorical effect, or for leverage in the grievance process) are peeled away, a!l that will remain is a colorable daim 
that in light of the quality of the services rendered, the fee charged was an excessive one_ In such a case, an 
adjustment of the fee ordered by the arbitrators is likely to defuse the dient's sense of grievance and to appropriately 
resolve the dispute with some finality. Where more serious misconduct is present, the matter should not end there. But 
the more closely intertwined the questions whether the attomey has oommitted an ethical violation and whether his 
claimed fee is in fact justified, the rrore likely ~ is that an initial arbitration proceeding will generate useful information 
for the disciplinary process. 
125 See generally Alan Scott Rau, "Does State Arbitration Law Matter At All? Federal Preemption," in ADR and the 
Law 199 (151n ed. 1999) ("A newly-discovered, but relentless, 'pro-arbitration' policy has given rise to a federal 
imperialism that inevitably calls into question the legitimacy of all sorts of state laws dealing with dispute resolution. 
The lion is no klnger lying dovvn with the lamb; ~- has, instead, eagerly been passing around the mint jelly'). See also 
Nuclear Electric Ins. Ltd. v. Central Power & Light Co., supra n.109. In this coverage dispute between an insurer and 
an insured, the insured resisted arbitration on the ground that under the Texas Insurance Code, any contract of 
insurance "entered into by an unauthorized insurer is unenforceable by such insurer." This provision, according to the 
insured, meant that it could not "properly be said to have 'made' any arbitration agreement whatsoever." However, 
since under Prima Paint the claim of invalidity challenged not the arbitration clause itself but rather "the entire 
p:llicy''--to which the insured had ''wiilingly manifested tts assenf'-{he court held that this claim "must be submitted 
to the arbitrator." The insured, however, had also advanced what purported to be an atiemative argument-that the 
Insurance Code provisions constituted an "extemal legal constraint on the arbitrability of this dispute," thereby 
foreclosing the arbitration of the claims as a matter of law. This strikes me as being very much the same thing in a 
different guise, and rt was in any event rather easily brushed aside-the court pointing out that the "putative 'legal 
oonstraints' on the agreement to arbitrate originate from state law'' rather than federal law. Cf. Broughton v. CIGNA 
Heatthplans of Califomia, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 334 (Cal. 1999), holding that the state legislature did not intend that claims 
for "public injunctive" relief under the state's oonsumer protection statute could be arbitrated, and arguing that 
atthough the Supreme Court "has stated generally that the capacity to withdraw statutory rights from the scope of 
arbitration agreements is the prerogative solely of Congress, not state courts or legislatures, it has never directly 
decided whether a legislature may reshict a private arbttration agreement when it inherently conflicts with a public 
statutory purpose that transcends private interests." Whether this distinction is meaningfur.--.or indeed even intelligible---
is questiOned in Alan Sa::ltt Rau et at., Notes for Teachers, Processes of Dispute Resolution: The Role of Lawyers (3d 
ed. 2002) at V-72, V-73. 
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is a case just over the boundary, it must be one where the futility of waiting upon post,award 
review is uncommonty selfevident126-perhaps blended with the extra added ingredients of a 
n·ansaction malum insc, moran arbitral panel whose Bdelity to statutory policy seems dubious. 128 
126 The Court in Mitsubishi, supra n.124, famously warned that "in the event the choice-of-forum and 
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory 
remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as 
against public policy." 473 U.S. at 637 fn.19. However, the recent securities fraud cases brought against 
Lloyd's of london~in which standardized contracts commonly joined an English choice-of-law clause 
with a choice-of-forum clause giving jurisdiction to English courts-suggest that even this possibility may 
be little more than a hypothetical construct. See, e.g., lipcon v. Undervvriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 
F.3d 1285 (11 111 Cir. 1998)(such clauses will not be invalidated "simply because the remedies available 
in the contractually chosen forum are less favorable than those available in the courts of the United 
States"). A similar attitude has led some courts to suggest that even a failure on the part of arbitrators to 
apply U.S. antitrust law need not be fatal to the ultimate award. In Simula, Inc. v. Autoiiv, Inc., 175 F.3d 
716, 723 n.4 (91n Cir. 1 999), the court concluded that "even if Swiss law is applied to the dispute, there 
has been no showing that it will not provide [the antitrust claimant] with sufficient protection": "[R]emedies 
in a foreign forum need not be identical"; the test, said the court, is whether the law applied by the 
arbitrators "is so deficient that the plaintiffs would be deprived of any reasonable recourse." 
127 Such a case is the subject of Gary Born's rhetorical question: "If a band of robbers agree to divide their 
loot, and to arbitrate any resulting disagreements, does the separability doctrine insulate the arbitration 
clause from the illegality of the underlying contract?," Born, supra n.103 at 211; see also Solei many v. 
Soleimany, [1999] O.B. 785, 797 (C.A. 1998)("The English court would not recognise an agreement 
between the highwaymen to arbitrate their differences any more than it would recognise the original 
agreement to split the proceeds"). But even in such dramatic instances, deference to arbitral competence 
in contract interpretation may well be called for: To an advocate's hypothetical in which "a murder-for-
hire customer proclaims himself by seeking judicial assistance to compel arbitration," Judge Ginsburg of 
the D.C. Circuit riposted with a hypothetical of his own: Suppose that the parties had been using "a 
certain trade lexicon, in which othetwise ominous terms have an inoffensive meaning. It is precisely so 
that an arbitrator may interpret and apply those terms that the parties agreed to arbitration," and so a 
court should not "intervene before the arbitrator has determined what the contract means." National 
Railroad Passenger Corp., supra n.124, 892 F.2d at 1071. 
l 28 Cf. Harbour Assurance Co. (U.K.) Ltd., supra n.67, [1993]1 Lloyd's L. Rep. at 469: 
There may be cases in which the policy of the rule is such that it would be liable to be defeated by 
allowing the issue to be determined by a tribunal chosen by the parties. This may be especially true of 
contrats d'adhesion in which the arbitrator is in practice the choice of the dominant party. 
See also Soleimany v. Soleimany, supra n.127 at 800 ("ls there anything to suggest that the arbitrator 
was incompetent to conduct such an inquiry? May there have been collusion or bad faith, so as to 
procure an award despite illegality?"): Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 783 (7'1' Cir. 
1994) (Posner, J.)(arbi!ration clause may be enforceable even if the dispute concerns the validity under 
the antitrust Jaws of the container contract--especially "where as in this case there is no suggestion . 
. that the arbitrators are themselves a eat's paw of the cartel"). In the leading case of Durst v. Abrash, 253 
N.Y.S.2d 351 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd on opn. 266 N.Y.S.2d 806 (N.Y. 1965). the plaintiff sought a 
declaratory judgment to the effect that a purported sale of stock "was in fact a disguise for a usurious loan 
agreement." The defendant's motion to compel arbitration was denied-the court expressing a concern 
that otherwise "anyone desiring to make a usurious agreement impenetrable need only require the 
necessitous borrower to consent to arbitration and also to arbitrators by name or occupation associated 
with the lending industry." Yet a few years later, the Court of Appeals had little trouble in reversing a 
lower court that had attempted to follow Durst by "restrict[ing] the scope" of an arbitration and ordering 
that "the subject of usury [shall] not enter into the presentations or the decision." In this later case, it was 
the borrower who sought to compel arbitration of the entire transaction: In defending the creditor's suit 
to collect on promissory notes, the borrower had demanded arbitration and "sought to withdraw his usury 
counterclaim without prejudice to raise it in the arbitration proceedings." So the motion to compel 
arbitration was not thought to "implicate any of the policy considerations which disturbed the court in 
Durst." Rosenblum v. Steiner, 403 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. 1978). 
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But in the nature of things this seems like a tlivial concession, merely demonstrating, once again, 
how any clocninal proposition that is entirety unqualified is unlikely to be wise. 129 
d. Another lesson of the cases is how easy it may be-but how dangerous-to confL:ttc 
questions of"separabilityn and questions of the scope of review. It does not at all follow that 
entrusting the issue of contract validity to arbitrators under Prima Paint necessmily and in all cases 
entails giving them the final word. Review at some level to ensure that "public policy" is not being 
disservcd is of course a familiar phenomenon that has not been thought incompatible with the 
LTadition::li mandated deference to arbitral awards.uo See United Pape1workers Int'l v. Misco, 484 
U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (but only "where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public 
policy that is well defined and dominant, [and] ascertained by reference to the laws and legal 
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests"), 
An issue left open in Misco [see 484 U.S. at 45 fn.12 J now secrns to have been finally 
resolved by Eastern A~sociated Coal Corp. v. United Mine \X'orkers of Amer., 531 U.S. 57 
(2000): It now appears that it is only when the parties themselves lacked the power to 
accomplish a certain result by contract--say, when a party seeks to compel conduct that 
would violate some positive b.w~that their agent's decision to the same effect, in the form of 
an award, will be vacated. See 531 U.S. at 62-63,67 (labor arbitrator ordered an employer to 
reinstate a truck driver who had twice tested positive fOr marijuana; uwe must treat the 
arbitrator's award as if it represented an agreement between iemployer'] and the union as to 
the proper meaning of the contract's words," so "the question to be answered is not whether 
[the driver's I drug use itself violates public policy, but whether the agreement to reinstate him 
does so"; it was ctitical that neither Congress nor the Secretary of1l:ansportation "has seen fit 
to mandate the discharge of a worker who twlce tests positive for drugs"). 
129 
"Rau draws considerable comfort and self-satisfaction from his faith in temperate and clever lawyerly 
distinctions:' Tom Carbonneau, "Le Tournai Of Academic Commentary on Kaplan: A Reply to Professor 
Rau," Mealey's 1nt'l Arb. Rep., April 1997, at pp. 35, 39. 
'
30 See United Paperworkers ln!'l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)(but only "where the contract as 
interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, [and] ascertained 
by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public 
interests"). 
An issue left open in Misco [see 484 U.S. at 45 fn.i2] now seems to have been finally resolved by 
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Amer., 531 U.S. 57 (2000): It now appears that 
it is only when the parties themselves lacked the power to accomplish a certain result by contract-say, 
when a party seeks to compel conduct that would violate some posit'ive law--"·that their agent's decision 
to the same effect, in the form of an award, will be vacated. See 531 U.S. at 62-63, 67 (labor arbitrator 
ordered an employer to reinstate a truck driver who had twice tested positive for marijuana; "we must 
treat the arbitrator's award as if it represented an agreement between [employer] and the union as to the 
proper meaning of the contract's words," so ~the question to be answered is not whether [the driver's] drug 
use itself violates public policy, but whether the agreement to reinstate him does so"; it was critical that 
neither Congress nor the Secretary of Transportation "has seen fit to mandate the discharge of a worker 
who twice tests positive for drugs"}. 
The restrictive standard of review announced by Eastern Associated Coai is also consonant with our 
usual understanding that in most cases, after all, the parties can enter into "a bona fide compromise of 
an issue as to whether a contract is illegal," Soleimany, supra n.127, [1999] Q.B. at 801 
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·Judicial humility might well be at its height where the contested ~'legahtiesu are of 
peripheral social importance, and where the arbitrators seem to have made an honest ~ttempt 
on ((disputed evidence" to characterize the tran.'laction in the appropriate way. 131 
· In other cases it may be appropriate to engage in a more overt and explicit process of 
balancing--weighing the strength of the policy invoked against the interest in the finality of 
awards. In the course of doing so, one would naturally expect a court to calibrate the "level of 
opprobrium'' 132 that the violation of any particular statutoty rule would seem to present. 
131 See, e.,g., CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.2d 234 (fex. 2002). Arbitrators had awarded a contractor a 
valid mechanic's and materialman's lien on the defendants' homestead. The lower court nevertheless 
examined afresh the validity of the liens, noting that "homestead rights have historically enjoyed sacred levels 
of protection in our jurisprudence": It found that the contractor had fai!ed to comply with certain statutes-
requiring, for example, that the contract be acknowledged by both parties and filed in a timely fashion with the 
appropriate county clerk-and therefore refused to foreclose. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed, 
as it could not find that the award "clearly violates careful!y articulated, fundamental policy" or that the 
arbitrators had "completely disregarded" statutory requirements: 
A debt that indisputably arises from gambling ... should have no greater claim to judicial enforcement by 
confirmation of an arbitration award than by litigation. On the other hand, it is no more against policy to 
arbitrate whether a debt has arisen from gambling or some other activity rendering it unenforceable, as 
opposed to some legitimate activity, than it is to litigate the same issue .... These are the clearer ends of a broad 
spectrum of cases in some of which a court should not ignore the plain character of an award, no matter how 
the arbitrator characterized it, and in others of which a court should not be permitted to reassess an arbitrator's 
decision on disputed evidence regarding the character of the obligation. (emphasis in original). 
A broader argument for the homeowner--that the validity of the liens could not be arbitrated at all because 
"courts are the exclusive arbiters of whether the technical requirements for peliecting a mechanic's lien have 
been satisfied"-was brushed aside, with the sensible observation that the Legislature could not possibly have 
"insist[ed] on a judicial determination of technical issues ... while leaving the more substantive issues regarding 
the extent of performance and the existence and amount of a debt to arbitration." 
For a similar recent case, in which an exclusive license was challenged as unlawful under the Sherman Act but 
upheld by the arbitrators, see Baxter tnt'!, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829 (7\h Cir. 2003). The 
defendant's argument~that "arbitrators are not allowed to command the parties to violate rules of positive 
law''-was found ·~rue enough, but whether the tribunal's construction of [the agreement] has that effect was a 
question put to, and resolved by, the arbitrators. They answered no, and as between [the parties) their answer 
is conclusive." Ensuring that the arbitrators ''took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them" 
"is as far as our review legitimately goes." 
m See Westacre Investments Inc. v. Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co. Ltd., [2000] Q.B. 288, 314-315 (CA 
1999)(Waller L.J. dissenting)(the trial judge "narrowly came down on the side of upho!ding the finality of the 
award. !t would seem that if the case had concerned a drug-trafficking contract he might well have taken a 
different view but he placed 'commercial corruption' at a different level of opprobrium from drug-trafficking"); cf. 
Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd., [1999] 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 222 (Q.B.D. Comm. 
Ct.). In Hi!marton the contract was allegedly illegal under the law of Algeria, which was the place of 
performance, but an ICC arbitration was held in Switzerland. The arbitrator decided that "the Algerian statute 
in question constituted a prohibited measure of a protectionist nature, to ensure that Algeria maintains a state 
monopoly on foreign trade; thus ethically speaking, it could not take priority over the parties' freedom of 
contract"; the award was enforced. Ewan Brown, Illegality and Public Policy-Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
in England, [2000] lnt'J Arb. L. Rev. 31, suggests that for a different result in Hilmarton, ''the illegality would liave 
to involve a degree of seriousness such as corruption, fraud, drug trafficking, prostitution or paedophilia such as 
to merit the opprobrium of the English court irrespe<...iive of the Swiss law position." A similar list appears in 
Richard H. Kreindler, Aspects of Illegality in the Formation and Performance of Contracts, [2003] lnt'l Arb. L. 
Rev. 1, 2 ("overtly illegal contracts" ''whose subject matter or purpose is generally considered to offend 'public 
morality"'). In arbitrations govemed by the New York Convention we have become famiiiar, here and elsewhere, 
with the notion that an asserted "public policy" must somehow be more "fundamental," more "universal," than 
contingent local policies on which courts might insist in domestic cases. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas 
Co., Inc. v. Societe GEmerale de l'lndustrie du Papier (Rak!a), 508 F2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir. 1974)(only ''where 
enforcement would violate the forum country's most basic notions of morality and justice"); Ph. Fouchard et al., 
TraitB de !'Arbitrage Commercial International 1012-1015 (1996); Redfern & Hunter, supra n.59 at 444-446. 
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·But even a commitment to de novo judicial review need not completely undercut the 
utility of"separability. 11 For in many cases the qualities for which arbitrators are chosen-their 
special competence) perhaps) or their sensitivity to values shared by the parties-might be 
decisive in bringing an effective end to the controversy; 133 their "first look" might command 
acquiescence, or might for other reasons obviate the need ever to take up the question of 
11 illegality" at all. ))' 34 And in most cases, in any event, arbitrators might be expected to deploy 
13~ Cf. Agur v. Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (App.Div. 1969), appeal dismissed by 313 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. 
1970), in which a separation agreement provided that any future chi!d custody disputes would be 
decided by three arbitrators (inc!uding an Orthodox rabbi) "all of whom are to be versed in Jewish 
religious law." The court refused to order arbitration, noting that although such arbitrators "might well be 
appropriate for certain questions which could arise under the agreement, the exclusion of persons 
having other and as pertinent qualifications for tile determination of custody impairs the efficacy of the 
arbitration"~the court itself by taking evidence on the matter could "properly put into focus the expression 
of intent by the parties that Jewish religious law shall be given high place in the factors governing the 
custody of the child." It now seems settled in New York that custody matters may not in any event be 
arb"itrated as a matter of"public policy," e.g., Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 1993)("the 
court's traditional power to protect the interests of children cannot yield to the expectation of finality of 
arbitration awards"); in some other states, arbitration agreements may be enforced with the caveat that 
a "special" de novo review of the resulting award is necessary_ See Rau et al., supra n.14 at 779-780. 
Nevertheless even in this sensitive and highly regulated area of child custody, trust in tile 
technical competence of arbitrators, and a desire to avoid judicial involvement, may in fact combine to 
limit the scope of review. This will particularly be true with respect to the many quotidian and trivial 
conflicts that inevitably arise in the course of parenting. When a father, exercising his rights under a 
custody agreement, selected ice hockey as an appropriate extracurricular activity for his daughter, the 
mother objected, and the guardian ad litem appointed under the agreement "concluded that, because 
of the large time commitment required by hockey" and the need to allow the daughter "sufficient time 
to focus on school work,'' an alternative activity should be chosen. The court held that what it characterized 
as an arbitral award should be reviewed "only for gross error." Davidson v. Lafferty, 2002 WL 1943661 
(Alaska). 
134 Few things, after all, will quiet a defendant's "public policy" challenge quite as decisively as victory on 
other grounds. See National Railroad Passenger Corp., supra n. 124 (indemnification provisions of 
agreement were challenged as contrary to public policy; since it would have to ~ultimately decide" the 
issue anyway, the trial court concluded that "it would expedite resolution of this dispute for it to decide 
the public policy issue at once rather than first to compel arbitration"; held, reversed; "had this case been 
submitted to arbitration, and had the [arbitrators] concluded that the contract did not require Amtrak to 
indemnity Conrail for the damages in issue, the district court would presumably never have had to 
address the public policy issue at all"). 
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their talcnL'i orexpelience to provide useful insight or guidance to the ultimate decisionmaker. 135 
See) e.g. 1 supra n.l24 (usefulness of attorney-client fee arbitration to ultimate disciplinary 
proceedings); In the Matter of Connelly, 55 P.3d 756 (Ariz. 2002) ("the State Bar should await 
the conclusion of fee arbitration proceedings before initiatingfom1al disciplinary proceedingsn; 
"because fee arbin·ation detetmines whether a lawyer charged a reasonable fee and, if not, the 
amount that represents a reasonable fce 1 the award provides valuable infonnation for a fmmal 
disciplinmy hearing, if one follows"). Cf. Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood, 74 7 A.2d 
1017 (Conn. 2000). Here a law finn1s partnership agreement called for the forfeiture of all post~ 
retirement bcnefit'l if a partner engaged in a competing practice oflaw within three years after 
retirement. An arbitrator found that a former partner had lost any right to benefits under this 
provision, and the nial court confirmed the award. On appeaL however, the state supreme 
court concluded that the trial court should have conducted a de novo review, given that the 
award "implicated a legitimate public policy-facilitating clients' access to an attorney of their 
choice n-and that courts "have greater expertise and knowledge" in the identification and 
application of state policy. Nevertheless, even here~~"adher[ing] to the long~ standing principle 
that findings of fact are ordinarily left undisturbed upon judicial revicw"-the court noted 
that it would "defer to the arbitrator's interpretation of the ab,'Teentents regarding the scope of 
the forfeiture upon competition provision." 
135 See, e.g., supra n.124 (usefulness of attorney-client fee arbitration to ultimate disciplinary proceedings); 
In the Matter of Connelly, 55 P.3d 756 (Ariz. 2002)("the State Bar should await the conclusion of fee 
arbitration proceedings before initiating formal disciplinary proceedings": "because fee arbitration 
determines whether a lawyer charged a reasonable fee and, if not, the amount that represents a 
reasonable fee, the award provides valuable information for a formal disciplinary hearing, if one 
follows"). Cf. Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood, 747 A.2d 1017 (Conn. 2000). Here a law firm's 
partnership agreement called for the forfeiture of all post-retirement benefits if a partner engaged in a 
competing practice of law within three years after retirement. An arbitrator found that a former partner 
had lost any right to benefits under this provision, and the trial court confirmed the award. On appeal, 
however, the state supreme court concluded that the trial court should have conducted a de novo review, 
given that the award "implicated a legitimate public policy-facilitating clients' access to an attorney of 
their choice"-and that courts "have greater expertise and knowledge" in the identification and application 
of state policy. Nevertheless, even here-"adher[ing] to the long-standing principle that findings of fact 
are ordinarily left undisturbed upon judicial review"-the court noted that it would "defer to the arbitrator's 
interpretation of the agreements regarding the scope of the forfeiture upon competition provision." 
Where important statutory policies are thought to be implicated, it seems inevitable that arbitrators will 
increasingly be expected to furnish some explanation or rationalization that is considerably more 
elaborate than the naked awards common in domestic commercial arbitration. A straw in the wind is 
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998)(arbitrators denied relief despite "overwhelming 
evidence" of age~based discrimination; in concluding that that the arbitrators "ignored the law or the 
evidence or both," their failure to explain the award "can be taken into account"). 
Professor Posner has suggested that a desire to ensure respect for mandatory rules can best be 
reconciled with an interest in the efficiency of international arbitration by having courts engage in the 
"optimal strategy" of random de novo review-a strategy that would result in "arbitrators frequently 
respecting mandatory rules" (since they would "fear the possibility of de novo review"), and in courts 
refraining from invariably reviewing awards ("creating savings in congestion"). If parties are "not sure 
whether American courts will review arbitration awards or not-and if American courts occasionally do 
review arbitration awards-that would be a good thing." Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization 
of International Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 Va. J. lnt'l L. 647, 651~52m 667-68 
(1999). 
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e. And what are we to make, finally, of the sudden proliferation of cases in which 
contracts that forbid the award of punitive damages (or of attorneys' fees, or other relief 
guaranteed by statute) are challenged as being outside the permissible ambit of arbitration for 
reasons of "public policy"? The most appropriate way to treat such cases, I would suggest, 
follows directly il.-om everything that I have wlitten above. 
· Let's begin by considering a contract for the sale of textile goods; under the terms of 
the agreement, the buyer may not recover any consequential damages, and he may in no 
event recover anything more than "the difference in value on date of delivery between goods 
specified and goods actually delivered." Although the total purchase price was only $984, the 
buyer claims$ 7313 in damages, and the arbitrators award$3 780. Even a naked award of this 
amount might be explained by an implicit arbitral finding that the contractual limitation of 
remedies should be set aside as "unconscionable"--or that athe custom and usage in the textile 
industiywas such that clauses of this nature are never given effect." 136 
136 One can without difficulty imagine still other rationales that might conceivably support the award. 
The damage limitation might have been "waived." Alternatively~and particularly in the harsher days 
before First Options v. Kaplan, see text accompanying nn. 235-49 infra-it might be thought that merely 
arguing the point before the arbitrator "could be deemed as a submission to the arbitrator of the amount 
to be awarded," Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 287 N.Y.S.2d 765, 769N770 (App. 
Div. 1968), rev'd, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. 1969). It does not, finally, seem to have been urged that a 
$3780 award could be justified quite consistently with the contractual limitation if the arbitrators had 
found the fair market value of the goods to be substantially in excess of the purchase price on the date 
of delivery. 
In Granite Worsted the New York Court of Appeals held nevertheless (4-3) that the award should not have 
been confirmed, and that the matter should be "remitted to the arbitrator": While the arbitrator may 
indeed refuse to enforce the clause on such grounds, it was necessary for the award to "indicate that he 
has in fact deliberately and intentionally exercised that power so that judicial review can proceed 
without the need for speculation as to what has in fact occurred in the arbitral tribunal." 306 N.Y.S.2d at 
939. Even this weak ground for vacatur seems to have been bypassed in later New York cases, see, e.g., 
Tilbury Fabrics, Inc. v. Stillwater, Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. 1982)(the "mere possibility" that an arbitral 
award included consequential damages, "award of which was expressly prohibited by the contract," "is 
not enough to permit the award to be disturbed"); Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 
779 (N.Y. 1984)("to infer a limitation [on the power of the arbitrator] from the substantive provisions of an 
agreement . . .is to involve the courts in the merits of the dispute"; to the extent that Granite Worsted 
Mills holds anything to the contrary, it is overruled). 
Similar results will be reached in similar cases where a seller seeks before arbitration to "eliminate from 
the scope of arbitration those demands which seek recovery of consequential damages"; see Allen 
Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Dorado Dress Corp., 333 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1972)("[i]ssues concerning the 
applicability of the damage limitation clause, its enforceability in this particular instance, its validity, 
and any other issues concerning the question of the amount of damages recoverable in the face of such 
provision are for the arbitrator to determine"); United Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. lmo Industries, 
Inc., 1993 WL 43016 {Del. Ch.)(limitation of liability clause "in no way restricts the arbitrator's authority 
to decide '[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question"'; the "strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration .... would be vitiated" if the courts, "under the guise of defining the scope of the arbitration 
agreement, in effect decided the dispute''). Cf. Farkar Co. v. RA Hanson DISC, Ltd., 604 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 
1979), in which the Second Circuit chose to follow Granite Worsted Mills by holding that "the district 
court should direct the arbitrators to be bound by the limitation of damages provision unless in a 
separate determination expressed in the award they find the provision to be unconscionable." The court 
also made a separate finding that in the case before it, "the defense of unconscionability is not so clearly 
frivolous as to bar its consideration as a question of fact"; it is criticized for performing this pre-arbitration 
filtering function in ian R. Macneil et al., supra n.19 at § 15.1.6 ("lt would be better in such cases . 
simply to let ihe matter go to the arbitrator"). 
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·Now lees move on to a contract for the residential application of pesticides-here, 
similarly, the agreement limits the consumer to the exclusive remedy ofhaving the company 
"re,treat" the property, and bars the arbitrator from awarding "consequentiaC exemplary, or 
punitive damagcs.'li 37 If what I have written in sections "c." and "d." above is at all persuasive, 
then it follows that here, too, the arbitrators must have the power to determine the 
aunconscionability" of tltis damage limitation 138-and, if they choose to set the clause aside, 
the power to award damages for personal injury. 139 
·And essentially the same analysis is called f01; I think, where it is a f-ederal statute that 
appears to make particular remedies available w aggticved pbintiffs. 140 1l1is is in part, once 
again, a simple question ofhumcning arbitrators should they ever CiiLically assess a contractual 
137 Carll v. Terminix lnt'l Co., L.P., 793 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. 2002)(homeowners and minor clliidren sued 
for physical injuries suffered through the negligent application of pesticides; heid, "it would be 
unconscionable and against public policy to compel arbitration"). 
138 Cf. id. at 925 (UCC § 2-719(3), providing that the "limitation of consequential damages for injury to 
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable," "lends support to our conclusion"}. 
139 Cf. Smith v. Gateway, Inc., 2002 WL 1728615 (Tex. App.-Austin). Here a consumer ordered a 
computer from Gateway and, when it did not operate properly, unsuccessfully attempted to return it. 
The purchase agreement barred the arbitrator from awarding "special, exemplary, consequential, 
punitive, incidental or indirect damages, or attorneys' fees." The case was ordered to arbitration, and 
the arbitrator concluded {apparently in dictum} that Gateway's attempt to limit the award of damages 
and attorneys' fees allowed by the state Deceptive Trade Practices Act was "contrary to public policy" 
and "unenforceable." However, the arbitrator also concluded that Gateway had in any event not 
violated the OTPA~and so he merely awarded the consumer what was apparently the price of the 
computer, making each party responsible for its own attorneys' fees. The consumer's argument on 
appeal was curious-a rare exercise in abstract reasoning: Since the agreement in principle violated 
the OTPA, he contended, he should never have been ordered to arbitrate in the first place. The court 
inevitably disagreed: Ordering arbitration was appropriate because "the claims of unconscionability 
were for the arbitrator to decide"; most significantly, the court noted that had the consumer in fact 
prevailed on the merits of his DTPA claim, "the arbitrator might have awarded him the damages 
allowed" by the statute. Cf. Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F.Supp.2d 1071 (C.O. Cal. 2002){court found 
that a contractual limitation on punitive damages was not "substantively unconscionable," but noted at 
the same time that "if the arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitration Association finds that the 
iimit on punitive damages goes beyond the law, such a limitation will not take effect"). 
\ 40 To that effect see, e.g., Larry's United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083 (81h Cir. 2001}{group of 
independent retail grocers filed suit against wholesale supplier for excessive charges; held, "[w]hether a 
prospective waiver of punitive damages violates the public policy underlying RICO's treble damages 
provision is a matter for the arbitrators in the first instance when fashioning an appropriate remedy if a 
RICO claim is proven to the arbitrators' satisfaction, and we express no views on the issue at this time"); 
Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 300 F.3d 88 (1"1 Cir. 2002)(TILA; "[a]rbitration is the correct initial 
forum for the Thompsons to air their objection to the attorney's fees provision in the arbitration agreement"); 
cf. Greai Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3'° Cir. 1997)(sexual harassment daim 
based on state law, where employment agreement provided that arbitrator could not award punitive 
damages; held, "tl1e party challenging the validity of such waivers must present her challenge to the 
arbitrator, who will determine the validity and enforceability of the waiver of asserted state law rights"; [i]t 
would be anomalous for a court to decide that a claim should be referred to an arbitrator rather than a 
court, and then, by deciding issues unrelated to the question of forum, foreclose the arbitrator from 
deciding them"; Arkcom Digital Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 289 F.3d 536 (81h Cir. 2002)(terminated franchisee 
brought suit under state Franchise Practices Act, and alleged that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable because the arbitrator was prohibited from awarding remedies expressly authorized by 
the statute; held, "issues of remedy go to the merits of the dispute and are for the arbitrator to resolve in 
the first instance"). 
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waiver of damages and find it wanting. 141 To be sure, our earlier discussion of judicial review 
suggests that in many such cases there may be something more at stake-that arbitrators may 
actually be encoumged or expected to do the right thing. 142 But in any event, to say that parties 
cannot be sent to arbitration because 
0 Arbitrators, as mere "creatures of contract," "are not judges with expertise in 
interpreting the law"; 143 or because 
0 Compelling arbitration would "would amount to givinge{fect to a prospective waiver 
of substantive swtutOJy rights," 14+is quite obviously unacceptable-if only because the Supreme 
Court has time and again, over the course of two or three decades, routinely slapped down 
similarly distrustful assessments of the arbitral pnxcss. 
141 Cf. Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1061 (11 1h Cir. 1998)(Cox and 
Tjoflat. JJ.). Here an employment contract authorized !he award of damages "for breach of contract 
only," and barred "an award of other damages." Two of the three sitting judges found that the arbitration 
clause "includes Title VII claims within its scope"-but held that arbitration of such claims could not be 
compelled because the employee had been denied "the possibility of meaningful relief." One argument 
was to the effect that "if an arbitrator were to award [the employee] classic Title VII relief such as back pay 
or reinstatement, a court applying the FAA could vacate ihe award." But the preceding discussion 
suggests that this d'IC\um is totally misgu·1ded: Certainly to the extent that such remedies might be 
thought to be mandated by positive law, it would be error to vacate the award on the ground that the 
arbitrator had "exceeded his power." See also Smith v. Gateway, n.139 supra. 
'
42 Cf. Mitsubishi Motors, supra n.124, 473 U.S. at 637 fn.19: Although the parties' contract in Mitsubishi 
contained a choice-of-law clause calling for the application of Swiss law, the ICC's amicus brief thought 
it "unlikely" nevertheless that the arbitrators would apply Swiss law to tile respondent's Sherman Act 
claim, thereby wholly displacing American law; the petitioner agreed that the claims had been submitted 
to the arbitrators on the basis that American law would apply. Cf. Andreas Lowenfeld, The Mitsubishi 
Case: Another View, 2 Arb. lnt'l 178 (1986)("mandatory law" "cannot ordinarily be avoided by party 
choice of law" in the same way as, say, the law governing the extent of implied warranties, or the 
measure of damages for breach of contract). See also Spinetti v. Service Corp. lnt'l, 324 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 
2003)(provision requir'lng each party to pay its own attorneys' fees "runs counter to statutory provisions 
under Title VII"; cases like Great Western Mort·gage Corp. v. Peacock, supra n.140, "did not foreclose the 
ability of courts to examine public policy arguments"). 
143 Brief of Respondents. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL 144669 (U.S. Brief, *15). 
144 Brief of Public Citizen, Inc. As Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, PacifiCare Health Systems, 
Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL 133077 (U.S. Brief, *2); see also Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 
670-72 (6 111 Cir. 2003)(emp!oyment agreement limited punitive damages to the greater of $5000 or the 
sum of a claimant's backpay and front pay awards; held, "the enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
would require [the plaintiff] to forego her substantive rights to the full panoply of remedies under Title 
VII"). 
In State ex rei. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002), a consumer contract with an 
arbitration clause prohibited any award of punitive damages. The court found such damages "essential 
to the enforcement and effective vindication of the public purposes~ underlying state consumer protection 
law, held the clause "clearly unconscionable," and declined to compel arbitration: 
Obviously [the consumer] has no absolute entitlement to such damages, but he does under West 
Virginia law have a legal entitlement to them, if he can prove their legal basis. The question is whether 
[the retailer]-by placing limiting language in an adhesive contractual provision relating to arbitration-
may absolutely and categorically shield itself (and ·others) from an important sanction that is provided 
by West Virginia law for the benefit of the public. Our answer is that [it] cannot do so. 
ld. at 280 fn. 11 (emphasis in original). There is no indication whatever that the court even considered 
the possibility that the issue of "unconscionability" could be submitted to the arbitrators themselves. If 
this is not willful blindness, it must then surely be the result of incompetent lawyering. 
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It is in this last group of cases, however, where recent authority has been particularly 
incoherent. There are judicial decisions that take it as axiomatic that it is for a court to 
detennine whether an arbitratjon cLause contains provisions "defeat[ing] the remedial purpose" 
of a federal statute-and that where the answer appears to be "yes," arbitration cannot be 
compelled. 145 A11.d there is abundant commentary in which the same tired a priori assertion is 
trotted out in the guise of argument. 146 Indeed there seems to be something of a competition 
going on to flnd the most tendentious way possible of posing the question: To posit, for example, 
that a linlltation on statutory remedies amounts to "a limitation on the authmity of arbitrators" 
i.s naturally intended to suggest that this must be a matter for judicial determination-for what 
power can arbitrators have that is not given them by the contracting parties? And where the 
arbitrators do lack such "authority" to award the l-Ull panoply of statutory remedies, who but a 
court can decide whether the claim itself can be arbitratecl? 147 The notion that such a 
limitation on ren1edies thus implicates ((arbitrabiliLy" may even be buttressed by the fortuities of 
145 E.g., Paladino, supra n:141 at 1062 (Cox & Tjof!at, JJ.)(Title VII; "the arbitrability of such claims rests 
on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to court remedies"; a clause that 
limits remedies to "damages for breach of contract only" is therefore unenforceable); Gambardella v. 
Pentec, Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d 237 (D. Conn. 2002)(attorneys' fees: "[b]y denying [the plaintiff] access to a 
remedy Congress made available to ensure that violations of Title VII are effectively remedied and 
deterred, the arbitration agreement . impermissibly erodes the ability of arbitration to serve those 
purposes as effectively as litigation"): In re Managed Care Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989 (S.D. Fla. 
2000), aff'd sub nom. In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation, 285 F.3d 971 (11 111 Cir. 2002), rev'd 
sub nom. Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL 1791225 (U.S.)(RICO; the "prohibition on 
extra contractual damages prevents [the plaintiff] from obtaining any meaningful relief for his 
statutory claims"): cf. Ex Parte Thicklin, 824 So.2d 723 (Ala. 2002)(action for breach of express and 
implied warranties; "it violates public policy for a party to contract away its liability for punitive damages, 
regardless whether the provision doing so was intended to operate in an arbitral or a judicial forum"; 
therefore "enforcement of this portion of the arbitration agreement" would be "unconscionable"). 
146 See, e.g., Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration By Those With Superior Bargaining 
Power, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 857, 922 & fn. 375: 
[Prima Paint] does not mandate that the arbitrator determine if the arbitration clause restricting or 
limiting statutory rights violates pub!ic policy or is otherwise unenforceable. .The claim that an 
arbitration clause is invalid because it improperly restricts statutory remedies should be distinguished 
from the situation where the parties in the container contract exclude certain types of damages 
The reader will note how neatly the question is begged: It is only "the container contract" that excludes 
other types of damages, but the restriction of "statutory remedies" somehow necessarily implicates the 
"arbitration clause" itself. 
147 See Coddington Enterprises, Inc. v. Werries, 54 F. Supp.2d 935, 941-42 (W.O. Mo. 1999), rev'd sub 
nom. United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083 (8'n Cir. 2001)(RICO; "[t]he arbitrators will not award 
punitive, consequential, or indirect damages": this "is a limitation on the authority of arbitrators, something 
the parties can doubtless agree to---even if their agreement means that arbitration provides inadequate 
remedies and cannot be enforced"); Harding, supra n.146 at 923 ("a defense to arbitration based on 
public policy stemming not from the unsuitability of the claim for arbitration but rather from the 
unsuitability of the particular arbitral scheme crafted for determining the claim does indeed challenge 
the validity of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of the dispute"); Brief of Respondents, 
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL 144669 (U.S. Brief, *15)("The arbitration provisions in 
this case provide express limitations on the authority of the arbitrator," and so "the arbitrator cannot 
adjudicate whether the restraint is an impermissible limitation on the party's federal cause of action"); 
Terrell v. Amsouth Investment Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1233 (M.D. Fla. 2002)(contractual provisions 
"limit or preclude the statutory remedies in this whistle-blower case," and so the arbitrators do not "possess 
the powers necessary to implement the vast remedies available" under the statute"; accordingly, "this 
Court cannot compel arbitration"). 
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drafting-by the fact, say, that the offending provision is physically located in the arbitration 
clause itself rather than elsewhere in the contract. 148 Cf. Harding, supra n.146 at 924~25 
(criticizing Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 940 E Supp. I 44 7 (D. Minn. 1996), on the 
ground that it 11did not involve a situation where the parties in the container contract excluded 
certain categories of damages that could be recovered if a dispute were to arise; rather, the 
arbiLTation provision itself contained the conditions and limitations") (emphasis added). 
But if legal objections can thus be created and disposed of through the simple use of 
our cut and paste buttons, then surely we are engaged in the most fatuous of exercises. 
On the other hand, we can readily And alternative characterizations, wl1ich admittedly 
are no less tendentious-but then again, no less plausible. Suppose that the issue-~"whether 
the plaintiff can recover statutory damages or attorneys' fees"-is treated as one more claim or 
dispute within the scope of the arbitration clause; suppose further that in pursuing this inquiry 
the dccisionmaker is presented with some more precise questions: 
148 Cf. Harding, supra n.146 at 924-25 (criticizing Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 
1447 (D. Minn. 1996), on the ground that it "did not involve a situation where the parties in the container 
contract excluded certain categories of damages that could be recovered if a dispute were to arise: 
rather, the arbitration provision itself contained the conditions and limitations")( emphasis added). 
I cannot bring myself to believe that contracting parties are likely to perceive any distinction in meaning 
whatever among the following provisions: 
"The arbitrator shall not have the power or authority to hold Terminix responsible for ... indirect. special, 
incidental, consequential, exemplary or punitive damages," Carll v. Terminix lnt'l Co., L.P., supra n.137; 
"The arbitrators will not award punitive, consequential, or indirect damages," Coddington Enterprises. 
Inc., supra n. 147; 
"Neither party ... shall have any liability to the other for any punitive damages ... or any other indireci, 
special, exemplary, incidental, or consequential damages," Arkcom Digital Corp., supra n.140. 
These are all instructions to the arbitrators~wherever they appear, or however they are phrased. Is all 
of our case law to consist of advice to the drafters of Terminix contracts to "go off and try again"? 
Paying attention to precisely where the limitation of remedies is located in a contract is 
sometimes used as a makeweight to uphold the power of arbitrators to rule on the validity of the clause. 
E.g., Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., supra n.136 ("any limitation upon the power of the arbitrator must 
be set forth as part of the arbitration clause itself'); Beaver Coaches, Inc. v. Revels Nationwide R.V. Sales, 
Inc., 543 So.2d 359 (Fla. App. 1989) (the trial court's holding "that a limitation of remedies outside of the 
arbitration clause !imits the arbitrator's power" was erroneous; "because no limitation of remedies is 
contained within the broad arbitration clause involved herein, the denial of arbitrability" is reversed) 
(emphasis in original). If the reasoning here is no less silly, at least the result is considerably less 
troubling. 
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·For openers, is the conLTactuallimitation of remedies properly interpreted as a "waivee' 
by the pbintiff of the recovery otherwise made available by statute! 149 
·If so, is the plaintiff able to waive this recovery? More precisely: Are, say, 11sophisticated 
groups of doctors'' who contract with a managed care company150 the sort of plaintiffs who in 
these circumstances need the protection of an unwaivable rule? For commercial parties in 
high~stakcs cases, the appropriate trade~off between litigation and informal justice may 
sometimes take the form of choosing a more intensive fonn of judicial review; an alternative 
bargain might call for reducing the risk of excessive dan1agc awards. 151 
·And in any event, is it sensible to address either of these concerns in the form of an 
intc1im decision preceding the merits? Might they not instead be the focus of attention at a 
later point--once the predicate ofliability has been established, ancl :m appropriate remedy 
needs to be crafted? 
149 The agreements in PacifiCare Health Systems v. Book, 2003 WL 1791225 (U.S.) prohibited the 
arbitrators from awarding, respectively, "punitive" or "extracontractual" damages. The district court 
concluded without discussion that these provisions applied to bar the recovery of HJCO treble damages, 
see 132 F.Supp.2d at ·JOOO~IOOI. However, the defendants·--unconvindngly, but I think not frivolously-
maintained that the agreements did not actually prevent an award of such damages, Petitioners' Brief, 
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 2002 WL 31789394 (U.S. Pet. Brief) at *29-"33 ("Even if the 
Court were to determine that RICO treble damages have a punitive component, as the Court has done 
in some other treble damages contexts, they are not 'punitive' for purposes of interpreting the scope of 
an arbitration clause''). The Supreme Court agreed that at least the terms of the agreement were 
"ambiguous," and the intent of the parties "uncertain"-and that the meaning of these remedial limitations 
was therefore a question for the arbitrator: "[W]e think the preliminary question whether the remedial 
limitations at issue here prohibit an award of RICO treble damages is not a question of arbitrabiiity." 
2003 WL 1791225 at *4 & fn.2. 
See also, e.g., DeGroff v. MascoTech Forming Technologies-Fort Wayne, Inc., 179 F. Supp.2d 896 (N.D. 
Ind. 2001). Here, similarly, the employer's "Corporate Dispute Resolution Policy" provided that the 
expenses of attorney representation shall be "the sole responsibility of the employee." But at the same 
time the "Policy" allowed an arbitrator to grant "such other relief as may be in conformance with 
applicable principles of common, decisional, and statutory law in the relevant jurisdiction.'' 
15a In re Managed Care Litigation, supra n.145, 132 F.Supp.2d at 998. 
151 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 Amer. Rev. of lnt'l Arb. 225, 245-
46, 259-60 (1997): 
So in high-stakes cases I can imagine that a desire to ensure predictability in !he application of legal 
standards, a desire to guard against a "rogue tribunal," or against the distortions of judgment that can 
often result from the dynamics of tripartite arbitration-may all weigh heavily in the decision to limit by 
contract the binding effect of an arbitral award. Parties who, through risk aversion or inadequate 
confidence, have ex ante the perspective of a "potential loser" may particularly be impelled in this 
direction. 
Cf. Metro East Center for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications lnt'l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 929 
(71h Cir. 2002)(Easterbrook, J.)(contractual choice of the "American Rule" for attorneys' fees in arbitration; 
"identifying a high-value legal right does not show that the right must be off limits to economic activity 
between consenting adults"; "the more valuable the right, the more the customer can get in exchangeft). 
Evcrytbng You 1\.ewlly Need to Know .About "Separab-ility" 231 
Framed in this way, ail these questions begin very nwch to look as if they belonged to 
the realms of interpretation and appreciation of context-that is, to the matters of substance 
that have been routinely entrusted to arbitrators. 152 
On this view of the question, then, it should only be in the most narrowly delirnitcd 
class of cases that claims of "iUegality" or Hunconscionabili ty" must be reserved for judicial 
decision. Tl1ese are the cases in which the putative defect is "wrapped up," or "enmeshed," in 
the very process of arbitration-to the point indeed that it would be difficult even to imagine 
a tribunal able to reconstitute itselfby setting the offending provision aside. As usual, concrete 
illustration seems more helpful than mere metaphor in making the point dearer. [am refcning, 
(or example, of challenges to: 
· the impartiality of the arbitrator, 153 or 
102 The discussion in the text was written before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Pacificare Health Systems in April 2003, see n.149 supra. In light of the Court's quite unsurprising 
opinion, I can't think of anything to change or add. See also the discussion at text accompanying nn. 
270~277 infra. 
See also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton. Inc .. 514 U.S. 52, 58, 60 fnA (1995}("the case 
before us comes down to what the contract has to say about the arbitrability of petitioners' claims for 
punitive damages," and in determining that the parties' choice of New York law was not intended to bar 
the award of punitive damages, "our interpretation accords with that of the only decision-maker arguably 
entitled to deference--the arbitrator~}; McCaskill v. SCI Management Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 680 & fnJ 
(71h Cir. 2002)(Title VII; provision in agreement that each party "shall pay its own costs and attorneys' 
fees, regardless of the outcome of the arbitration," was conceded by employer to be unenforceable; the 
employer has therefore "waived the intertwined issues of severability and construction of arbitration 
agreements by the arbitrator and may not now raise them on rehearing}(emphasis added). 
l53 E.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (41h Cir. 1999){under the employer's arbitration 
rules, "the employee's arbitrator and the third arbitrator must be selected from a list of arbitrators created 
exclusively by [the employer]"; "[g]iven the unrestricted contra! that [the employer] has over the panel, 
the selection of an impartial decision maker would be a surprising result"); Murray v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers !nt'! Union, 289 F.3d 297 (41h Cir. 2002){"A single arbitrator shaH be chosen by the 
alternate strike method from a list of arbitrators provided by the President's office [of the empioyerr; 
held, "we again refuse to enforce an agreement so utter!y lacking in the rudiments of even-handedness"). 
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· the site of the arbitration, 154 or 
154 E.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 18 Cai.Rptr.2d 563 {Cai.App. 1993). Plaintiffs were 
"unsophisticated borrowers of limited means" whose agreement with a finance company provided that 
disputes "shall be resolved by binding arbitration by the National Arbitration Forum, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota." According to the NAF it was apparently "not possible" before a ciaim was brought to advise 
a claimant what the actual location of the hearing would be, but the court suggested that "the provision 
on its face suggests that Minnesota would be the locus for the arbitration." The arbitration provision was 
found to be "unconscionable and thus unenforceable": "While arbitration per se may be within the 
reasonable expectation of most consumers, it is much more difficult to believe that arbitration in 
Minnesota would be within the reasonable expectation of California consumers." J am not sure whether 
the problem here was (a) that the plaintiffs actually had to go to Minneapolis-or (b) that the contract 
was so drafted that the plaintiffs might be deceived into believing that they had to go to Minneapolis. 
I guess it really doesn't matter. See also Bank v. WorldCom, Inc., 2002 WL 171629 {N.Y. Sup. Ct.)("There 
could hardly be a more unconscionable provision than one which requires a consumer who wishes to 
dispute a billing matter, no matter how small, to travel to Washington, D.C., despite the fact that the 
arbitration organiz.ation selected by Defendant has offices throughout the United States": nevertheless 
the court "upholds Washington, D.C. as a venue for the arbitration"). 
The arbitration "distant forum" cases seem curiously uninformed by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (Washington consumers injured on defendant's 
cruise ship held to forum selection clause requiring suit in Florida; while "forum~selection clauses 
contained in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness," plaintiffs 
have not satisfied the "heavy burden of proof' required "to set aside the clause on grounds of 
inconvenience"); see also Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995)(clause selecting 
Greece as forum for litigation "should not be negated unilaterally by plaintiff's conclusory assertions that 
she cannot afford to travel to Greece, that she would be afraid to stay at a strange city, that she does not 
know any Greek lawyers, etc."). 
\n any event, of course, cha\\enges on this ground are rarely successful \n a commercial setting, see Alan 
Scott Rau et al., Rau, Sherman & Shannon's Texas ADR & Arbitration: Statutes and Commentary 164 
(West 2000 ed.). But cf. Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d 888 (Cal. App. 2001 )(dispute between 
"large wealthy international franchiser" and "small 'Mom and Pop' franchisees located in California"; 
''[!]he agreement requires franchisees wishing to resolve any dispute to close down their shops, pay for 
airfare and accommodations in Utah, and absorb the increased costs associated in having counsel 
familiar with Utah lawT 
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· the filing fee required to set the process in motion, 155 or 
155 See, e.g., Teleserve Systems, Inc. v. MCI Telcommunications Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 1997)(under 
MCI Tariff applicable to disputes with telephone service customers, a filing fee of $204,000 was required; 
held, "filing fee is patently excessive and bears no reasonable reiation to the arbitration forum's administrative 
expenses in processing the claim"); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. I 998){under 
ICC Rules, purchaser of computer would be required to pay filing fee of $4000; held, "the designation of a 
financially prohibitive forum" renders clause unenforceable; case remanded "so that the parties have the 
opportunity to seek appropriate substitution of an arbitrator'' pursuant to§ 5 of the FAA). A ludicrous case at 
the extreme--which surely is not intended as a reasoned application of current law, except perhaps in 
California-is Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1177 (91" Cir. 2003). Here a f1ling fee of $75 was 
held to be "substantively unconscionable" because it is "not the type of expense that the employee [would] 
be required to bear'' in court: Since the fee was to be paid "directly to [the employer] rather than to the 
arbitration service,~ this meant that in effect "the employee is required to pay [the employer] for the privilege 
of bringing a complaint," which may well "deter employees from initiating complaints." 
Obviously, substantial filing fees may affect the claimant's very access to the arbitral forum-at least to the 
extent that such fees are not advanced by the attomey-entrepreneur. But then, the fees of the arbitrators and 
the administrative fees of the institution may have precisely the same deterrent effect-particularly where the 
panel or the institution is prudent enough to require an advance deposit, see AAA, Commercial Arbitration 
Rules, R.54 (AAA may require the parties to deposit "in advance of any hearings" such amounts as it deerns 
necessary to cover the expenses of the arbitration, including the arbitrator's fee); Craig et al., supra n.48 at ch. 
14 ("Advance to Cover Costs"). See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902, 934 {N.D. Cal. 2002), affd, 319 F.3d 
1126 (9u' Cir. 2003)(claimant's "potential cost before arbitration begins would be $5800"; "[t]he arbitrator's 
authority to alter the allocation of the costs of arbitration at the conclusion of the case does little to mitigate 
the cost of 'buying into' arbitration"). 
On the other hand, where the costs will abide the result, the matter seems quite different E.g., Morrison v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., supra n.144 at 654-55 (clause required employer to advance all arbitration costs, 
but--following issuance of the award-each party was to pay one-half of the costs of arbitration, unless the 
arbitrator used her discretionary power to impose all costs on the losing party). In such cases, it cannot suffice 
merely to advance a simplistic comparison betvveen (a) ihe fees of the arbitrator and of the administering 
institution, and (b) the institutional costs of invoking the judicial system. Such a comparison is patently 
unrealistic-if only because such a partial view takes no account whatever of all the burdens-all our pre-trial 
and appellate practice---that will be minimized by an a~ernative process thai requires less "lawyering." See 
Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost An Unlavvful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The 
Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 143, 164 {2002)(comparing the 
costs of arbitration and litigation "on a total cost basis"). But for an apparent failure to appreciate even this 
simple point, see Phillips v. Associates Horne Equity Services, Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 840, 846 {N.D. Ill. 
2001)("the cost of pursuing arbitration" "is likely to be at least twelve times what it currently costs to file a case 
in federal court")(emphasis added); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 {91n Cir. 2003)(agreement required 
customers to split arbitrator's fees with AT&T; "the scheme is unconscionable because it imposes on some 
consumers costs greater than those a complainant would bear if he or she would file the same complaint in 
court")(emphasis added); Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 862, 875 (D. Ore. 2002)(requiring 
payment of arbitrator's fees, ''as opposed to reasonable costs," is "not permitted"; those fees "should not be 
borne by plaintiffs even if they lose, just as a party is not required to pay for the services of the judge regardless 
of the outcome in court")- Nor does such a view take any account whatever of the possible impact that 
litigation-related expenses may have on the very availability of contingent-fee legal services, see Rau et al., 
supra n.14 at 820-21. The arbitrator's authority to ailocate costs in the final award does not seem fundamentally 
different from any commonplace contractual provision for fee shifting, see Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, 
Harnilton & Scripps, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 687 {Cal. App. 1999)(requiring that the costs of arbitration be "borne 
by the losing party'' is "indistinguishable from a clause requiring the losing party to pay the prevailing party's 
attorneys' fees and costs"). Whether the existence of such power is likely to reduce the chilling effect on 
potential claimants-Dr indeed to deter the risk-averse claimant even further-must also be problematical. 
Given all these imponderables, a flat presumption that an arbitration clause must always be construed so as 
to irnpose all costs on the "stronger'' party may be something of an overreaction, see Cole v. Burns ln!'l Security 
Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(court finds the arbitration agreement "valid and enforceable" 
"because we interpret the agreement as requiring [the employer] to pay all of the arbitrator's fees necessary 
for a full and fair resolution of [the employee's] statutory claims")-but even this seems infinitely more 
sensible than an a priori refusal to enforce the clause at all. 
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·limits placed by contract on the binding effect of any award. 156 
Only challenges such as these seem "relevant to the nature of the forum in which the 
complaint willl~e heard. "157 Ar1d so these and these alone~to retum to the locus clas~icu_<; of Prima 
Paint-··--arc the true C:-1Ses of 11challcnges to tlle arbitration clause itsel£'' 
As we have seen, anynumlx:r of courts have recently taken it upon then1...~lvcs to invalidate 
the "limitations on arbitral authmity" di'icussed in this section. 158 Having done so, they are necessmily 
faced with a further question-whether the overall agreement to arbitrate is utainted'' and thus 
ineffective, or whether arbitr<:ttion should nonetheless proceed without the offending provision. 159 
Since I think the initial step is illegitimatc~that is, that the question ought never to have arisen in 
the first place-I would rather not enter into this topic at alL Let me simply note here some of the 
complex learning that we might have been spared: 
1se E.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 2003 WL 548926 (Cal.)(employment agreement permitted either party 
to "appeal" an arbitration award of more than $50,000 to a second arbitrator; held, the arbitral appeal 
provision is "unconscionably one-sided" and unenforceable because it "inordinately benefits defendants"). 
It is quite common to find insurance contracts under which aH disputes over uninsured motorist 
coverage are to be sent to arbitration--but where either party is given the right to demand a trial de novo 
in the event the award exceeds a certain amount (typically the minimum for bodily injury liability under 
state financial responsibility Jaws). Such clauses have often be held to be unenforceable, e.g., Schmidt 
v. Midwest Family Mutual Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1988)("would result in complete frustration of 
the very essence of the public policy favoring arbitration"); O'Neill v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 
397 (D. Vt. 1992)(c!ause "discriminates against the insured"). I have expressed considerable skepticism 
about these holdings, see Rau, supra n.151 at 239-246, and particularly id at 241 fn. 67. But I am certainly 
willing to concede that the validity of such clauses is a matter for judicial determination. 
157 Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, supra n.140 at 232. 
158 See text accompanying nn. 145-148 supra. 
159 See Graham Oil Co. v. Area Products Co., 43 F. 3d 1244 (9'h Cir. 1995)(franchise agreement, under which 
neither party may recover exemplary damages or attorneys' fees, violates the Petroleum Marketing 
Practices Act, "the offensive provisions clearly represent an al1empi by [the franchisor] to achieve through 
arbitration what Congress has expressly forbidden," and [s]uch a blatant misuse of the arbitration procedure 
serves to taint the entire clause"); Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services, Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11 1n Cir. 
2001 )(Title VII; agreement "plainly requires that costs and fees be shared equally by the parties, and 
supplants the arbitrator's authority to award fees and costs": held, the employer's "attempt to defeat the 
remedial purpose of Title VII taints the entire agreement, making it unenforceable"). 
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· r tis occasionally suggested that whether the obligation to arbitrate survives should 
depend on whether the illicit provision can be simply deleted or "severed" (with Hthe rest of the 
arbitration agreement left intact"--apparently permissible)> or whether the court would have 
to '\efom1" the contract by "augmenting it with additional terms" (apparently impernlissible). i&J 
This needless resort to formalism reminds me of the worst judicial excesses of the previous 
century (that is, the Nineteenth) .161 For everything a court tells the parties, it could as easily 
tell the arbitrators themselves, by sending the case to them under the approptiate instructions. 162 
·It has also been suggested that where a court has struck down a lin1itation of remedies, 
the drafting party should be "penalized" by forfeiting completely any right to invoke the 
arbitration clause: Should we choose to preserve the agreernent to arbitrate, the argument 
goes> drafting parties may be "encouraged" to insert unconscionable terms--"because they 
16u E.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., supra n.156 at *5; Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696~97 (Cal. 2000)("8ecause a court is unable to cure this unconscionability through 
severance or restriction, and is not permitted to cure it through reformation and augmentation, it must void 
the entire agreement"); Bailey v. Ameriques! Mortgage Co., 2002 Wl. 100391 (D. Minn.)("the number of 
invalid provisions found in the Agreement taints the entire agreement and renders severability inappropriate"). 
In Carll v. Terrninix lnt'l Co., l..P., supra n.137, the court held that since the award of punitive damages was 
barred, the "entire arbitration clause. as a whole, must fail." The conclusory assertion that the limitation of 
liability language was "not independent of the agreement to arbitrate"-"not distinct"-apparently rested 
solely on the fact that "the same contractual provision that directs arbitration limits the authority of the 
individual conducting that arbitration." This,_ of course, is not argument. 
A variant-and remarkably disingenuous-approach can be found in Judge Hatchett's opinion in 
Paladino, supra n.141. The contract here provided that the ·'arbitrator is authorized to award damages for 
breach of contract only, and shall have no authority whatsoever to make an award of other damages." This 
was found to be a mere "clarification of the types of claims the parties intended to submit to arbitration"-
that is, as a demonstrated intention not to arbitrate a Title VII claim at all. ld. at 1057-58. The result of this 
"interpretative' route was of course the same as that chosen by Judge Hatchett's two colleagues-who 
found that the clause did indeed cover Title VII claims, but that the limitation of "any prospect for 
meaningful relief' rendered it completely unenforceable. 
161 Cf. Alan Scott Rau, "Arbitrability" and Judicial Review: A Brief Rejoinder, 1 J. of Amer. Arb. 159 
(2002), where I refer to 191h century cases holding that where the parties had made a material mistal<e 
as to the acreage of a tract of land, the Statute of Frauds would prevent reformation upwards-for that 
would entail a conveyance that had not been the subject of a writing·-but not downwards-since the 
lesser acreage was already included in the original contract; "I believe it was Schiller who remarked 
somewhere that 'nothing has a greater hold on the human mind than nonsense fortified with 
technicalities."' ld. at 176. 
162 Cf. Spinetti v. Service Corp. lnt'l, supra n.142, 324 F.3d at 217 ("what was implicit in the district court's 
order to compel arbitration" was that "final responsibility for attorneys' fees should be governed by the 
appropriate statute, be it either Title VII or ADEA": held, district court's order, "as interpreted by us," is 
affirmed): Howard v. Anderson, supra n.155 at 187 ("the Court is confident that once the relevant law is 
brought to the arbitrator's attention, he will conduct a proceeding that will vindicate [the employee's] 
statutory rights"). 
Nor does it seem particularly useful to require that the drafters of contracts give us explicit assurances of 
what we after all know already-that they wou!d prefer to proceed to arbitration even after provisions 
found to impermissibly restrict statutory remedies are set aside. Cf. Fuller v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & 
Jack of Delaware, Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 1158 (D. Colo. 2000)(a "savings clause," providing that if any part 
of the agreement is adjudged to be unenforceable, "such adjudication shall not affect the validity of the 
remainder of the Agreement," "allows me to disregard the fee-splitting provision so as to uphold the 
validity of the agreement"); Ex parte Thicklin, supra n. 145 (contract "contains a severability clause"; 
held, "the portion of the arbitration clause that prohibits the arbitrator from awarding punitive 
damages is void, and we strike only that portion of the clause"). 
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know that, ar the very minimum, the agreement to arbitrate will be uphdd." 163 But <iwhen a 
party attempts to abuse the arbitral process and gets caught ['sic], that party should completely 
lose the privilege-gained only by its superior economic position--of requiring the weaker 
party to arbitrate. 11164 
Once we cut our way through this rhetoric, what we have is a view of arbitration 
reduced to little more than the illicit fruit of a dominant parris deviousness: 1·11e unstated 
premise must be that the arbitral process is, even at its best, still so disproportionately favorable 
to the drafting party that only the prospect of being remitted instead to litigation is likely to 
deter him from mischief. The psychology is dubious; 165 The respondents in PacifiCarc Health 
Systems, Inc. v. Book proposed that under a regime of" severance," the draftingparty"would 
benefit from the inclusion of the most restrictive limitations, knowing that the limitations will 
involve no risk but will deter potential Litigants and will only be stricken following judicial 
review," Brief of Respondents, supra n. 143 at *26; sec also Perez v. Globe Airport Security 
Services, supra n.l59 at 1287 ('Such provisions could deter an unknowledgeable employee 
from initiating arbitration, even. if they would ultimately not be enforced. It would also add an 
expensive procedural step to prosecuting a claim; the employee would have to request a court 
to declare a provision unlawful and sever it before initiating arbitration"). 
\63 Harding, supra n.146 at 940; see also Armendariz, supra n.160 at 697 fn.13 ("An employer will not be 
deterred from routinely inserting such a deliberately illegal clause into the arbitration agreements it 
mandates for its employees if it knows that the worst penalty for such illegality is the severance of the 
clause after the employee has litigated the matter''). 
re4 Harding, supra n.146 at 944. 
165 The respondents in PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book proposed that under a regime of 
"severance," the drafting party "would benefit from the inclusion of the most restrictive limitations, 
knowing that the limitations will involve no risk but will deter potential litigants and will only be stricken 
following judicial review," Brief of Respondents, supra n. 143 at *26; see also Perez v. Globe Airport 
Security Services, supra n.159 at 1287 ("Such provisions cou!d deter an unknowledgeable employee 
from initiating arbitration, even if they wou!d ultimately not be enforced. It would also add an expensive 
procedural step to prosecuting a claim; the employee would have to request a court to declare a 
provision unlawful and sever it before initiating arbitration"). 
Note that what we are not talking about here is the effect of a legal rule on primary conduct, cf. 
Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 682-83 (1960)(discussing 
"whether severance should ever be applied to an employee restraint"; "for every covenant that finds its 
way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their 
contractual obligations and on competitors who fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor"). 
A well-advised employee living under a regime of blanket invalidity could open a business next door to 
his former employer with impunity: the prospect of losing even partial protection would presumably 
encourage lhe employer to draft reasonable post-employment restrictions that will have no chilling 
effect on the unrepresented. But to suggest that claimants are likely to be deterred from seeking any 
redress in arbitration by a contractual departure from what would otherwise be, say, the remedial scheme 
of Title VII, seems fanciful. And of course, the decision to strike any offending clause can be made at 
any time~on a pre-arbitration motion to compel, before the arbitrators themselves. or at the stage of 
judicial review: If such an "expensive procedural step to prosecuting a claim" is seen as troubling, what 
about (a) full blown litigation with respect to a substantive claim, immediately following upon (b) the 
court's refusal of a motion to issue a stay or to compel arbitration? 
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the generalized distrust of the arbitral process is patent. 166 The choice of arbitration as 
an appropriate forum fOr resolving these questions would of course render unnecessary any 
careful calibration of detenence and incentives. We may believe that attempted overreaching 
is unlikely to be rewarded by decision makers whose overaH view of the merits, ('while departing 
from the judicial model, is nevertheless infused with attention to such things as corn mercia] 
understanding, good business practice and notions of honorable behavior, and with practical 
reasoning fi'om familiar legal nom1s." 167 But let's assume that we remain entirely agnostic on 
that subject: In any event I very much doubt that we must follow all the implications of the 
cases discussed here-~including their apparent commitment to the romantic proposition that 
the verdict of a hypothetical and often unattainable civil jury is necessarily the basel.ine for any 
"correct" result. 168 
11. "Separabilhy" is jus~ a metajJhor, a tag- it is not a subsLitute for thought. 
Occ:L~ionallyone 1-vill come across acoun that Pll11JOits to take the notionof'separabiliq/' 
very seriously indeed. The judge has heard somewhere that the validity of a "separable" 
arbitration clause docs not necessarily depend on the validity of the underlying agreement-
so that he is expected to determine the clause's enforceability in isolation from the contract in 
which it is embedded. Docs it not follow, then, that the agreement to arbitrate-in and of 
itself-must satisfy all the requisites of contract formation? 169 And so, if only one of the parties 
;ee See Graham Oil Co., supra n.159 at 1250 (Fernandez, J., dissenting)(the court's holding that the 
franchisee is not bound to arbitrate at all can only be explained on the ground, "subliminal as it may be," 
"that arbitration is such a bad thing for companies like [the franchisee] that a few limitations of statutory 
rights (entirely satellite to any dispute) will taint the whole"). Cf. Harding, supra n.146 at 944 fn. 494 
(rather than reflecting a "negative view of arbitration," the decision to prohibit arbitration altogether 
because of the presence of "abusive terms" "reflects instead a desire to preserve arbitration and protect 
it from corruption"). Who will not be reminded of that chestnut from the Vietnam era, an American 
officer's earnest insistence that we "had to destroy the village in order to save it"? 
167 Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, supra n.27 at 534. 
168 See Rau, supra n.14 at 822; Kent Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 
U.C.LA L.Rev. 1935, 1939 (1997): 
Other than the triai bar and an occasional exhilarated juror, is there anyone left in America whose 
impression of a civil jury trial is so positive that he or she is willing to pay for one? I fear that, after a 
decade of relentless publicity bemoaning the civil jury~its unpredictability, its expense, its tendency to 
wildly overcompensate some plaintiffs and undercompensate others, its untrustworthy composition in 
some jurisdictions in Texas and elsewhere~the number of us having confidence in the common sense 
and good judgment of a jury, and ready to pay for it, is small indeed. 
Cf. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1344, 1356*58 (1997)("We should not assume that jury trials are an essential feature of the 
employment law landscape"; "European countries with wrongful dismissal laws rely on specialized labor 
tribunals (essentially tripartite arbitration boards) with well-defined, scheduled recoveries; there is no 
access to the ordinary civil courts, let alone civil juries, for such disputes"). 
1
fj 9 "In addition to the contract really aileged to have been formed (the container contract), the separability 
doctrine pretends that the party also alleges a fictions! contract consisting of just the arbitration clause, 
but no other terms." Stephen L. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor's Associates, Inc. 
v. Casarotto, 312 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1001, 1010 (1996); see In re Knepp, 229 BR. 821 (N.D. Ala. 
1999)(quoting Ware; "[u]nder this doctrine, a arbitration clause must fulfill all the requirements of a 
contract including mutuality of assent and cannot rely on the container contract for these elements"). 
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("An) is bound to arbitrate, while the other ("B") is fi:ee to litigate, then is it not obvious that the 
arbirr-ationclause itself contains no mutual promises~c-md therefore that.A:.s promise to arbitTate 
is not binding because it is not supported by consideration? Since B's promise is "illusory," /\s 
own pron1isc must be nudum fJacturn. 170 This truly is "separability" with a vengeance. 
Such holdings, however, are absurd-as they represent neither sensible applications of 
ordinary Contract law, nor sensible doctrinal responses to the problem of Prima. Paint. For one 
thing, even if the arbitration clause and the container contract arc treated in all respects as 
('selrcontaincd" or "autonomous"-~split off~ for analytical ptuvoses~ one from the other-the 
hornbook requirement of consideration is still quite easily satisfied. 171 See Alan Scott Rau, 
"Does State Arbitration Law Matter At All! A Continuing Role for State Law~'' in ADR and 
the Law 208,213-14 & n.29 (15thed. 1999): 
170 E.g., Stevenslleinweber/Sullens, Inc. v. Holm Development & Management, Inc., 795 P.2d 1308 (Ariz. 
1990)(heid, under the state arbitration statute that "embodfies] the concept of separability endorsed by the 
United States Supreme Court" in Prima Paint, that where there is "no mutual obligation to submit 
contractual disputes to an arbitrator" the arbitration provision "is void for lack of consideration": defendant's 
contention "that the arbitration provision should be considered in isolation from the principal contract only 
when it is necessary to preserve the parties' agreement to arbitrate is without merit"): The Money Place v. 
Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 714 (Ark. 2002)("foilow[ing] the lead of the United States Supreme Court [in Prima 
Paint, we] decline to address the issue of whether thet·e is sufficient consideration for the contract as a 
whole"; "mutuality within the arbitration agreement itself is required"); Cash In A Flash Check Advance of 
Arkansas v. Spencer, 74 S.W.2d 600 (Ark. 2002)("mutuality requires that the terms of the agreement impose 
real liability upon both parties"; [!]here is no mutuality of obligation where one party uses an arbitration 
agreement to shield itself from litigation, while reserving to itself the ability to pursue relief through the 
court system"); Labor Ready Central Ill, L.P. v. Gonzalez, 6<1 S.W.3d 5"19 (Tex. App. 2001)("the agreement 
covers arbitration of claims asserted by [employee] but not arbitration of claims asserted by [employer]": 
"we cannot conclude" that both parties "mutually surrendered their rights to trial by jury [and thus that] valid 
consideration existed"): Hagedorn v. Veritas Software Corp., 250 F.Supp.2d 857 (S.D. Ohio 2002)(same; 
"there is a lack of mutuality of obligation and the contract is illusory"), 1 "~ 1 See Alan Scott Rau, "Does State 
Arbitration Law Matter At All? A Continuing Role for State Law," in ADR and the Law 208, 213-14 & n.29 
(15111 ed. 1999): 
[C]onsideration for a promise to arbitrate might, on time-honored grounds, be found {a) in the stronger 
party's promise to be bound by the results of any arbitration , .. or {d) in employment cases, by the fact of 
continued employment made available to an at~wiil employee who agrees to an arbitmtion clause. 
E.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (91h Cir. 2002)(the employee argued that the 
arbitration agreement "is not supported by adequate consideration because [the employer] is not required 
to submit any of its claims against employees to arbitration"; however, ihe employer's "promise !o be bound 
by the arbitration process itself serves as adequate consideration"): Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 
F.3d 373, 377-78 (4'h Cir. 1998)("[a]n agreement to be bound by the arbitration process does not necessarily 
mean an agreement to submit the employer's claims to arbitration; rather, it more likely means that the 
employer agreed, with respect to any claims the employer has agreed should be submitted to arbitration, 
to be bound by the rules of the arbitration procedure and to be bound by its results'")(emphasis in original). 
The court might readily have taken either of these routes to find the arbitration agreement enforceable in 
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (Jih Cir. 1997), but didn't. 
A somewhat different problem is exemplified by cases like Phcix v. Atriums Management Co., Inc., 230 
F.Supp.2d 1279 (D. Kan. 2002). Here an "employee handbook" provided for arbitration of any claim that 
either party might have against the other-but also permitted the employer to "revise, supplement or 
rescind" any portion of the handbook "at its sole and absolute discretion." On this basis the court found that 
the arbitration clause "does not constitute a separate binding agreement because defendant's promise to 
arbitrate is illusory." But of course, any term in an at-will employment contract-say, the wages to be paid-
can be changed prospectively. The fact remains that the employer could no more avoid the provisions of 
the arbitration clause in piace at the time a claim was asserted, than he could avoid the payment of wages 
at the rate in effect when labor was performed. 
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[C] onsideration for a promise to arbitrate might, on time-honored grounds, be found 
(a) in the stronger party's promise to be bound by rhe results of any arbitration ... or (d) in 
employment cases, by the fact of continued ernploymcntmade available to an at-will crnployee 
who agrees to an arbitration clause. 
There is, however, a more fundamental point. I argued earlier that behind the 
metaphor of a "separate" arbitration clause, the doctrine of Prima Paim does serious work: 
Since some sort of a default rule is necessary with respect to the "likely boundaries of contractual 
consent," PrirnaPaint provides a rough and rebuttable presumption, a tentative conclusion, as 
to the parties' likely allocation of clecision-makingresponsibility. 172 Viewed in this tight, there 
is absolutely nothing in the policies underlying the case that requires us to look for rnutual 
promises to arbitrate---nothing that prevents us from "borrowing" the comideration thatsustallts 
the overall agreement for use in upholding the arbitration clause as well. This, too, is hornbook 
law: A lease's "one-sided option" to renew is, after all, supported by consideration in the form 
of the lessee's payment of rent for the principal te1m. 173 
It requires no great insight, though, to notice that what is going on in these cases is 
something other than a mere na'ive failure to get the point of Prima Paint: Invoking"separability" 
is far more likely to be a "smokescreen"174--a more or less disingenuous surrogate for dealing 
with perceived unfairness in the arbitration clause itself Indeed most recent cases tend to 
ignore the problem of"consideration" entirely-and to engage instead in a direct inquiry into 
the legitimacy of clauses by which only the "weaker" party in an adhesion contract is bound to 
submit his claims to arbitration. So where "the weaker bargaining party has no choice but to 
settle all claims arising out of the contract through Gnal and binding arbitration, whereas the 
more powerful bargaining party and drafter has the unilateral right" to settle a dispure "in a 
court oflaw," this may be seen as "so one~sided as to be substantively unconscionable." 175 
172 See text accompanying nn. 69-90 supra. 
173 See 2 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§ 5.12 (rev. ed. 1995){"0ne Consideration Exchanged 
for Several Promises"; "[w]here an option is part of a larger contract, the consideration for the contract is 
also consideration for the option"}; Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 
1999)(rev!ewing authority). 
Professor Drahozal and the Macneil treatise disapprove of the cases discussed in this section on 
a somewhat different ground-that while Prirna Paint proper is "pro-arbitration," cases such as those in 
n.166, supra, represent "adverse discriminatory treatment" of arbitration and are thus preempted by 
federal iaw. Christopher R. Drahoza!, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. Corp. L. 537, 546 & fn. 
68 (2002); 2 Macneil et al., supra n.19 at§ 17.4.2; see also Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 
438, 453 (2d Cir. 1995)("[a) doctrine that required separate consideration for arbitration clauses might 
risk running afoul or· the "strong federal policy favoring arbitration"). 1 have no particular problem with 
this analysis, although it seems simpler merely to repeat one of the truisms of common-law reasoning-
that the proper reach of a case extends as far as its rationale extends, and no further. 
174 Avid Engineering, Inc. v. Or!ando Marketplace Ltd., 809 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. App. 2002}. 
m E.g., !wen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 995 (Mont. 1999); Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, 
Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr.2d 348, 354 (Cal. App. 1999). The ·'leading case" is undoubtedly Armendariz v. 
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 745 (Cal. 2000)("an arbitration agreement 
imposed in an adhesive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but 
not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences"). 
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I pass over the fact that in many cases any perceived "one~sidcdnessn will inevitably 
be trivial-since the drafting party is unlikely in any event to have claims to assert, in any 
forum, against the adhering party. 176 And I equally pass over the fact that, as Professor 
Drahozal points out, lTeating such clauses as "unconscionable" may be particularly shortsighted 
as putative measures of" consumer protection"~since the drafting party may naturally react 
by subjecting his OUJl1 claims, too, to binding arbitration. 177 
\Xfhat is most sniking about this case law is rather what it suggests about our changing 
discourse of"unconscionability.'' What seems to underlie many decisions is the notion that 
inequality in the tenns of the commitment to arbitrate must belijustified" by some "special" or 
"legitimate" or even "compelling" commercial need-a need that must be "factually 
established": 178 In the absence of any such showing, it may be illicit for one party to draft a 
176 A lender may wish to retain the option of invoking the judicial system in order to institute collection or 
foreclosure proceedings, see Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Ky. App. 
2001)(foreclosure has "come to be heavily regulated by statute, allowing for streamlined procedures and 
effective protections for both sides"); Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 862, 872 {D. Ore. 
2002)(same): Stephen Ware, Paying the Price of Progress: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements, 2001 J. Oisp. Resol. 89, 97-98 (since collection actions "nearly always involve small amounts of 
money" and "often result in default judgments," coilections practice is in fact "an assembly line in which large 
numbers of small claims are processed at a low cost per claim"). Or a franchisor may wish to seek an injunction 
against trademark violation: an employer of key personnel, against unauthorized competition or the improper 
use of trade secrets, see llcknor v. Choice Hotels lnt'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 944 fn.6 (9111 Cir. 2001); see generally 
the excellent discussion in Christopher R. Orahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 695, 762-
764. 
But it is hard to see why an en-player's ''retention of litigation rights" against a file clerk should trouble us unduly~ 
---given our difficulty in envisaging just what such a suit would look like in the first place, cf. McCoy v. Superior 
Court, 104 CaL Rptr.2d 504 (Cal. App. 2001 ). After all, had the employer too been nominally obligated to 
arbitrate any claim it might have, the situation would seem much the same. The highly abstract nature of this 
"onesidedness" has led the Ninth Circuit down some murky paths indeed. In Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, supra 
n.155, the court found "unconscionable" a clause that did not require an employer to submit to arbitration any 
"claims it might hypothetically bring against employees." The court conceded that the possibility of any such 
claim against an employee was quite "remote"-but for some reason, this seemed to make things worse, not 
better: "[T]he lucre of the arbitration agreement flows one way: the employee relinquishes rights while the 
employer generally reaps the benefits of arbitrating''-and so, ·'this arbitration agreerr.ent's coverage would be 
substantively one-sided even without the express limitation to ciaims brought by employees"! 328 F.3d at 1173-
1174. And indeed, in the Ninth Circu~. clauses that are indeed even-handed- drafted so as to apply to both 
parties--are sometimes criticized on the ground that-as a practical matter-only the drafler is likely to have a 
claim: cf. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 fn.14 (91h Cir. 2003). Sometimes you just can't win. 
The point made here may also explain why courts holding one-sided arbitration clauses to be "unconscionable" 
often need-in order to find that the drafting party has indeed retained the right to litigate--to tease this 
conclusion out of contractual silence. See Armendariz, supra n. 175, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d at 772 ("[a]lthough it did 
not expressly authorize litigation of the employer's claims against the employee . . such was the clear 
implication of the agreement. Obviously, the lack of mutuality can be manifested as much by what the 
agreement does not provide as by what it does"); McCoy, supra ("! [the employee] voluntarily agree that any 
claim ... arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my ... empioymenf' 
shall be arbitrated: "the agreement here did not clearly require the employer to arbitrate its claims against the 
employee"; "at best, the agreement is ambiguous; at worst, it is a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the Firm's 
retention of litigation rights"). In such cases the drafting party obviously did not even think it worth its while to 
make the stipulation express. 
177 See Drahozal, supra n.173 at 561 ("tf the business requires arbitration of ail claims---which is a very plausible 
response-consumers may actually be worse off than under the nonmutual arbitration clause. If consumers 
prefer to litigate rather than arb~rate the business's claims, they would have preferred the nonmutual clause."). 
178 Armendariz, supra n. 175, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d at 769-772; Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1174 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002); Lytle v. Otiflnancial Services, Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 665 (Pa. Super. 2002). 
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provision that simply allows it to 1'maximize its [own] advantage" 179 without a corresponding 
1
'benefit" to the other. 180 1l1e test of the legitimacy of arbitration is thus the drafter's willingness, 
when asserting his own claims, to submit himself to it: 1l1e notion apparently is one of estoppel, 
if not indeed of the Golden Rule: "If the arbitration systen1 established by the employer is 
indeed fair, then the employer as well as the employee should be willing to submit claims to 
arbitration." 181 
Of course, by definition parties enter into contracts when the overall perceived utility 
of the transaction for them exceeds any costs (including foregone alternatives), Where any 
jJarticular contractual provision confers benefits (or imposes burdens) unequally, it is hardly 
self-evident that this lack of a neat symmet1y amounts in itself to such "unfairness" as to 
warrant judicial relief. Certainly such a conclusion is particularly dubious when a court is 
called on to make the traditional, cabined inquiry-into whether the one-sidedness gives rise 
to "a profound sense of injustice in the heart of eve1y "decent, fair-minded person. "182 There 
is also a more general point: It is hard to understand why an arbitration clause rnay not in any 
event properly be drafted to reflect with some accuracy the power imbalances, the allocation 
oflisks, and the relative "advantages," already reflected in the substantive tenns of the parties' 
underlying agreement: That is, it is hard to understand why the parties~ dispute resolution 
system need be "justified'~ 8t all, in isolation and abstTaction from questions of relative economic 
strensrth. 183 This is a fortiori the case with respect to the issues we\e dealing with here-where 
an arbitration clause may bind one party only, but where the structure of the clause in no way 
implicates the integrity of the adjudicative process itself. 
What explains the shaky legal status of"one-sidcd" arbitration clauses, I think, is 
nothing more than the classic recurring fallacy of the false comparison: It is familiar to see the 
messy realities of arbitration held up alongside an idealized litigation alternative~in which 
179 Flores v. Transamerica Homef:rst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 376 (Cal. App. 2002). 
18° Cf. PlaSkett v. Bechtel lnt'l, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 334, 341-342 (D. V.I. 2003)(the arbitration clause as 
interpreted by the court bound both parties to arbitrate their respective claims; however, the further 
requirement that the employee notify the employer of any claims within 30 days was held 
"unconscionable" because it "unreasonably favors" the employer and the employee "obtains absolutely 
no benefit from this provision"). 
161 Armendariz, supra n. 175, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d at 770. See also Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 199 
F.Supp.2d 771, 779 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). The arbitration clause here also bound both parties to arbitrate 
their respective claims, but the court found it unconscionable on the apparent ground that "an asymmetry 
born out of a difference in bargaining power" had left the employee with "no choice" other than to agree. 
Relying on President Kennedy's expression of an aspiration "to treat our fellow Americans as we want to 
be treated," the court noted that "the attorneys that drafted" the arbitration agreement "would certainly 
never sign that agreement if they were in Plaintiff's shoes." 
182 Carlson v. Hamilton, 332 P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958)(damages awarded where a liquidated 
damages clause called for "the exaction of a reasonably small percentage of the price for a breach that 
would cause delay for repairs, time lapse for re-sale, and possibly other items of damage susceptible of 
little but conjectural measurement'). 
183 See Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, supra n. 27 at 511-512. Cf. id. at 509-511 (discussing, and 
approving, cases in which the appointment of "a single arbitrator so closely allied with one of the parties 
as to be presumed partial to him" has been upheld. 
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justice is unfailingly available) costless, swift, rational, predictable and accurate--·and inevitably 
to be found wanting, tM See Northcom, Ltd, v, James, 694 So,2d 1329, 1338~39 (Ala, 1997) ( 
"[tlhc clement of unconscionability in the context of an arbitration clause is supplied 
by the fact that, by agreeing to arbitrate, a panywaivcs his right to 1a remedy by due process of 
law,' and his 'rightoftTial by jury'"); see also Kinney, supra n, 175,83 CaL Rpn:2d at354 ("the 
party who is required to submit his or her claims to arbitration foregoes the right, otherwise 
guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions, to have those claims tried before a jurl; 
however, "by contrast, the party requiring the other to waive these tights retains all of the 
benefits and protections the right to a judicial forum provides"). 
It is presumably this "lirigation romanticism)! that is responsible for so much of the 
overwrought rhetoric 185 and Woody Guthrie,inspired prairie populism156 that increasingly 
184 See Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 694 So.2d 1329, 1338-39 (Ala. 1997)("[t]he element of unconscionability 
in the context of an arbitration clause is supplied by the fact that, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party waives his 
right to 'a remedy by due process of law,' and his 'right of trial by jury"'); see also Kinney, supra n.i75, 83 Cal. 
Rptr.2d at 354 ("the party who is required to submit his or her claims to arbitration foregoes the right, otherwise 
guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions, to have those claims tried before a jury"; however, "by 
contrast, the party requiring the other to waive these rights retains all of the benefits and protections the right 
to a judicial forum provides"). 
See also Rau et al., supra n.14 at 820-821 ("Professor Jerome Cohen once remarked, in a very 
different context, that the worst kind of Comparative Law thinking is that which compares "our theory'' with 
"their reality"-and, inevitably, finds the latter deficient)(emphasis in original). 
185 E.g., In re Knepp, supra n.169, 229 B.R. at 827 ("The reality that the average consumer frequently loses 
his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, 
insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the 
body politic"; held, "rais[ing] this issue sua sponte," arbitration clause is unconscionable; "consumers lack a 
meaningful choice today, particularly when they are purchasing a motor vehicle," and the clause requires the 
consumer "lo give up access to the courts, forsake his rights and constitutional protections to participate in 
arbitration which requires the payment of fees"). 
Professor Sternlight urges that even assuming binding arbitration "is preferable to litigation for society as a 
whole,'' "it is not necessarily fair or just to force a loss on certain individuals" just to achieve such benefits: 
It could be that sociely as a whole would be better off if a particularly nasty individual were gagged, locked 
up, or even thrown off a cliff. Still, most would argue that the individual's rights of free speech, liberty, and life 
make it wrong to harm the individual, even if society as a whole would gain. Applying this same reasoning, 
it may be wrong to force a detrimental system of justice on consumers merely to obtain a gain for society as 
a whole .... Indeed, our Bill of Rights and much of our law support the proposition that it is wrong to lake from 
one person merely to secure a greater gain for others. 
This tour de force of cost/benefit analysis may be what passes for reasoned argument in the academy these 
days. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.O. 637, 696 & fn. 333 (1996). 
1se Lytle v. Citifinancial Services, Inc., supra n.178, was brought as a ciass action; the plaintiff claimed that 
when he refinanced his mortgage, the defendant had collected a prepayment penalty and unearned 
finance charges in violation of state and federal law. On its way to concluding that the lender's "one-sided 
preservation of the right of access to the courts is unconscionable," the court characterized the case thus: "This 
litigation reveals yet another vignette in the timeless and constant effort by the haves to squeeze from the 
have nots even the last drop." 810 A.2d at 658 (emphasis in original). After noting earnestly that "if it's good 
for the powerful, it's bad for the people," the court then launched into a lengthy rendition of "The banks are 
made of marble." !d. 
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pervades the advance sheets and law reviews. But, as Judge Easterbrook recently remarked, 
this is precisely a the sort oflitany that the Federal Arbitration Act is supposed to silence. "187 
12. Nor i1 "separability" merely a froiU: on the part of]ustice Fartas. 
Much American commcntaty seenlS to treat the doctrine of Prima Paint as some sort of 
inexplicable al:x:ITation~a ''shell game,'' 185 :-1 docninal mystification, a tour de force in which Ju-;tice 
l~rtas "donned [his J magician's ro~s'' 189 and invented out of whole doth this lof,rically indefensible, 
"mind l;oggling, "190 "simply ludicrous," "6ction."191 More charitably, the doctrine ofsepar::J.bility has 
been patronized 3-'> a "vestige of an era of!aw that has long p2ssed'--perhaps forgivable in the ilrst 
flutters sun·ounding the birth of the ADR movement, and usetltl then" to send a strong message to 
the lower courts about the legitimacy of the FAA'~bttt n1ost unsuitable for 1\oday's sophisticated 
times." 192 
ln none of this discussion, howeveJ; do I find any recognition of the fact that every modern 
ref,rime of 3rbimuion~ifnot indeed every piece oflegislation in the civilized world-t,:'lkes separability 
::1s the foundation stone of the entirestructurc193 : EntTusting the validity of the underlying contract 
to arbitrators seem,.:; universally recognized 8S being necessmy both to guard the integrity of arbitral 
dccisionmaking on the merits1 and to allow the process to get smood1ly under way. Predating Hirna 
Paint194-but a!so a centTal and quite uncont:roversiat feature of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration195~separability hcL'i become "a truty international rule of 
law.Hl% 
As one might expect, the doctrine of separability is not commonly rationalized along the 
lines I have suggested here: It is most readily defended, not just a .. <; one more default rule of contract 
interpretation, but rather c1.s a grudging departure from strict logic in the interest of"practice" and 
187 Metro East Center for Conditioning & Health, supra n. 151, 294 F.3d at 927. 
180 Reuben, supra n.4 at 824. 
1s9 Davis, supra n.4 at 196. 
tEo Kanowitz, supra n.4 at 75. 
191 Ware, supra n.4 at 131-32. 
192 Reuben. supra n.4 at 880. 
1s3 ! am aware that this might be considered something of an overstatement. Cf. Nancy Turck, "Saudi 
Arabia," 3 Jnt'l Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Paulsson ed.) Suppl. 17 (1994) at p. 13 ("doubts 
are cast whether in !he case of a submission agreement an arbitrator can decide on the validity of the 
contract in dispute in Saudi Arabia"); Patrick Lane, "South Africa," id. Supp. 20 (1995) a! p. 6 ("[t]he 
question as to whether the agreement is void or voidable goes to the question of the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction and therefore cannot be decided by him"). 
194 See Fouchard eta!., supra n.132 at 215 ("the principle of the independence of the arbitration 
agreement from the underlying contract, initially a product of French case law in 1963, is today so 
widely recognized that it has now become of those general principles of arbitration which international 
commercial arbitrators readily invoke, whatever the situs of the arbitration or the governing law may be") 
(my translation). It has even been suggested that the New York Convention of 1958 "may be said to 
sustain severability'' "by implication," Schwebel, supra n.93 at 22, although this is not a commonly-
shared view and the Fouchard treatise calls such a claim "daring." Fouchard et al., supra n.132 at 219. 
195 Art. 16(1); see generally Howard N, Holtzmann & Joseph E. Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary 490 ("general 
agreement"), 508 (1989). 
196 Sanders, supra n.93 at 42 (my translation). 
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"neccssity.''197 See Schwebet supra n.93 at 2, 4 ("the requirements of effective arbitration" justify a 
rule of separability; a contrary rule "would prejudice a key object of the agreement's provision for 
arbitration: namely, speed and simplicity of settlement of dL'lpute_~, without the time-cOlk'iUtning 
trouble and expense of recourse to the comt'i"). But Judge Schwebel also believes that the docttine 
can l;c justified by reference to the presumed '\vill of the p81tics," see id. at 3 ("Had the parties, when 
concluding the agreement, been asked: 'Do you mean, ii1 providing that ''any dispute atisingoutof 
or relating to this agreement" shall be submitted to arbitration, to exclude disputes over the validity 
of the abrreemcnt?,' surely they would have replied that they did not mean to exclude such 
disputes"). 
The terms of the debate matter little: 1l1e tension LlE'tween a model of arbitration as a mere 
ucrcaturc of contract," and arbiLration as uadjudication in the image of public tribunals," may be a 
familiar one in all legal systen1s, but even in more collectivist societies where the fOrmer model is not 
197 See Schwebel, supra n.93 at 2, 4 ("the requirements of effective arbitration" justify a rule of separability; a contrary 
rule ''would prejudice a key object of the agreement's provision for arbitration: namely, speed and simplicity of 
settlement of disputes, without the time-consuming trouble and expense of recourse to the courts"). But Judge 
Schwebel also believes that the doctrine can be justified by reference lo the presumed ''will of the partjes," see id. at 
3 ('Had the parties, when concluding the agreement, been asked: 'Do you mean, in providing that "any dispute 
arising out of or relating to this agreemenf' shail be submrtted to arbitration, to exclude disputes over the validity of 
the agreement?,' surely they would have replied that they did not mean to exclude such disputes"). 
See also J. Gillis Wetter, Salient Features of Swedish A.rbitration Clauses, 1982 Y.B. Arb. lnst. of Slockholm Chamber 
of Commerce 33, 35 (1984)(although the doctrine of separability "militates against strict reason," "most developed 
jun"sdictbns have come to accepf' it because "failing it the arbitral process wouid be ineffective"). 
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axiomatic-that is, ht most of the world outside the United States 198 -something like Prima Paint is 
taken for E,7ranted. Such a unifonn understanding should at the very least give us pause. 199 
13. State courts too must a{JfJly a rule of"sefJarability. '' 
Even at this late date the extent to which state courts are bound by the dictates of 
federal arbitration policy continues to elude precise definition. Grotesque misconceptions in 
the reports are mercifully rare200-but then, so is any sophisticated understanding of the 
relationship of state and federal law. Where the question of!' separability" arises, it is sometimes 
assumed without a great deal of discussion that state courts are obligated to follow Prima 
198 See generally Rau & Pedamon, supra n.68. 
199 A common jurisprudence seems particularly fitting when we consider the increasing interpenetration of the 
regimes of "domestic" and of "international" arbitration-when we consider, for example, how easy it is to bring a 
dispute within the scope of the New York Convention, and how the case law growing out of Chapters I and II of the 
FAA have grown to be virtually indistinguishable. See generally Rau, supra n.38 at 229-234 & esp. h 73 (cases rr.ay 
come within the Convention even without "any real international dimension"); see also id. at 236-239 ("highly 
unlikely--to put it mHdly-that actual results in concrete cases wili tend to diverge signmcantly depending on whether 
an award is scrutinized under Article V of the Convention or under§ 10 of the FAA"). 
However, I should mention here one of the most troubling recent developments in our law of dispute resolu'tion: This 
is the increasing willingness of courts to deform the general structure of the common law of arbitraiion----€ven in 
international cases---in perceived response to the peculiar equities presented by contracts of adhesion, and more 
generally, by the arbitration of disputes arising out of regulatory legislation. Given our current expanded notions of 
arbrtral competence, this phenoiT'€non was perhaps inevitable. See. e.g., id. at 251-257 ("Contracts of Adhesion and 
the Abuse of Arbitration"; "to distort the regime of the Convention hardly seems the appropriate way of dealing with 
the thomy problem of the enforceability of forum-selection agreements"); cf. Reuben, supra n.4 at 847-48 (the 
doctrine of separability "frustrates" "the reasonable expectations of parties"-"particularly consurners and workers"-to 
their "day in courf'). 
Now I have always nurtured a certain faith in the ability of common law courts to reach sensible resulls----Bt least when 
pruperly instructed in the exercise of "reasoned elaboration." Rau, supra n.12 ("on the margins there will, of course, 
inevitably be difficulties in ascertaining 'agreement,"' although ''we do already have an elabor-ate jurisprudence in 
which courts have regularly struggled with this and similar questions without untoward results"; IT may still, though, be 
"necessary on occasion to rein in judges who may be lazy or ill-informed''). This is a quirk that may be atttibutabie to 
my advanced age, or (another way of saying the same thing) to the Legal Process-oriented nature of my education. 
But I am willing to concede that such an attitude may well be naiVe, and that my powers of prophecy-reasoning to 
what I consider to be unimpeachably "correcf' results----Bre occasionally flawed, see Rau, supra n.38 at 238-39 
("manifest disregard of the law"; this is an "empty category," and reversal on this ground "will never happen in our 
lifetimes"). And so, Professor Park's proposal in this symposium that the FAA be amended ·~o provide a separate 
framework for international arbi1ration"-so that it may "evolve free from whatever patemalistic measures might be 
appropriate to domestically-cultivated concerns"-strikes me as an excellent tactical response to the problem, 
William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, text acr..ompanying fns. 7, 13, 
20-21. 
200 But not unheard of: See, e.g., Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Civil Court N.Y.C. 2001), in 
which the court held that the FAA "does not apply" to a transaction in which a buyer sought the return of 
an allegedly defective computer. The mere fact that interstate commerce was clearly involved did not 
"in and of itself create a cause of action under federal law," "nor is there an amount in controversy that 
would permit the action to be brought on diversity of citizenship grounds." It somehow seemed to follow 
that the case was "a state court matter" to be resolved under state law. 
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Paint201~and at least as often, but with no greater lucidity, that they are not.202 E.g., Marks v. 
Bean, 57 S.\V.3d 303 (Ky. 2001) (despite a clause in the contract <ipurporting to reserve issues of 
fraud and misrepresentation for arbitration,'' "the clear and plain language of [the state 
arbitration] statute dictates a legislative intent that innocent parties not be forced to com_ply 
with an arbitration provision in contacts tainted by fi-aud"); Sun Dtilling Prods. Corp. v. Rayborn, 
703 So.2d 818, 819 (La. App. 1997) ("the policy of resolving the question of fraud in the 
inducement in court rather than through arbitration ... appears to continue to be the policy of 
this state," and so "we are constrained to affirm the actions of the trial court r staying the 
201 E.g., Eddings v. Southern Orthopedic & Musculoskeletal Associates, P.A., 555 S.E.2d 649, 655 (N.C. 
App. 2001 )("[i]n light of the Supreme Court's holding in Southland Corp. that the FAA is federal 
substantive law applicable in state courts, we hold that the reasoning in Prima Paint applies equally in 
the present case"); Centra Industries, Inc. v. McGuirewoods, LLP, 270 F.Supp.2d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)(although Tennessee law refuses to compel the arbitration of fraudulent inducement claims, state 
taw "applies to the interpretation and enforcement of the agreement only to the extent that federal 
substantive law so permits~; the rule of Prima Paint "holds regardless of whether state law differs"). 
It is often difficult of course to tell whether a state court really considers itself "obligated" to 
follow Prima Paint. To the extent that the court would~in any event~adopt a rule of separability as a 
matter of its own local law, the question becomes entirely academic. See generally Reuben, supra n.4 
at 852-55 (reviewing authority). 
202 E.g., Marks v. Bean, 57 S.W.3d 303 {Ky. 2001 )(despite a clause in the contract "purporting to reserve 
issues of fraud and misrepresentation for arbitration," "the clear and plain language of [the state 
arbitration] statute dictates a legislative intent that innocent parties not be forced to comply with an 
arbitration provision in contacts tainted by fraud"); Sun Drilling Prods. Corp. v. Rayborn, 703 So.2d 818, 
819 (La. App. 1997)("the policy of resolving the question of fraud in the inducement in court rather than 
through arbitration ... appears to continue to be the policy of this state," and so "we are constrained to 
affirm the actions of the trial court [staying the arbitration] regardless of our concerns about the potential 
havoc this policy could play with arbitration clauses in Louisiana"); cf. TRCM, LLC v. The Tw\light 
Partnership, 706 So.2d 1037 (La. App. 1998)(in this case the contract "specifically requires that the 
validity of the contract be settled by arbitration"; case remanded with directions to enforce the arbitration 
provision)(emphasis in original). See also Reuben, supra n.4 at 852 & 852 n.193 (state courts "are not 
similarly bound by the so~ca!ied 'Federal Rule," although "[r]easonable questions may be raised" 
whether state courts refusing to follow Prima Paint may not be preempted by federal law). 
Here too it is often difficult to tell whether a state court really considers itself "free" not to follow 
Prima Paint. A holding t11at a claim of fraudulent inducement must be determined by a court rather 
than by an arbitrator can be explained either: 
by a belief that a state rule flatly rejecting separability is not preempted by federal policy, even where 
interstate commerce is involved, or 
by a finding that, as a matter of interpretation in the particular case, the parties' agreement withheld the 
question of fraudulent inducement from the issues to be submitted to the arbitrators. As we have seen, 
as a default rule Prima Paint always permits such a move, see point #8 above, text accompanying nn. 
84~90 supra. 
Opinions can sometimes be drafted in the latter sense to avoid having to take the former route. This 
point is nicely exemplified by Frizzell Construction Co. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d 79, 84-85 (Tenn. 
1999). Here the court began with the undoubted premise that "if the parties did not agree to arbitrate 
the claim of fraudulent inducement, then they can not be compelled to arbitrate the claim despite its 
arbitrability under the FAA." Given the contract's choice-of-law ciause-which called for the agreement 
to be "governed by the law of the place where the Project is located"--it seemed to follow that "the 
parties in this case have [only] agreed to arbitrate their disputes to ihe extent allowed by Tennessee law"; 
the local version of the Uniform Arbitration Act had already been interpreted as prohibiting the submission 
of this issue to arbitration. Cf. City of Blaine v. John Coleman Hayes & Associates, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 33, 
38 (Tenn. App. 1991)(held, "conform[ing] to the dissent in Prima," "the legislature [intended] to except 
actions for rescission from a decision by arbitrators"). Whether Frizzell can legitimately stand alongside 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), is doubtful; see text accompanying 
nn. 211-219 infra. But this is undoubtedly a heresy that is harder to police. 
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arbitration] regardless of our concerns about the potential havoc this policy could play with 
arbitration clauses in Louisiana"); cf. TRCM, LLC v. The 1\vilight Partnership, 706 So.2d 1037 
(La. App. 1998) (in this case the contract "specifically requires that the vaLidity of the contract 
he settled by arbitration"; case remanded with directions to enforce the arbitration 
provision) (emphasis in ori&,-'inal). See also Reuben, supra n.4 at 852 &852 n.l93 (state courts 
Hare not similarly bound by the so~called 'Federal Rule,'' although ''(r]easonable questions may 
be raised" whether state courts refusing to follow Prima Paint may not be preempted by federal 
law). 
Here too it is often difficult to tell whether a stare court really considers itself'lfree" not 
to follow Prima Paint. A holding that a claim of fraudulent inducement must be determined 
by a court rather th8n by an arbitrator em be explained either: 
by a belief that a state rule flatly rejecting separability is not preempted by federal policy, 
even where interstate commerce is involved, or 
Now of course it is true that Justice Fortas' opinion in Prima Paint was carefully drafted 
to rely soLely on the FAP:s "procedural provisions facially applicable only to federal courts. "203 
(fhis is a reference to§ 4 of the Act, which Justice Fortas thought-at least with respect to 
cac;es brought in federal court-----~ !'provided an explicit <.mswcrn to the question of separability.) IO+ 
But the conclusion i.s unwarranted that the Court had thus made a "conscious effort to fashion 
a doctrine applicable only to the federal courts"--so that state court resolution of claims of 
fraudulent inducement would '~not impinge" on the Act's substantive mandate in§ 2. 205 TI1c 
Court had crafted the narrowest possible rationale precisely because ofits reluctance to say 
anything explicit about the binding effect of the FAA on the states~an issue that was not yet 
before it. But this rhetorical strate,:,;ry could have deceived no-one: Justice Black in dissent was 
at pains to point out that the Court had not held "the body of federal substantive law created 
by federal judges under the [FAAt to be applicable instate courts.Z(X:, Yet at the sarr,e time he 
recognized quite sensibly that this is precisely the result that would, after all, "normally follow" 
from the premise that the FAA was an exercise of the commerce power-and that any 
hoLding to the contrary would give rise ro just that "forum shopping" and "unconstitutional 
discrimination" between state and federal litigants that cases like Erie were "designed to 
200 Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. Fla. 
L. Rev. 61, 92 (1985); see also 1 Macneil et al., supra n.19 at§ 10.7.4.3 (Prima Paint "was itself firmly 
founded in particular language of the FAA" and so need not "necessarily have led to the development 
of a large penumbra of general federal arbitration law"). 
204 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967). The relevant text of§ 4 of 
the FAA is at n.10 supra. 
205 Atwood, supra n.203 at 92 & n.210. 
206 Prima Paint Corp., supra n.204, 388 U.S. at 424 (Biack,J., dissenting). 
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eliminatc.u207 So Justice Forms' exclusive reliance on§ 4 was transparently just a way station: 
It is surely only the smallest of steps from the proposition that federal substantive bw "ovctTidcs 
state law to the contrary" in federal courts, 208 to the conclusion that state courts are equally 
bound by this law.209 1l1e decisional techniques deployed in Prima Paint take on a very different 
meaning today when viewed retrospectively through the lens of Southland v. Keating, where 
that final step was taken-and where the concerns of litigant equality acknowledged by 
Justice Black became determinative.210 
207 ld. at 420,424-25 (Biack,J., dissenting). Cf. Allan R Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 Yale L.J. 1935, 
1947 (1991){under current Erie doctrine, the "mere fact of diversity of citizenship should not result in a 
different allocation of rights between the parties than would exist in the absence of federal jurisdiction"; 
the "twin aims" of Erie-to avoid forum shopping and the "inequitable administration of the law"-
"collapse into a single concern for equality," since forum shopping "contributes to different treatment of 
litigants on the basis of their citizenship"). 
208 Prima Paint Corp., supra n.204, 388 U.S. at 400 (Fortas, J.), 41 0·011 (Black, J., dissenting). 
209 See ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law: Reformation-Nationalization-Internationalization 
138 (1992){"The Court's basis of decision made it logicaliy inescapable that the [FAA] governs in state 
courts as well, and the Court all but said so"); but cf. David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes 
in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act (J. on L. & Contemp. 
Problems, forthcoming 2003)("Southland did not follow inexorably from Prima Paint"; in the FAA 
Congress enacted "quasi-substantive rules of procedure governing federal courts," and the absence of 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction shows that the Act "is not the 'normal' exercise of commerce power the 
Southland majority wishes to make it"). 
210 Southland Corp, v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984)("[w]e are unwilling to attribute to Congress the 
intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a right to enforce 
an arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in 
which it is asserted"). Of course this is not at all the classic Erie situation, but rather what has been termed 
"the familiar 'reverse-Erie' question: To what extent must a state abandon or adapt what would otherwise 
be considered its normal rules of 'procedure' in order to give full effect to a federal right?" Rau, supra 
n.171 at 210. 
Professor Schwartz draws attention to a neat paradox that can be found in the Court's arbitration 
jurisprudence: 
Southland's concerns about forum shopping and litigant equality necessarily rest on the premise that 
arbitration is "outcome determinative"-that it "touches on substantive rights"-a line first taken in Erie 
cases like Bernhardt v. Polygraphic, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Yet at the same time, 
the modern Court has regularly upheld the arbitration of statutory claims in reliance on the standard 
rhetorical move that arbitration is nothing more than "a specialized type of forum selection that does not 
adversely affect anyone's substantive rights." 
See Schwartz, supra n.209; see also nn. 124, 126 supra. 
There is not the space here to go down this track-but let me suggest that since these two lines 
of cases do not, after all, pose quite the same question, there is no reason to insist that results be entirely 
congruent either. On the one hand, despite the rhetoric that arbitration is "just another forum," some 
leeway in the enforcement of statutory claims may be tolerable-at least as long as a rough vindication 
of legislative policy still seems likely; see, e.g., the Lloyd's securities fraud cases cited at n. 126 supra. 
On the other hand, the concerns expressed in Prima Paint and Southland--the desire to avoid divergent 
results in state and federal courts~do not implicate solely the uniform enforcement of the underlying 
substantive cause of action; they touch equally the very interest in autonomy that a party seeks to 
advance by entering into a contract in the first place. But then, I gather that in any event this interest in 
private ordering is of very little moment in Professor Schwartz' scheme of thing: Since the ''adhering 
party [to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement] is typically hampered by a large disparity in bargaining 
power or information," "parties who impose such agreements should not be heard to cry 'forum shopping."' 
See Schwartz, supra. At bottom the argument seems to be one further illustration of my point that when 
we reason from, and generalize from, the horrors of adhesion contracts, the price we inevitably pay is the 
distortion of our overaJJ Jaw of arbitration. See n. 199 supra. 
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111is proposition is highly unlikely to be tested soon in any conclusive fashion. But if we 
arc to remain true to the narrative of the Supreme Coures jurisprudence) I think we must fairly 
conclude that the presumption underlying Prima Paint has become part of the federal common 
law of arbin·ation-a body oflaw that state courts are now obliged to respect. 
It may help to justify this assertion if we return to eXl-;lore the implications of the C'...ouds 
1995 decision in Mastrobuono. 211 To begin with) it is quite uncontroversial that where a 
contract expressly contemplates an arbitral award of punitive damages, then state law may not 
remove this power from the jurisdiction of the arbitrators-in such a case the HNew Ymkn or 
"Garrity, "212 rule is clearly preempted. 213 That is a completely uninteresting proposition and 
not, of course, what Mastrobuono was about. 1he only questions in Mastrobuorw were, "did the 
parties grant the arbitrators the power to award punitive damages? If not expressly, then did 
they do so by implication? And if no dear inference can be drawn fTom textual matters, what 
should we presume with reference to their probable intent''? 
'TI1e Court's ultimate holding-, that an arbitral award of punitive damages "should 
have been enforced as within the scope of the contract"214-}'derived both from an explicit 
interpretative strategy and a conscious choice of a default rulen215 : There was of course the 
contra proferentemchesmur.2 16-butotherwise, the conclusion that the contract in fact contained 
no restTictions on arbitral power rested firmly on '\he federal policy favoring arbitration" and 
the Moses,Cone inspired plindplc that any "ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause 
itself [should be] resolved in favor of arbitration."217 Even that principle might seem somewhat 
abstract unless the necessmy corollmy is added-that a "generic" choice,of-law clause 
incorporating New York law is in itself an insufficient indicium of intent to exclude arbitral 
power with respect to punitive damages: And once the clause is set aside, there is nothing but 
"ambiguity"-or indeed, "silence'1-whichcan be filled with the federal dcf8.ult rule. 
Now the Court inMastrobuono did not of course need to address the question whether 
its holding would equally apply in state courts. 218 The tenor of the opinion, however) deady 
suggests that the Court expected it would. ll1e simple remark, for example, that had there 
211 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 ("1995); see generally Rau, supra n.26 at 
254-261. 
212 The longstanding rule in New York, as in a number of other states, has been that an arbitral award of 
punitive damages is against "public policy" even though the parties had granted the arbitrators the 
power to award such damages-and even though on a similar cause of action a court or jury could 
impose them. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)("For centuries the power to punish 
has been a monopoly of the State, and not that of any private individual. The day is long past since 
barbaric man achieved redress by private punitive measures"). 
213 Mastrobuono, supra n.2"11, 514 U.S. at 58. 
214 ld. at 64. 
215 Rau, supra n.26 at 256. 
216 Mastrobuono, supra n.211, 514 U.S. at 62-63. 
m ld. at 62 & fn.8; the reference is to Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v., Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
u.s. 1' 24-25 (1983). 
218 See Rau, supra n.26 at 257 ("The Supreme Court appeared to construe the contract de novo, and 
found that its conclusion accorded with 'the only decision-maker arguably entitled to deference'~the 
arbitrator. So no state court was involved at any time"). 
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been no choice~of~law clause at a !I) then "punitive damages would be allowed because, in the 
absence of contractual intent to the contrary, the FAA would pre~empt the Garrity rule/'m 
speaks volumes; In conjunction with the invocation of Moses Cone and ofMitsubishi, it tells us 
that the presumption of arbitral jurisdiction~which, while rebuttable, needs no particular 
contractual language to support it -is part of a federal common law that trumps any state 
default rule to the contrary. 
One deduces from this that state rules of contract interpretation may occasionally be 
boiTowed-in]ustice Holmes' typically quotable phrase-as a "benevolent gratuity,"220 but 
not as a source oflaw in its own right. Conceptually there can be no "gap" in a common law 
system, and "a rich federal common law-what the Supreme Court prefers to call the federal 
substantive law of arbitrability-is being generated every day, by federal and state courts alike, 
as a means of spinning out all the implications" of the federal statute. "This is a task that is 
inexn·icably linked to the question of the proper interpretation of the statute itself," and so 11 the 
dimensions of the federally granted right to arbitrate must continue to be a matter of national 
COllCC111. " 221 
Mastrobuono was followed for a while by a brief spell of wishful thinking, in which it was 
often assumed that federal courts should defer to state court construction of the scope of 
contractual obligations...........-evcn if the result were to limit arbitral authority-::md rhat federal 
law should have the same transparency it assumes in Erie, abstracted from any functional 
analysis or any comideration of national policy.222 But after some hesitation even the New York 
courts seem sensibly to have capitulated, and it seems to be generally accepted that state 
judges are expected to follow the Supreme Court's lead.223 
219 Mastrobuono, supra n.211, 514 U.S. at 59. 
220 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220 (1917). 
m Rau, supra n.171 at 214. 
222 See Rau, supra n.26 at 257-261 & especially at 257 fn.138. 
223 See, e.g., Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 648 N.Y.S.2d 535, 538 (App.Div. 1 996)(Mastrobuono 
"makes it dear that, with respect to arbitration proceedings governed by the FAA which preempts the 
Garrity rule, the arbitration of punitive damage claims is required except where the parties have 
unequivocally agreed otherwise"); Americorp Securities, Inc. v. Sager, 656 N.Y.S.2d 762 (App. Div. 
1997)("although the Garrity rule prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive damages," the FAA has a 
"preemptive effect" on "inconsistent state ru!es"). 
But cf. Goff Group, Inc., v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 231 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1151-52 (M.D. Ala. 2002). Here the 
court was apparently faced with a conflict between an arbitration clause and a choice-of-law clause that 
both called for the application of Pennsylvania law and provided for the resolution of all disputes "in the 
appropriate federal or state court." Finding that the case was "essentially on all fours with Mastrobuono," 
the federal court thought-in the absence of any Pennsylvania case on point-that it had "to make an 
educated case [sic] as to how [the state's] highest court would resolve the dispute." It then concluded that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would "essentially reach the same result" as the Court did in 
Mastrobuono---particularly since the state court would be equally "constrained" by the principles underlying 
the FAA, including the "federal policy favoring arbitration." This is just climbing up the hill in order to 
clamber righi down it again-reaching a fairly sensible result by the most unnecessarily circuitous of 
detours. 
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One corollary is that it is hard to imagine that much life is left any more in cases like 
Vblt. 224224 Volt Infonnation Sciences, Inc. v. Board ofEustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 
U.S. 468 (1989). Sec generally Rau, supra n.125 at 207: 
1l1e notion that state arbiu·ation law which is at odds with the dictates of the FAA, can 
be reintroduced through the device of ;-1 choice-of-law clause has been steadily eroding, and is 
being increasingly ig:rJored. Volt has become peripheral to the point where it is now often said 
that he case can be (limited to its own facts."'See also Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Industries, Inc., 
142 E3d926, 936 (6thCir. 1998) (discussing Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 5!7U.S. 681 
(1996); the "Court's charactetization of the CaHfom.ia law at issue in Volt as merely determining 
the efficient order of proceedings appears to be another attempt by the Court. to limit Volt to its 
facts"). 
Another corollaty is that Prima Paint must have the same prescriPtive power. IfPrirna 
Paint too rests on the presumption of an intent to arbitrate, then it too should have become p::l.rt 
of the substantive federal common law of arbitration. The titual invocation of this common 
law in Moses Cone225 is reinforced here by a variety of functional considerations-notably that 
to allow threshold litigation of claims of contract validity could easily "vitiate the policy aims" 
224 Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
See generally Rau, supra n.l25 at 207: 
The notion that state arbitration law which is at odds with the dictates of the FAA, can be reintroduced 
through the device of a choice~of-law clause has been steadily eroding, and is being increasingly ignored. 
Volt has become peripheral to the point where it is now often said that he case can be 'limited to its own 
facts."' 
See also Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Industries, Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 936 (61h Cir. 1998)(discussing Doctor's 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); the "Court's characterization of the California law at issue 
in Volt as merely determining the efficient order of proceedings appears to be another attempt by the Court 
to limit Volt to its facts"). 
Now for one thing, it is hard to understand how a case can be thought to be properly decided~but 
neverthe!ess at the same time thought to have no resonance at all beyond its "own facts": In any common-
law system, no such animal can exist. Nor is it a particularly striking phenomenon to find obsolete decisions 
"distinguished" away in order to mask changes of heart. So it seems curiously na·lve to insist that Volt must 
remain good law because the Court in Mastrobuono "explicitly disclaimed any intent to disturb the result 
in Volt and cited the opinion liberally throughout its analysis," Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, 
Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2250, 2267 (2002); see also id. 
at 2265 n.96 nhe Court explicitly distinguished Volt and did not suggest that its reasoning was unsound"). 
It is also peculiarly unconvincing to claim that Volt at least continues to have some purchase with respect 
to state law "favorable" to arbitration: compare id. at 2259 (in Volt "the state policy furthered the federal 
goal of encouraging arbitration," while in Mastrobuono "the policy at issue would have direct!y impeded 
the FAA's goals")( emphasis in original), with Rau, supra n.26 at 250~254 ("[i]t is difficult to say just what it is 
about the California arbitration statute [in Volt] that was thought to 'generally foster the federal policy 
favoring arbitration'"; it "remains paradoxical that the effect of applying a state statute in Volt was to deny 
a motion to compel arbitration in precisely those circumstances that earlier cases applying the FAA had 
found to require such an order''}(emphasis in original). 
225 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, supra n.209, 460 U.S. at 24-25 {"[fjederal law in the terms of the 
Arbitration Act governs ['the arbitrabitity of the dispute"] in either state or federal court," and § 2 of the Act 
"[creates] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability"; citing to Prima Paint as an "example," "as a 
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation 
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability"}. 
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of the FAA by makingt3.r more difficult the streamlined dispute resolution that the contracting 
parties had bargained for.22 6 Even as I write, finally, we are being reminded that federat 
presumptions with respect to the allocation of responsibility between courts and arbitrators are 
an important part of this federal common law-and one that escapes state controL 227 
228 See Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Industries, supra n.216, 142 F.3d at 938. Ferro in fact neatly exemplifies the 
conceptual !ink between Mastrobuono and Prima Paint. In Ferro the contract between the parties included 
both a standard "broad" arbitration clause, and a choice"of-law clause calling for the application of Ohio law. 
The tria! court held that the issue of whether this contract had been "fraudulently induced" was "non-arbitrable 
under Ohio law": While it dedined to stay the arbrtration, which was already under way, the court did enjoin the 
arbitrators from resolving the issue of fraudulent inducement, and later found that the plaintiff had indeed 
fraudulently induced the defendant to enter into the agreement. The Sixth Circuit reversed: Under Prima 
Paint, the claim of fraudulent inducement should have been submitted to the arbitrators. The choice-of-law 
clause changed nothing--since "the relevant provisions of state law and the FAA appear to conflict," '"the state 
law is preempted"; ''following Ohio law would clearly contravene the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 2 of 
the FAA by requiring the issue to be resolved in a judicial forum." 142 F.3d at 934-35. Only if under 
Mastrobuono the choice-of-law clause had constituted an "unequivocal inclusion" of the state rule-which it did 
not-could the issue have been preserved for judicial determination. It has provocatively been suggested that 
the preemptive effect of this federal default rule of interpretation---its presumption of an intent to arbitrate-.....can 
aiso serve a prophylactic function. See Note, An Unnecessary Choice of law, supra n.216 at 2254. This is the 
point after all of an overbroad rule: A thumb is placed on the scales in recognition of the historical tendency of 
state courts to be less than even-handed in assessing the arbitral process-and to cut off in advance the 
potential manipulation of contractual ambiguities. To "preempt" after all means both to supplant or override, 
and to forestall or prevent (This last sentence is obviously not intended as argument, just as an intriguing 
semantic factoid). See also Rau, supra n.171 at 213 {"where contract doctrine calls for courts to engage in 
intensive, fact-oriented application of broad, unexceptional standards, it will be particularly hard to monitor 
state cases to ensure conformity with federal law. [For example, state] courts that have historically shown some 
animosity towards the enforcement of arbitration agreements may read the law of equitable estoppel narrowly 
so as to allow a party to avoid having to arbitrate with nonsignatories"); Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 
257 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 2001){"any default rule is doomed to be inaccurate in some cases," but "[i]n light of 
the FAA's history," we believe that "wrongly concluding that parties intended to opt out {of the FAA's default 
regime] is worse" than "wrongly concluding that they did not"). Cf. laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: 
Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-law Judgments, 101 Mich. l. Rev. 80, 95, 98 (2002)("even those 
who justify the Court's state-ground reversals on the need to police states' supremacy clause violations discount 
particularized state-court conduct, taking instead a more structural, prophylactic stance that simply assumes 
enough cheating by all states, over time, to warrant Supreme Court review"). 
m See Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 2003 Wl 21433403 (U.S.), discussed at text accompanying 
n.278 infra. In Green Tree the state courts had ordered arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis, and had later 
confirmed the ensuing award; the respondent had moved to vacate, arguing that the imposition of classwide 
arbitration was a "fail[ure] to enforce [the arbitration clause] in accordance with its terms, in violation of the FAA." 
In his plurality opinion Justice Breyer fashioned a rule by which: 
under the federal common law of arbitration, the question whether a contract permits or forbids the use of class 
arbitration procedures is presumptively one for the arbitrator to decide rather than the courts, and under this 
common law the presumption of arbitral competence is binding on state courts. Taking these two points 
together, the question of classwide arbitration became one of construction with which the state courts had 
nothing to do. The case was remanded "so that this question may be resolved in arbitration." 
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens expressed his agreement with the f1rst point"--but not 'Nlth the second: 
Although "arguably" the interpretation of the agreement "should have been made in the first instance by the 
arbitrator rather than the court," the respondent had not claimed that this decision "was made by the wrong 
decisionmake( -and since '1here is nothing in the [FAA] that precludes" the findings of the state supreme court 
made "as a matter of state law," he would have preferred simply to affirm the state court orders confirming the 
award. However, in light of the division of the Court-which would othetWise make any judgment at all 
impossible---and because "Justice Breyer's opinion expresses a view of the case close to my own," he ultimately 
concurred in the judgment 2003 Wl 21433403 at *7-*8. By contrast, a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by two other justices, primarily disagreed only with the first point: The proper decisionmaker, 
he thought, was the court rather than the arbitrator. But since (as the respondent urged) the state court's 
construction clearly "contravenes" the "express agreement of the parties," its judgment permitting classwide 
arbitration must be "preempted by the FAA." 2003 Wl 21433403 at *8, *10. That left only Justice Thomas-
whose singular inability to reconcile himself to Southland v. Keating, supra n-210, rendered him once again 
incapable of making any meaningful contribution to the discussion. 
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II. What (if Anything) is Added by First 0/Jtions? 
14, Three separate questions will recur in connection with any arbitration--and it is critical 
to l<ecp them distinct in any analysis. 
1lw discussion here is at a somewhat higher level of abstraction than I have engaged 
in previously: It evokes the conceptual framework that Justice Breyer first made explicit in 
First Options v. Kaplan228-in which he identified the '\hree types of disagrecmene) that were 
present in the case. Let me unpack them. TI1ey are: 
1. How should a particular substantive issue be decided? This is a matter of deciding 
"the n1eritsn of the dispute-how the substantive law should be applied to any contested 
question. Such questions, of course, may include any merits~based defense-such as an 
allegation that a contract is invalid. 
2. "\"Xlho is to decide the level #1 issue?" "Is the decision for the court or for the 
arbitratort) "For example, in Prima Paint, who is to determine the merits of the fraudulent 
inducement claim?" "Did the parties agree to arbitrate this particular issue?" "Did the parties 
in their contract grant to an arbitrator the jurisdiction to decide this dispute ?11 
I have indulged in some redundancy here in order to underline that all of these arc 
quite interchangeable fonnulations--each one is simply a different way of asking precisely the 
same question. 229 Justice Breyer sununalizes this type of disagreement by saying that it concems 
"the arbitrability of the dispute. "230 
3. And finally, just who is to decide the level #2 issue! Is it (as one might expect) fora 
court to determine the extent of the arbitrator's '(jurisdiction"? Or are there circumstances 
where an arbitrator himself may have the "primmy power)) to pass on his own authority?l31 Use 
of the term "primary power" is obviously intended to evoke the essential issue here-which is 
one of the scope of judicial review: FlO the extent that a decision at level #2 is entrusted to 
arbitrators, courts would be expected not only to defer prospectively-by refusing to rule on an 
issue entrusted to arbitral decisionmaking-but after the fact as well) by limiting review to 
narrow statutmy f:,'Tounds. In the absence of such a grant of power, though, judicial review is de 
novo. 232 
228 First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, supra n.2, 514 U.S. at 942. See also Rau, supra n2 at 306-07. 
w But cf. Reuben, supra n.4 at 874 n.326. 
23\l First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, supra n.2, 514 U.S. at 942. 
231 
"!! is the dilemma of the box within a box or, in the case of arbitration, the authority as to the decision as 
to the authority to make the decision." Perry v. Hyundai Moior America, Inc., 744 So.2d 859, 866 n.S (A!a. 
1999). 
2~2 See Rau, supra n.2 at 351 n.170. 
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TI1is level #3 issue might possibly be characterized as the question ofncomt)etence/ 
compCtence": But as I have argued elsewhere) whatever we gain in a heightened appearance 
of sophistication by invoking this term) is outweighed by what we lose in the virtual certainty 
of incoherence: Given that Ametican legislation ''allows an objecting party to seck judicial 
determination of the scope of consent either before, during or after an arbitration/'233 the tcnn 
is strictly irrelevant to American proccdure.234 
15. Given this taxonomy, it is plain lhat the doctrine of se1Jarability continues to be central to 
our law of arbitration. 
a. First Options v. Kaplan 
While the First Optiom decision can only be fully understood in light of the precise 
problem the Court thought it was faced with-and in terms of the precise factual context in 
which the case arose-I hope it is not necessary to rehearse aH that herc. 235 It may be enough 
to remind ourselves that in First OjJtions, the level #1 issue was whether Mr. Kaplan was 
personally liable under a workout agreement that he had signed on behalf of a corporation of 
which he was president and sole sharcholdet: The level #2 issue was whether Mr. Kaplan was 
jxrsonall}1 obligated to arbitmte this question-that is> whether he was bound to an arbitration 
clause that he al.legedly did not sign in his personal capacity. This claim that "nothing is subject 
to arbitration because there is no agreement to arbitrate must be the mother of arbitrabihty 
questions.'1236 Over Kaplan's objections, the arbitrators had taken it upon themselves to assert 
their jurisdiction over him~whether on the basis of the signed agreement, or on the ground 
that he was the companls 11 alterego.)!237 
Now it should be evident from this summary that the principal intellectual interest of 
the First 01Jtions case was at level #3~raising the question of the appropriate dccisionmaker 
with respect to arbitral jurisdiction: Did the arbitrators' assertion of jurisdiction command the 
233 Grad v. Wetherholt Galleries, 660 A.2.d 903, 908 (D.C. App. 1995)(Uniform Arbitration Act). 
234 See Rau, supra n.2 at 288 & n.6, 301 n.38, 307 n.55. 
Cf. Ph. Fouchard et aL, supra n.132 at 415 (the rule of competence/competence is essentially a 
timing mechanism, merely "a rule of chronological priority''); Antonias Dimolitsa, "Separability and Kompetenz-
Kompetenz," in International Council for Commercial Arbitration, supra n.59 at 217, 229 ("the competence-
competence principle has always been seen as a concession on the part of national legal systems, so that 
arbitrators might rule on their own jurisdiction, subject to possible review by courts"); Sanders, supra n.93 at 
32 (according to the understanding of competence/competenc..e in most national legal systems, the "decision 
by which the arbitrators have asserted their own jurisdiction can subsequently be attacked in the courts. There 
is thus a later judicial control over the panel's decision with respect to its jurisdiction"). Compare id. at 42 ('just 
as the arbitrators can make a determination as to their own jurisdiction," the notion of separability indicates 
that "they can decide--this time though, without any monitoring by the courts except in the most exceptional 
case-----on the validity or nullity of the main contract'')(my translations; emphasis added). 
205 See the detailed exposition at Rau, supra n.2 at 289-302. 
236 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Exalon Indus., Inc., 138 F.3d 426, 429 (1 81 Cir. 1998). 
m See Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, 19 F.3d 1503, 1511 (3'd Cir. 1994)(stock exchange arbitration panel 
denied Kaplan's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; exchange's Director of Arbitration "said only that the 
denial was consistent with the Exchange Arbitration Panel's interpretation of jurisdiction"). 
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deference commonly extended to arbitral awards? justice Breyer quite accurately terms this 
both a 1'nanov/j and an "arcane)' issue238~and it is) in fact, increasingly becoming a marginal 
one. On the way to concluding that the answer to the question is "no)" the opinion suggests 
that the panel might indeed have had the authority to determine the validity of Kaplan's 
consent to arbitration-~bw:only if the parties hCl.d ';agree[ d] to submit the arbitrability question 
itself to arbitration."239 Such an intention to leave to the arbitrators themselves the threshold 
question of an intent to arbitrate is, howevc1; sufficiently unlikely----"sufficiently at odds with 
normal practice"240~that courts "should not assume)) such an intention in the absence of 
"clear and unmistakable" evidence that they did so.241 Given this adverse presumption, the 
Court simply could not find) "on the record before us,'' a ''clear willingness)) on Kaplan's part to 
be bound by the arbitrators' finding of consent.242 
Titis level #3 conclusion should naturally lead us to the next question~that is, whether 
arbitral jmisdiction actually exists. But here, the level #2 finding of the court below·-a de novo 
finding that Kaplan had never consented, in his individual capacity, to aHow arbitrators to 
determine the merits of the dispute-was not disturbed.243 
ns First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. supra n.2, 514 u.s_ at 942, 945. 
23s ld. at 943. 
240 This phrase is not from the Supreme Court In Kaplan but from a particularly arlicufate predecessor, Virginia 
Carolina Tools, Inc. v. lnt'l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 117 (4 111 Cir. 1993). 
241 First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, supra n.2, 514 U.S. at 944. 
Note that it is a clear misreading of First Options to conclude that "when a court is called upon to 
determine the existence of a contract," it must find "clear and unmistakable evidence of agreement to 
arbitrate." Lepera v. ITT Corp., 1997 WL 535165 at *3 n.2 (E.D. Pa.). Rather, First Options insisted that we 
have such evidence before submitting the question of consent to the arbitrators rather than to the court. Of 
course, the burden of proof as to the existence of an arbitration agreement is on the proponent of such an 
agreement--and so I suppose the court in Lepera is correct in holding that (at least where the agreement is 
contested) a motion to compel arbitration should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, giving the 
opposing party the benefit of aft reasonable doubts and inferences. But it would obviously be contrary to 
federal policy to suggest that the proponent must carry a higher burden than is usual in civil cases-to assert 
that "the threshold for clarity of agreement to arbitrate is greater than with respect to other contractual terms." 
ld. at *4. But cf. Reuben, supra n.4 at 870-71 (discussing "by what standard [a court is] supposed to determine 
if the parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute," and suggesting that First Op!ions is "ambiguous on whether 
the 'clear and unmistakable standard' also applies" to such questions; "there seems to be little reason to apply 
a lesser standard of proof to the merits of the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate than is 
applied to the predicate question of 'who decides' that question"). 
2
"
2 First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, supra n.2, 514 U.S. at 946. 
f 43 See Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, 19 F.3d 1503 (3'd Cir. 1994), affd, First Options of Chicago v. 
Kaplan, supra n.2. The Third Circuit had noted that an "arbitrator's decision to assert jurisdiction over 
objection" is "subject to de novo judicial review." After a lengthy discussion, it held that whatever First Options 
could point to in order to demonstrate Kaplan's consent to arbitrate~whether it was his membership in the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, or some theory of piercing the corporate veii~was without merit. 19 F.3d 
1512-23. In the Supreme Court this question of the actual existence of arbitral jurisdiction-that is, the level 
#2 question-was held to be a "factbound issue" that was "beyond the scope of the questions we agreed to 
review." 514 U.S. at 949. 
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So First Ol)tion.s adds nothing that is particularly fresh or compelling-nothing that we 
could not already have assumed. 244 It reminds us that-if arbitration is not to be an entirely 
closed and self-contained system--one must get into it somehow; that a somehow'' is through a 
judicially-sanctioned agreement to arbitral jurisdiction. Now of course the Court's presumption 
against leaving the question of consent to the arbitrators themselves is, like all presumptions, 
rebuttable:'/\ dispute over whether I have validly af,rrecd to anydJing is a dispute like any other, 
which parties can presumably resolve as they wishn245-forexample, by submitting it to ''judges'' 
of their own choosing. But the fundamental premise with which we started-that one is only 
bound to arbitrate if he has ab.rrced to do sc/45-mcans at the very least that a judicial decision 
to that effect must be available) even if only at one remove: Where the First Ofxions presumption 
is overcome it must be because there is a court that is ''satisfied))247 that the parties had agreed 
to entrust this question of consent to the arbitrator, and that they were willing to be bound by 
this arbitrator)s award. res never turtles all the way down. 248 
If there is anything that is at all original about First Oj)tions, it is that it has relieved 
parties like Mr. Kaplan fi\)m the painful dilemma to which much previous case law had 
subjected them. A respondent against whom an arbitTation proceeding has been initiated-
but who believes that he is not personally bound by any arbitration agreement~is often 
confronted with a menu of wholly unpalatable choices: Simply boycotting the proceedings 
would entail the loss of his right to contest the claim on the merits; on the other hand, 
appearing before the arbitrators LO argue that he had never consented to arbitral jurisdiction 
would often be taken to mean that he had j(waivcd" the issue or "submitted" it to the panel. 
ll1e First Options presumption counseling against a finding of any submission on Kaplan's part 
thus allows him to participate under protest while preserving a judicial forum for the determination 
244 Everything in First Options is already present in germ in cases going back 40 years and decided under § 
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)eunless the parties clearly and unmistakably 
provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not 
the arbitrator''); United Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 
(1960)('Where the assertion by the claimant is that the parties excluded from court determination not merely 
the decision of the merits of the grievance but also the question of its arbitrability, vesting power to make both 
decisions in the arbitrator, the claimant must bear the burden of a clear demonstration of that purpose"). 
245 Rau, supra n.2 at 294-295 (emphasis in original). Cf. id. at 295, where 1 posit a hypothetical scenario in 
which 
Mr. Kaplan has told the putative uarbitrators" that while he really does not believe that he is bound to arbitrate, 
he recognizes that this remains a complex legal question: So, in order to avoid duplicative and costly 
litigation-and after lengthy discussions with his counsel----he thinks it best to entrust this issue to the panel for 
a final judgment, being willing to abide whatever the award may be. 
246 See text accompanying nn. 7-21 supra. 
247 See 9 U.S.C. § 4, quoted at n.9 supra. 
248 See Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes 1 (1988): 
A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture on astronomy. He 
described how the earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast 
collection of stars called our galaxy. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up 
and said, "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant 
tortoise." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" uYou're very 
clever, young man, very clever," said the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way down.l" 
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of assent.149 If the "clear and unmistakable" standard was intended to do nothing more than 
this-and that is precisely what I am suggesting-this alone would serve to considerably 
enhance both the fairness and the efficiency of our arbitration procedure. 
For reasons that escape me, the view is often expressed that First 01Jtions has somehow 
((undermined" the rule of separability-and that as a consequence the continuing validity of 
Prima Paint is now in doubt.250250 E.g., Williams v.'I11c Money Tree, 686 So.2d 1110, 1112 (Ala. 
1996) (Houston,]., concurring) ("the reasoning of [First Options] is dramatically opposed to 
that of Prima Paint, so Plima Paint and its progeny must give way to [First Options]"); Maye v. 
Smith Barney Inc., 897 ESupp.lOO, I 06 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("It is somewhat unclear whether 
the [Prima Paint] rule is of continuing validity in light of the holding in l FirstOptionsl that the 
question of whether the parties ever made an agreement to arbitrate is generally to be decided 
by the courts"}; Reuben, supra n.4 at 872~ 78 (noting the "fundamental tension" between 
Prima Paint and First Options and their ((opposing analytical foundations"). 
l11.e most likely diagnosis is that this notion proceeds from some a priori assumption-
some unspoken but question~begging premise-to the effect that the unenfOrceability of the 
underlying contract would necessarily deprive arbitrators of the power to act: If this were the 
case then the presumption of First Options would of course come into play, and a judicial 
decision on the issue of contract validity would be required. But much of this article has been 
249 See generally Rau. supra n.2 at 295-302 ("What the Court was intent on doing, in short, was simply to 
contrast the uninteresting and obvious case--where Kapian could have consented to an arbitral finding on 
jurisdiction~with the actual c..ase before it, which on the proper analysis it was important to hold that he had 
nof')(emphasis in original). See also Opals on Ice, supra n.19. Here the respondent had argued throughout 
the arbitration process that the panel did not have jurisdiction over the dispute, but the arbitrators made a 
provisional finding that they had jurisdiction because "the facts relating to jurisdiction ... were inextricably 
connected with the proof required on other issues." While the claimant contended that the respondent had 
"submitted the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrators," the court held-----relying on First Options-that "merely 
arguing the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator does not indicate a clear willingness to arbitrate that issue." The 
court itself went on to give summary judgment to the respondents on that ground that "there was no meeting 
of the minds as to an agreement to arbitrate." 
250 E.g., Williams v. The Money Tree, 686 So.2d 1110, 1112 (Ala. 1996)(Houston, J., concurring)("the 
reasoning of [First Options) is dramatica!iy opposed to that of Prima Paint, so Prima Paint and its progeny 
must give way to [First Options]"); Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F.Supp.100, 106 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)("1t is 
somewhat unclear whether the [Prima Paint] rule is of continuing validity in light of the holding in [First 
Options] that tile question of whether the parties ever made an agreement to arbitrate is generally to be 
decided by the courts"); Reuben, supra n.4 at 872-78 (noting the ''fundamental tension" between Prima Paint 
and First Options and their "opposing analytical foundations"). 
Judge Easterbrook, however, has never claimed that Prima Paint "sits uneasily alongside" of First 
Options; compare id. at 826 with Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., supra n.38. Sphere Drake 
involved the issue of an agent's iack of authority: "To arbitrate the agency issue, [the respondent] insists, would 
be circular, for arbitration is proper if and only if [the putative agent} indeed could bind [the respondent." 256 
F.3d at 588-89. The claimant argued that under Prima Paint, "all disputes about contract formation" must go 
to arbitrators, while "only disputes about the scope of arbitration clauses are resolved in advance by courts." 
256 F3d at 590. Judge Easterbrook remarked that if such a view were adopted the case would indeed ''[sill 
unreasily alongside" First Options-but found this reading of Prima Paint simply not "plausible." That's a 
considerable understatement: I argued strenuously earlier that such a sweeping view of separabililty would 
be totally at odds with the premise that we "need to f1nd a legally enforceable assent to submit to arbitration"~ 
which is "a conceptual cornerstone" of the Prima Paint decision. See text accompanying nn. 38~60 supra. 
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aimed at demonsLTatingthat none of this is true~~md that here no more than anywhere else are 
legal rules to be reduced to syllogisms, or derided on the ground oflogical impossibility. 
There is in fact not the slightest tension between the cases. Here)s why: 
·By contrast with First OjJtions, the level #3 issue was not implicated in any way in Prima 
Paint: Or rather, it was simply assumed without discussion that this decision would be made by 
the court-that the court, acting at the threshold as a gatekeeper, would pass on the julisdiction 
of the arbitrator. Neither of the parties had even suggested anything to the contrary. In a sense, 
then, the Court in First Otxions was only making articulate what it had for many years been 
taking for granted. 
·The Court in Prima Paint dealt instead exclusively with the level #2 question: "Who-----
court or arbitrator?~~L~ w determine the rnerirs of the fraudulent inducement claim?" Since the 
parties could have provided for arbin·al dccisionmaking had they chosen to do so, the task for the 
court here was to find evidence--or to supply a sunogate--with respect to contractual intention: 
0 Again incontra~t with First 01Jtions, there was no doubt whatever that the parties had 
entered into a valid arbitration agreement-neither of them in fact suggested the contraiy. 
TI1ere was, for example, no contention that a party had not intended to sign the agreement in his 
individual capacity or that the arbitration clause itselfhad been "induced by fraud." 251 
0 That left only one question of any importance--whether, in this unquestionably 
valid arbitration agreement, the parties had wished to entrust their arbitrators with the power to 
decide the fraudulent inducement claim. 
Now~ as is inv;niably the case-nothing in the way the clause wc1S worded was particularly 
probative. (It certainly helped, though> that the ''conlTactuallanguage [was] easily broad enough 
to encompass" the claim that the con'ittlting agreement had been procured by fraud.) 252 l have 
already explained why I think the Court's functional choice of a default rule to fill gaps in such 
cases is "an eminently sensible)) one.153 At the very lca~t, though, the strategic move familiar for 
almost half a centUiy-whether the driving engine is the competence attributed to expert 
decisionmaking, the role of arbitration in collective bargaining, the desire fOr docket clearing, or 
a simple construction of apparently unqualified language254-has been a strong presumption 
251 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,406 (1967)("1n the present case no claim has 
been advanced by Prima Paint that F & C fraudulently induced it to enter into the agreement to arbitrate '(a)ny 
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof."'). 
252 ld. 
253 This is proposWon #7 above. See text accompanying nn. 77-83 supra. 
254 
"Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is as b1uad as the one employed in this case, 
which provides for arbitration of 'any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the 
performance of any obligation hereunder .. .' In such cases, in the absence of any express provision excluding a 
particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the daim 
from arbitration can prevail." AT&T Technologies, supra n.77, 475 U.S. at 650. 
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that once the parties have af,rreed to arbitrate, they have been willing to submit al1 disputes to 
the arbitral forum. 255 
This is a default rute that readily explains the holding in Prima PainL~the Court there 
could simply find no evidence that the presumption had been rebutted.256 It also, as I suggested 
above, readily accounts for more recent cases lilcc Mas~robuono. 257 Most importantly, it is a 
presumption that is re~affinned and given an explicit rationale in First Options itsclf. 258 
b. The October 2002 Term Trilo,lfl 
Our law of arbin·arion is for some reason replete with "trilogies, "259 and the Supreme 
Court Tcnn that has just ended continues that pattem. It is not a particularly challenging task 
to uncover a shared theme in all three of these recent arbitration decisions: 'W'hat they suggest, 
consistent with what lam arguing here, is that much of the flutter and fuss that has surrounded 
First OfJtions-now becoming an increasingly marginalized case-has been unwan·antcd. 260 
·Howsam 
The rules of"self~regulatory organizations" li.kc the NSAD impose a limit of six years 
after which no customer claim 'ishall be eligible for submission to arbitration."26 t When a 
broker sought to enjoin a customer ffom arbitrating a dispute on the £,>round that it was time~ 
baned under NSADrules, a district court dismissed the action, holding that under the standard 
"Client Service Asrrcement" the question of eligibility should be determined by an arbitrator 
255 See n.77 supra. 
256 Prima Paint, supra n.253, 388 U.S. at 406 (''Indeed, no claim is made that Prima Paint ever intended that 
'legal' issues relating to the contract be excluded from arbitration"). 
257 See text accompanying nn. 214-219 supra. 
258 First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, supra n.2, 514 U.S. at 945 (''when the parties have a contract that 
provides for arbitration of some issues, [they] likely gave at least some thought to the scope of arbitration. 
And, given the law's permissive policies in respect to arbitration, one can understand why the law would insist 
upon clarity before concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related matter")(emphasis in 
original). 
25~ See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 
Va. L. Rev. 1305 (1985); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bii! of Rights and Law Practice 
Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 Am. Rev. lnt'l Arb. 1 (1995); David Gibbs, "After Waffle House, 
Arbitration Gets 'New Trilogy' of Employment Law," 20 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 17 (2002). 
= See Rau, supra n.2 at 289 ("There May Be Less Here Than Meets the Eye"). 
261 Rule 10304 of the NASD Code provides: 
No dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbitration under this Code where six (6) 
years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy. This 
section shall not extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shai! it apply to any case which is directed to 
arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Rule 603 of the NYSE's arbitration rules is substantially the same. See generally Constantine N. Katsoris, 
The Resolution of Securities Disputes, 6 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 307, 323-24 (2001). 
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rather than by the courts. 262 1lte Tenth Circuit reversed: Puqxxting to fotlow First Options, it could 
not find any "clear and unmistakable" agreement by the parties to arbitrate the issue whether the 
claim was time~bancd. And) as might have been expected, the Supreme Court reversed in tum: 
im[TJ he applicability of the NASD time lin1it rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, not for 
the judge"; "we cannot conclude that the p81tics intended to have a court, rather thanancu'bitT3tor; 
intervret and apply" the rule. "263 
Now it would be perfectly !ogical~indccd plausible~tosee compliance with the sikycar 
time limit as in some sense raising the questionof"consent to the juriscliction of the arbitrators": 
\\/bile the parties have undoubtedly"agreed" to arbitrate timely claims, it does not at all "foUow th<.1t 
there is any 'agreement' at all to arbitrate clairns not brought within_ contractual time Hmits; nor does 
it follow that they have 'agreed' to arbitrate anything where the contract irnp:_Jscs ccrtllin procedural 
prerequisites to the asscltlon of a claim that have not yet l-:x:en met. '>264 111is is precisely the approach 
urged by the broker inHotusam and accepted by the Tenth Circuit.265 Yet it seems infinitely more 
sensible to treat the NASD time limits in a way that is consistent with functionally identical cases, 
in which similar assertions~that a claimant's delay or missteps have caused the dispute to be no 
longer "arbitrable"~are made. 266 For example, in any rational legal system the appropriate 
decision maker for questions mising out of the NASD time bcw will be the same as, say, for questions 
of"procedural ~u-bitrabi!ilty''267 ---cases where arbitral discretion has long l-:x:en taken for granted. 203 
262 The clause provided that all controversies ... concerning or arising from (i)any account maintained with Dean 
Witter by Client; (ii) any transaction involving Dean Witter and Client, ... or (iii) the construction. performance 
or breach of this or any other agreement between us ... shall be determined by arbitration before any self-
regulatory organization or exchange of which Dean Witter is a member. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 958 (10111 Cir. 2001). rev'd, Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
;ooJ Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2002 Wl31746742 (U.S.) at *5. 
~c. Rau, supra n.2 at 310. 
;oo5 See Respondent's Brief, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 2002 Wl 1728503 at *7 ("Petitioner appears 
to assume that the 'subject matter' at issue here is the recommendation and sale of securities to petitioner by 
Dean Witter brokers. But the 'subject matter' could be defined just as easily as the recommendation and sale of 
securities to petitioner by Dean Witter brokers within the past six years"); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 
supra n.262, 261 F.3d at 965 (NASD time limit is a "substantive limit on the claims that the parties have 
contracted to submit to arbitration"; "courts, and not arbitrators, should determine whether an action is time-
barred by the NASO Code because that determination involves the scope of the arbitrator's subject matter 
jurisdiction"). 
:x£ I have argued this elsewhere at some length. Rau, supra n.2, at 316-331. 
267 See Rau, supra n.2 at 322 ("But wl1o could possibly think that linking together these two words---€ach with a 
troubled history, and each notoriously manipulable and vague-is calculated to increase intelligibility?"); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Of "Procedural Arbitrab!lity": The Effect of Noncompliance with Coniract Claims 
Procedures, 40 S.C. l. Rev. 847 (1989); Macneil et aL, supra n.19 at§ 21.1.2.1; Reuben, supra n.4 at 835~36. 
2£8 See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)(collective bargaining agreement 
provided for a grievance procedure under which disputes would first be submitted to a "step 1" and then a "step 
2" conference, with arbitration being "reached" only "in the event that the grievance shall not have been 
resolved or settled" in step 2; held, such "procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final 
disposition should be left to the arbitrator." 
In Howsam Justice Breyer relied heavily on Wiley for the proposition that "procedural questions which grow out 
of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to 
decide." 2002 WL 31746742 at *4. See also Rau, supra n.2 at 326 ('for those of us capable of holding both 
Wiley and [First Options] in our minds simultaneously, the two opinions must be read together: Wiley must 
remain part of the necessary background, helping to inform decisionmaking in litigation and helping to 
ensure coherence across cases where the factual problems posed are functionally identical"). 
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Ironically, abroad assenionof arbitraltXJwer in Howson seemed best to serve the interests of"the 
little f,;uy" 269----such are the perils of a result,oriented jurisprudence. 
· Pacificare I-Ieahh Syslcrns 
Agreements between HMO's and physicians provided for arbitration of any dispute 
that "arises out of or relates to this agreement or its tem1s"-but also specified that "punitive 
damages shall not be awarded." The physicians brought an action alleging, among other 
things, RICO violations based on a failure to reimburse them for health,carc services provided 
to patients covered by the defendants' health plans. The district court denied a motion to 
compel arbitration, concluding without discussion that the contract's restriction on punitive 
damages served to bar the recovery of treble damages under RIC0270-and going on to find 
these limitations unenforceable because they prevented the plaintiffs "from obtaining any 
meaningful relief for [their] statutmy claims."271 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of 
the lower court's opinion-but here too, and again unsurprisingly,272 the Supreme Court 
reversed.273 
The defendants had argued that even when damages arc sought under RICO, the 
contract's remedial limitations did not render the arbitration agreement unenforceable-and 
that in any event, this question of enforceability had to be decided by arbitrators rather than by 
courts. Writing for a unanimous court,274 Justice Scalia thought that to address either of these 
public,policy related questions was (lprcmaturc":l/5 The terms of the li.greement 'Nere 
((ambiguous" and the intent of the parties "unccrtain"-in particular, whether the contractual 
limitation was applicable to RICO claims at all "is, to say the least, in doubt.n276 So the 
arbitration clause was uat least initially, enforceable)): Courts should not take it upon themselves 
"the authority to decide the antecedent question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved," and 
the arbitrators must first be called on to teU us just what the agreement meant. 
Note that the result of compelling arbitration in PacificaTe was that the coverage of the 
arbitration clause ("Did the parties intend to bar, or rather to retain, a claimant's right to treble 
damages under RICO?") was made a matter f-i..;r f-tnal determination by the arbitrators. By 
M Cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right 
to a Jury Trial, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 669 (2001)(the increasing use of arbitration in contracts of 
adhesion ·•raise[s] the question of whether the adhesive use of binding arbitration unknowingly and involuntarily 
deprives such 'little guys' of their Seventh Amendment jury trial rights"); Sternlight, supra n.28 at 637 
("Attention All Consumers, Employees, Franchisees, and 'Little Guys"'). 
270 
"Dr. Kelly alleges RICO violations, which provide for treble damages. Treble damages are a form of 
punitive damages." !n re Managed Care Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001 (S.D. Fla. 2000), affd sub nom. 
In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation, 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom Pacificare Health 
Systems, Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL 1791225 (U.S.). 
271 ld.; 132 F.Supp.2d at 1000. 
272 See Rau, supra n.2 at 362-63 ("So, for example, whether an agreement grants arbitrators the power to 
award punitive damages wiil usually be a question as to which an arbitrator's judgment shouid be expected 
to command considerable deference"). 
273 Pacif1care Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 2003 WL 1791225 (U.S.). 
27
" Justice Thomas did not participate. 
275 Pacificare Health Systems, supra n.273, 2003 WL 179'1225 at *3. 
276 ld. at *3-*4. 
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contrast the Court did not directly address the scope of judicial review in the event the 
arbitrators should go on to find, not only that the claimants had intended to waive their right 
to treble damages, but also that such a waiver was permissible under federal policy. 277 
·Green Tree 
A number of homeowners took out home improvement loans from Green 1fee; the 
"sweeping" arbitTation clause in the contract278 required the arbitration of''all disputes, claims, 
or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from 
this contract.'' A putative class action was later filed in state court alleging violations of the 
state Consumer Protection Code, and Green 1iec responded with motions to st<ly and to 
compel arbitration. The trial court both srrantcd class certification and ordered arbitration, 
directing that a class action in arbitration proceed on an opt-out basis. The class action 
proceedings were then admini.<;tercd by the arbitrator, who awarded over $32 million in damages, 
att01neys' fees, and costs. Green 1l:ee moved to vacate the award, arguing that the imposition 
of class-wide arbitration was a Hfail [ ure] to enforce [the arbin·ation clause] in accordance with 
its terms, in violation of the FAA.u 1he trial court however confirmed the award, and the 
South Carolina Supreme Court aff1rmed: u [R]ely[ing] on independent state grounds," it held, 
it could apply "general principles ofcontTact inteqxctation" to find that where the contract is 
otherwise "silent," class-wide arbitTation may be ordered in the discretion of the ttial court.279 
'TI1e Supreme Court wholly agreed withneithcrparty~although obviously the pLaintiff 
wound up doing somewhat better than the defendant. A plurality of the Court, again in an 
opinion by Justice Breyer, held that the dispute "about what the arbitration contract ... means 
(i.e., whether it forbids the use of class arbitration procedures) is a dispute 'relating to [the] 
contract'" and therefore "for the arbitTator to decide)! rather than the courts of South Carolina.2w 
So rhe Court vacmed and remanded the case 11so that this question may be resolved in 
arbitration." Justice Breyer thus fashioned a rule by which: 
· under the federal common law of arbitration, this question~which went not to 
whether the parties had ever agreed to arbitrate1 but "what kind of arbitration proceeding they 
had agreed to"-is presumptively a question for rhe arbitrators themselves, and 
277 Justice Scalia did remark that "since we do not know how the arbitrator will construe the remedial 
limitations, the questions whether they render the parties' agreements unenforceable and whether it is for 
courts to arbitrators to decide enforceability in the first instance are unusually abstract." Padficare Health 
Systems, supra n.273, 2003 WL 1791225 at "4. This could mean simpiy that these further questions would 
be moot in the event the arbitrators found the contractual limitations of remedy not to apply so as to bar RICO 
treble damages. But it could also mean that an arbitration panel would be particularly well-placed to answer 
these questions--questions that depend in some measure on that "appreciation of contexf' and commercial 
reality which is the particular realm of arbitration-so that arbitral findings would be subject to a judicial 
control substantially less intrusive than de novo review. See generally the discussion at text accompanying 
nn. '131~152 supra. 
278 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 2003 WL 21433403 (U.S.) at *6. The full text of the arbitration 
clause appears id. at *3. 
279 Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002). 
280 Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278, 2003 WL 21433403 at *3, ~s. 
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·under this common law the presumption of arbitral competence is binding on state 
courts. 
Taking these two points together, the question of da...:;swide arbitration became one of 
construction with which the state courts had no business interfering. At least this was true 
once the contTact was found by the Supreme Court to be sufflciently ((unclear" as to warrant 
the exercise of arbitral interpretation.281 It is striking that Justice Breyer reached out for this 
formula-as far as I can tcll~with no particular urging fi:mn either party.zs2 
The common threads running through all these opinions should be brlght enough even 
for the most casual reader: 
·The particular obstacles raised in these cases-the NASD's time limit for asserting 
claims; the apparent waiver of treble damages; or the legitimacy of classwide arbitration-
could all plausibly be thought to limit the decisionmaking authority of the arbitrators: Each 
might be thought to raise a question as to the parties1 unconditional willingness to submit to the 
~e1 ld. at *5. (~Given the broad authority the contracts elsewhere bestow upon the arbitrator [the contracts grant to 
the arbitrator 'all powers,' including certain equitable powers 'provided by the law and the contract'], the answer to 
this question is not completely obvious"). In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens agreed at least with the first part 
of the holding: "Arguably'' the interpretation of the agreement should indeed ''have been made in the fir.:,i instance 
by the arbitrator ratiler than the court." But since Green Tree had not claimed that this decision "was made by tile 
wrong decisionrnaker," and since "there is nothing in the [FAA] that precludes" the findings of the state supreme 
court made "as a matter of state law," he would have preferred simply to affinn. HOVV'8ver, in light of tile division of 
the Court-which would othenNise make any judgment at all impossible-and because "Justice Breyer's opinion 
expresses a view of the case close to my own," he ultimately concurred in the judgment. 2003 VVL 21433403 at 
~7-*8. Even before Green Tree, federal oourts were beginning to hold that the question of consolidation could be 
a ''procedural matter committed to the arb~rator," see Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food & ComiT'ercial 
Workers Union, 321 F.3d 251 {1 51 Cir. 2003)(multiple contracts between the same parties); subsequent cases are 
already giving the plurality opinion in Green Tree the status of a holding to the effect that arbitrators, not courts, 
must decide whether class arbitration is available or forbidden, Pedcor Management Co., Inc. v. Nations Personnel 
of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355 (5~~> Cir. 2003). 
282 See Brief for Respondents in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 2003 VVL 1701523 at *44-~45 (to vacate 
and remand to the arbitrator is "a remedy that [Green Tree] never sought here, could not now seek, and in any 
event does not wanf'). Green Tree must be the most surprising of the cases in this "trilogy'': It is at first glance hard 
to square the holding with the many federal cases that have regularly refused to order the consolidation of related 
proceedings, in the absence of a specific command to that effect in the contract; judicial reticence has rested not 
on the belief that it is the province of arbitrators rather than oourts to take this step, but on the assertion that to do 
so would do violence to the (unexpressed) intention of the parties. E.g., Rolls-Royce Industrial Power, Inc. v. Zum 
EPC Services, Inc., 2001 WL 1397881 (N.D. Ill.) f'there is no textual evidence to suggest that [the respondent] 
would have wanted to participate in oonsolidated proceedings with third parties who were non-signatories to the 
agreemenf'): Govemment of the United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2na Cir. 1993)\'if contracting parties 
wish to have ail disputes that arise from the same factual situation arbitrated in a single proceeding, they can 
simply provide for consolidated arbitration in the arbitration clauses to which they are a party''): Coastal Shipping 
Ltd. v. Southem Petroleum Tankers Ltd., 812 D. Supp. 396, 403 (S.D. N.Y. 1993)('tlle absence of explicit language 
or other indicia that [the parties] intended to consolidate their disputes leads this Court to conclude that the parties 
did not consent to joint arbitration"). Of course, in the typical "consolidation" case the party "in the middle"----say, 
the owner of a construction project~is attempting to bring into the same proceeding two parties with interests 
adverse to each other~say, the architect and the contractor; no such dynamic is present where a number of 
consumers wish to aggregate their identical claims against a lender like Green Tree. This might be what the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina was getting at in Bazzle v. Green Tree, supra n.281, 569 S.E.2d at 357-
although the discussion there is too opaque for me to be sure. 
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process-and thus in some scn .. 'ie to irnp[icate the contractual"jUiisdiction" of the arbitrators. 283 
If so) then it would indeed follow fi·om First Options-at least in the absence of some ''clear and 
unmistakable" evidence of intention to the contrary-that it must be for a court to clear away 
the obstacles, and establish the existence of consent to arbin·ate, before any arbitration may be 
allowed to proceed. 
· In each case, though, the Court chose to conceptualize matters very differently 
indeed: Whether the contractual time limit had passed; whether the contract indicated an 
intention to waive the right to treble damages, or a willingness to engage in classwide arbitration-
each question was seen as a matter of contract interpretation that arbitrators are particularly 
well-placed to address. And each was treated as a discrete controversy that-just like any 
other dispute between the parties going more conventionally to the ''merits''-the parties were 
presumed to have wished to submit to arbitration. For example, in Howsam, the parties may 
well have agreed explicitly not to arbitrate untimely claims-but that is not at all the same 
thing as saying that they have agreed not to arbitrate disputes over timeliness. 284 
·The necessary finding of contractual consent to arbitral decisionmaking remained 
the subject of a couds limited "level #3" inqui1y: But in each case, this finding rested on little 
more than an a priori assertion about what "parties to an arbitration contact would nomnliy 
expect,"285 coupled with an invocation of the contract's "sweeping language concerning the 
scope of the questions committed to arbitration."286 In HOtUsam in particuLn; the comparative 
2a3 See text accompanying n.264 supra; see also William W. Park, "The Contours of Arbitral Jurisdiction: A Tale of 
Two Cases," INT'L ARB. NEWS, (Summer 2003) at pp. 2, 5) (in Padficare "the Court gave the arbitrators the power 
to detennine their own jurisdiction by interpreting the meaning of 'punitive damages' as used in the agreemenf'); 
Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n.278, 2003 WL 21433403 at *8 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)("the decision of 
what to subnit to the arbitrator is a matter of contractual agreement by the parties, and the interpretation of that 
contract is for the court, not the arbitrator"; "U]ust as fundamental to the agreement of the parlies as what is submitted 
to the arbitrator is to whom it is submitted")(emphasis in original). 
284 Rau, supra n.2 at 330; see also Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd. v. Sassoon I. Setty, Son & Co., [1953]1 W.L.R. 
1468, 1471~72 (Q.B. 1953)('if I have to choose between construing a clause which provides that any claim must 
be made within 14 days either as a clause that bars the claim altogether or as a clause that goes to the jurisdiction 
of the arbitrator, ! should choose the former; for I can see no reason for holding that a clause which is in form a 
limitation clause should be construed so as to affect the autl1ority of an arbitrator or the validity of his appointment'). 
285 Howsam, supra n.263, 2002 WL 31746742 at *5 ("parties to an arbitration contr-act would normally expect a 
forum-based decisionmaker to decide forum-specific procedural gateway matters"); see also Pacificare Health 
Systems, supra n.273, 2003 WL 1791225 at *4 n.2; Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278, 2003 WL 21433403 
at *5. 
200 Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278, 2003 WL 21433403 at ~6. Professor Reuben argues that a "broad 
arbitration clause" cannot in itself be sufficient to overcome the First Options presumption in favor of judicial 
detennination of ''jurisdictional" questions; he points out that after all the First Options case itself "was decided in 
the context of the Court's interpretation of a broad general arbitration provision calling for 'any controversy arising 
out of or relating to' the agreemenf' to be submitted to arbitration, but that '1he Court declined" to find this ciause 
"sufficient to establish 'clear and unmistakable ' intent to arbitrate the 'who decides' que:,iion." Reuben, supra n.4 
at 867 ('While the Court was not explicit in its ruling that a broad arbitration provision cannot satisfy the 'clear and 
unmistakable' waiver requirement,» such an understanding ''would seem to follow" from the rule that the Court did 
announce). But surely, the whole problem of First Options was that Mr. Kaplan had never been shown to have 
assented to this agreement in the f1rst place: Given our uncertainty with respect to his vvillingness to be bound by 
the arbitration clause, how the clause is drafted must be completely irrelevant. None of this is true in Prima Paint, 
nor in any of the 2002 '1rilogy'' cases. 
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advantage of arbitrators in doing the work of contract construction was buttressed both by the 
breadth of the NASD Code-empowering arbitrators 1'to interpret and determine the 
applicability of all provisions"-and by the institutional cotnpetence ofNASD arbitrators-
deemed "comparatively more expert about the meaning of their own rules. )'287 
· After reading these cases it is hard to escape the impression that First OtJtiuns is 
increasingly becoming marginalized. TI1e Court barely even "paid lip service" to the principle 
that judges are normally to decide ((gateway jurisdictionaltnatters. "288 Rather, we can sec in 
both of]tJsticc Breyer's opinions a subtle attempt to recharacterize what First Ojxions was all 
about: The First OtJtions presumption that "courts, not arbitrators [are] to decide a particular 
arbitration~related matter (in the absence of! clear and unrnistakablc' evidence to the contrary)" 
has now become little more than a jjlimitcd" and unarrow exception" to a more general 
imperative of arbitral competence. 289 
Of course the First OtJtions presumption retains lts greatest power in the core case that 
gave 1ise to the holding in the first place-where there is doubt as to ilwhether the partlcs have 
a valid arbitration agreement at all.'>290 Justice Breyer also suggested that one more ugateway 
matteru presumptively reserved for judicial determination might be the question "whether an 
arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of contTovcrsy"7·91 : 
But as strongly suggested by the holding of Pacificare292-~md as already adurnbratcd by the 
Court's earlier opinion in AT&T293-this will be a very perfunctory form of gatekeeping 
indeed. So as I suggested earlier, the 2002 "trilot:,.:ry" brings us considerably closer to Hn<tlly 
understanding First Options as little more than a focused response to a particular dilemma 
faced by people like Mt: Kaplan: 'TO understand the problem the Court thought it was faced 
with there, is to understand the quite limited reach ofits opinion. 294 
287 Howsam, supra n263, 2002 WL 31746742 at *5. In this assumption of greater arbitral competence \NBS found 
the principal support for the claims made about party expectations, since "it is reasonable to infer that the parties 
intended the agreement to reflect that understanding." ld. 
285 Park, supra n.283. 
289 Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278, 2003 WL 21433403 at *5-*6; Howsam, supra n.263, 2002 WL 
31746742 at *3. 
290 Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278, 2003 WL 21433403 at ~s; Howsam, supra n.263, 2002 WL 
31746742 at *4. See also China Minmetals Materials Import & Export Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corp., 2003 WL 
21468500 at *3, ·•5 {3'd Cir.)(arbitration panel, "in finding that it had jurisdiction, rejected [the respondent's] 
argument that the documents providing for arbitration were forged"; held, district court order confirming the award 
reversed; First Option "settled in [the respondent's] favor both the question of the need for a valid agreement to 
arbitrate and the quesf1on of the district court's role ·,n reviewing an arbitrator's determination of arb.1trabil'1ty when 
an award is sought to be enforced"). 
291 Howsam, supra n.263, 2002 WL 31746742 at *4; Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278, 2003 WL 
21433403 at *5. 
292 See text accompanying nn. 276-77 supra. 
293 AT&T Technologies, supra n.77; see text accompanying n. 302ff. infra; see generally Rau, supra n.2 at 357-65. 
294 See text accompanying nn. 24647 supra; see also Rau, supra n.2 at 344 (We might remember how this whole 
notion of a somehow particularly explicit consent to arbitral jurisdiction arose out of the specific problem posed by 
the fact pattem in [First Options]~and how it was seized on by Justice Breyer largely as an interpretive device, to 
prevent a reluctant respondent from having to steer at his peril between the twin dangers of default and of being 
inadvertently found to have 'submitted' to arbitration"). 
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16. While drafting of course is eve.rything, the 1Jrecise scope of an arbitration clause need no 
longer be a matter for judicial detC'tmination. 
Even before First OjJtions, the received wisdom held that it was presumptively for a 
court rather than an arbitrator co resolve even the daim by "an unquestioned party to an 
arbitration agreement" that some particular type of dispute is "outside the scope of that 
agreement. ''295 It is presumptively a comes task to clctcm1ine whether there has been ((consent 
to arbitrate" a particular dispute: And so a court must recoj:,rnize that a party may well have 
"consented" to the arbitration of disputes relating to a contractual shipmcntof(fruit"-but 
that he has not necessarily "consented)) thereby to arbitrate disputes arising out of the alleged 
f~1ilure to deliver pecans, or typewriters, or pork bellics. 296 An agreement's limitations on the 
scope of"arbitrable" issues have been taken, then, not as in,structions to the arbitrators as to how 
they are to go about deciding the dispute-but as limits on their ability to entertain the case in 
the first place. Justice Breyer in both Howsarn and Green Tree dutifully repeats the same Hne.297 
But of course, it is an even more familiar proposition that once a court actually sets 
about making this dctcnninaLion, it is expected immediately to deploy theso~c.allcd "presumption 
of arbitrability"-that is, except where there is the very dearest indication of a contrary intention, 
the court is expected in any event routinely to send the case to the arbitrators flx a decision on 
the merits. Th_e presumption is so compelling, and the process usually so perfunctory, that the 
two steps ate sometimes simply coni-lated: So wb.en a clause is broadly dnlftcd, and not 
particularly idiosyncratic, it might fairly be claimed that as a practical matter the judicial 
standard is "so deferential that the scope issue is in effect assigned to arbitrators.''298 
295 See 2 Macneil et al., supra n.19 at 15:7 (1999 Supp.)("the language of the Court" in First Options "is both 
unequivocal and plenty broad enough to cover" such cases); see also PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 
589, 596 {1"1 Cir. 1996)("we glean from AT&T [supra n.77] that the question whether the subject matter of the 
underlying dispute is within the scope of an expressly limited arbitration agreement is an 'arbitrability' issue'·); 
Sutton v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 181 F.Supp.2d 504 (D. Md. 2002)(video rental store moved to 
compel arbitration, under clause in membership agreement, of customer's claim for malicious prosecution 
and false imprisonment; "[iJt is logically untenable that from the customer's point of view, the membership 
agreements were meant to cover interactions with store employees and accusations of theft"): cf. William W. 
Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 Am. Rev. lnt'l 
Arb. 133, 134 (1997)("[w]hen the scope rather than existence of the arbitration clause is at issue, the same 
analysis ought to obtain"). 
200 See Rau, supra n.2 at 309, 364. This possible faiiure of consent is unaffected by the consideraiion that-
here and elsewhere-there is interpretive work to be done: An expert facffinder might after all be able to 
conclude, after examination of usage of trade and course of dealing, that the term ''fruit" had been used "in 
the botanical sense" to include "the contents of any developed seed plant ovary"-and could thus be 
construed as referring to pecans as well as to apples. See William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in Firs! 
Options v. Kaplan: What Sort ofKompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12 Arb. lnt'! 137, 14546 
(1996). 
297 See text accompanying n.291 supra. 
298 Walt, supra n.46 at 375 (1999). See also id. at 380 ("Initially assigning the scope issue to courts while 
allowing it to shift to arbitrators, conjoined with liberal evidence as to when the scope issue is shifted, amounts 
to assigning the matter ultimately to arbitrators"), 430 (the doctrine that "courts determine the 'arbitrability' of 
a dispute," and the doctrine that ''all doubts about an arbitration clause are to be resolved in favor of 
coverage," taken together, "in combination," "effectively allocate the scope issue to the arbitrate(")_ 
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Now there's inevitably a caveat: We should, at least in theoty, be distinguishing 
between two kinds of possible judicial decisions: 
·A flat holding to the effect that '\he matters in dispute are indeed within the coverage 
of the arbitration clauseu~that is, that the mc1its were entrusted by the parties to the arbitrator 
for resolution. (TI1is is the hallowed "presumption of arbitrability," and within the architecture 
of First Otnions, this is a decision at level #2). 
·A holding to the effect that "the vety question whether the matters in dispute are 
subject to arbitration is left fOr resolution to the arbitrators themselves"-that is, whether an 
arbitral decision on the merits was contemplated by the parties, and was within the scope of the 
arbitration clause, is itself a matter for arbitration. (\Xlithin the architecture of First Options, this 
is a level #3 determination. It is also the effect of the holding in Pacifrcare.) .299 
Only the fOrmer finding conclusively resolves the question of arbitral jurisdiction. So 
this is not a distinction without practical implication_~300-although it may perhaps be oversubtle 
for some. 301 
There is little doubt, as Pacificare makes clear, that we are seeing and Yvill continue to 
see many more cases of the latter type. But in fact all we really needed to know about the 
allocation of decision making responsibility between courts and arbltrators was already contained 
in the Court's earHer judgment in AT&T Technologies302~~a fascinating decision which 
suggests the proper heuristic to any attentive reader. It may be enough at this point merely to 
remind ourselves of the essentials: 
299 Pacificare Health Systems, supra n.273, 2003 WL 1791225 at *4 n.2 {"Given our presumption in favor of 
arbitration, we think the preliminary question whether the remedial limitations at issue here prohibit an award 
of RICO treble damages is not a question of arbitrability"). 
300 Cf. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Local 856, lnt'l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural 
Implement Workers, 97 F.3d 155 (61h Cir. 1996). Here the employer had sought a stay of arbitration on the 
ground that there was no agreement betvveen the parties, but the court denied ti'1e motion on the ground that 
"an interim agreement" existed that "included an agreement to arbitrate certain disputes." The arbitrator, 
though, u~imately found that the grievance was "not arbitrable" because there was no enforceable agreement, 
and that "neither tile Company nor the Union intended to be contractually bound." This award was vacated, 
and the grievance remanded to a different arbitrator: Since the parties had not "submitted" the issue to the 
arbitrator within the meaning of First Options, the arbitrator's decision was "in excess of his authority and in 
disregard of the law." "Were we to adopt [the employer's] position, we would in effect be overruling a prior 
holding of this Court." 97 F.3d at 162. 
3m See, e.g., Reliance Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Seismic Risk Ins. Services, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 
compare id. at 389 ("The Arbitrators Should Determine the Arbitrability of the Issues Surrounding the Profit 
Commission Agreement") with id. at 390 ("disputes concerning profit commissions are encompassed within 
the . .arbitration clause" and so arbitration of the disputes should be compelled); see also Rau, supra n.2 
at 314-15 & n.82. 
302 AT&T Technologies, supra n.77. AT&T has regularly been relied on in Justice Breyer's more recent 
commercial arbitration opinions; see, e.g., First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, supra n.2, 514 U.S. at 943; 
Howsam. supra n.263, 2002 WL 3'1746742 at 'A; Green Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278, 2003 WL 
21433403 at ~5. See the detailed discussion of both AT&T and Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB. 501 
U.S. 190 (1991), at Rau, supra n.2 at 357-62. 
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·A collective bargaining agreement contained an arbitration clause-not particularly 
"broad," as these things go-that required arbitrationof'\:my differences arising with respect 
to the intc11Jretationof this contractor the pe1fonnancc of any obligation hereunder.)\ However, 
"management functions"-including the termination of employment-were expressly 
excluded from arbitration. 
·TI1e union brought a grievance after a number of employees were Grecl. The company 
naturally invoked the 11management functions" clause to resist arbitration. Still another clause 
in the contract, however, seemed to say that by~offs could only be justified by an actual "lack 
of work''-~md since there was no "lack of work" here, the union argued that the management 
functions exclusion did not apply~and thus that the grievance should be arbitrated. From the 
complex intcnclation of aH these conLTactual provisions, the lower courts concluded that it 
would only be able to resolve the "arbitrability" question by becoming "entangled" in the actual 
consideration of the merits: For under the agreement, <tpparcntly, the arbitrators would only 
have jurisdiction if it Yvere first found-as the union asserted, but the company denied-that 
the right to tire workers was not unconditionally a management prerogative. This, however, 
was the very lssue in dispute between the parties. So the lower courts thought they had no 
other choice but to order "arbitration of the threshold issue of arbitrability"~for otherwise 
there would be nothing left tOr the arbitrator to decide.303 
·A unanimous Supreme Court found this unacceptable: TI1e order to "arbitrate the 
arbitrability issue" was necessarily improper, since the courts must after all act as the guardian,'> 
of the temple. The black letter rule, as we know, is that whether there is a duty to arbitrate a 
particular dispute is "undeniably an issue for judicial determination" (unless of course the 
parties "dearly and unmistakably provide otherwise") .3°'' 
· Howevc1; it is Justice Brennan's concurring opinion that warrants far more attention. 
Joined by two other justices, Justice Brennan naturally conceded that some juclicial finding of 
"consent" remained critical. But it did not at all follow from this premise that the courts were 
called on to indulge in an interpretation of the contested language: For the question of 
"consent" could be severed from the question of which party, union or employer, was in fact 
correct in its reading of the agreement. Instead, the judicial role was "much simpler"305 : The 
only issue f-lx the court should be whether the parties had agreed, in Lhe arbitration clause, to 
be bound by arbitral intert_Jretatiom of the other more "substantive" fJrovisions of ~he nmtract-that 
is, whether the parties had "agreed to submit disputes over the meaning" of the contract to 
arbitration.306 
The point, in short, is not so much that it is the court that ~'dccidcs"-it is rather the 
highly restricted compass of any judicial inquiry. The court's task is no longer to discover 
whether the arbitrators "actuallyn had "jurisdiction" at all: It is, instead, far more cabincd-the 
question is rather whether the agreement can be read so as to grant them this wider 
303 AT&T Technologies, supra n.77, 475 U.S. at 64748. 
JC4 ld. at 649. 
305 Jd. at 654 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
3013 !d .. 
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dccisionmakingpower) and then) perhaps, whether they have abused it.307 Understandably, 
Justice Brennan thought this deten11ination to be made by the lower courts on remand would 
be "straightfOrward and will require little time or effort."308 
Justice Brennan's opinion must inform our take on every later arbitration decision of 
the Court. If we can treat a dispute over the scope of the arbitration agreement as just one more 
discrete controversy---dependent on the interpretative skills of the arbitrators themselves-it 
is usually sensible to assume that it was entrusted by the parties to the arbitrator: "No more is 
required to establish the arbitrabitity of the dispute,"309 and no more should be necessary to 
remind district courts to swear off the work of contractual interpretation. 
307 To precisely the same effect, see Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices 
of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry, Local 38, 282 F.3d 746 (2002). A general contractor entered into an 
overall project agreement with several unions. TM.e "Permanent Arbitrator" named under that agreement 
concluded that the work assignment dispute between the parties was a 'jurisdictional dispute"-that is, in this 
context, a dispute involving a single employer caught between conflicting union demands-and he thus 
ordered the union to use the agreement's "jurisdictional dispute" resolution procedure, which involved 
sending the dispute to the leadership of the adverse unions. The union argued that this was instead a "non-
jurisdictional dispute concerning the interpretation" of a particular collective bargaining agreement to which 
it was a parly, and so should be decided under that agreement's separate grievance procedure. The district 
court assumed that it---and not the arbitrator~should decide whether or not the dispute was a 'jurisdictional" 
dispute. AT&T Technologies-not cited but, I hope, lurking in the background-suggests, though, that this 
was mistaken. Tile court of appeals did reverse, nothing that the "text, structure and context" of the 
agreement assign to the arbitrator "the threshold determination whether or not a dispute is jurisdictional"; the 
proper inquiry for the court "is not whether the underlying dispute is arbitrable in and of itself; rather, we must 
ask whether the overall dispute, which encompasses the disagreement over the nature of the underlying 
dispute," is arbitrable." ld. at 759 (emphasis in original). 
30e AT&T Technologies, supra n.77, 475 U.S. at 655. 
309 Air Line Pilots Association, lnt'l v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 553, 555 (7111 Cir. 2002)(Posner, 
J.); see also id. at 556 ("when an arbitration clause is so broadly worded that it encompasses disputes over the 
scope or validity of the contract in which it is embedded, issues of the contract's scope or validity are for the 
arbitrators"); Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J. v. Office of the Contract Arbitrator, 660 N.Y.S.2d 408 (App. Div. 
1997)(employer argued that security guards are not its "employees" and thus are not covered by the 
agreement to arbitrate; held, the "coverage question" "necessitates interpretation of numerous and interlocking 
provisions of the agreement" and thus "should be left to the arbitrator''; this conclusion is "further supported by 
the language of the agreement itself' which entrusts to the arbitrator "any questions regarding the contract's 
'application"'); Ryan, Beck & Co., LLC v. Fakih, 268 F.Supp.2d 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)("Cieariy, a referral of ·all' 
disputes concerning the construction of the [agreement] is sufficiently plain and sweeping to encompass 
disputes over the scope of the arbitration clause and to manifest the parties' intent to have the arbitrators 
decide that issue"). 
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Of course, both Prima Paint and First Options assume that the parties have chosen an 
arbitrator to do something. 310 Once they have done so they have an obvious incentive to 
monitor the behavior of arbitrators, minimizing the likelihood of a runaway ttibunal, "outlier'' 
awards, and unjustified assumptions of jurisdiction. And once we are satisfied they have done 
so, it seems rather extreme to treat such decisionmakcrs wholty as intermeddling, officious 
strangers: Parties who have agreed to arbitration cannot after all rationally claim to be wholly 
astonished when they find "their" arbiLTators have been tempted to expand their ownjurLsdiction 
through self-interest-nor is it unfair to charge them with the risk that this tnight sometimes 
occur.311 Enatly, the model put f01ward here has the most obvious advantages of administrative 
efficiency: It is not merely that what has been termed ''onc~stop adjucHcation)l3 12 is inevitably 
more economical, and thus likely to have been desired by both parties ex ante-that, as AT&T 
suggests, questions of scope and questions going ~<to the merits" arc often so intertwined that 
we can expect similar arbitral competence to be relevant, and similar factual considerations to 
come into play.-m It is also tTue that arbitrators will often be in a far better position than courts 
310 Imagine a contract between Contractor and Subcontractor; Contractor later purports to assign its rights 
under the contract to Assignee: 
Contractor (Assignor) and Assignee move jointly to compel arbitration; while the Subcontractor challenges 
the validity of the assignment, it also contests the standing of the Assignor to bring the action. In this situation 
a court must hold that a broad arbitration clause "encompasses the parties' disagreement as to the validity of 
the assignment"~and it should therefore be for the arbitrator to decide that issue, which "involve[s] the 
interpretation of other contractual provisions and not of the arbitration dause itself." 
By contrast, if the motion to compel were brought by the Assignee alone, we might have a different result 
Here a court itself might have to determine whether any arbitration agreement was in force between the 
Assignee and the Subcontractor. 
Cf. ACEquip ltd. v. American Engineering Corp., 315 F.3d 151, 155~56 (2"d Cir. 2003)(emphasis added)(dicta 
to this effect, but noting that the case arose in the context of an application to appoint an arbitrator, in which 
"a somewhat less stringent standard governs the court's decision"). Compare The Island on Lake Travis, Ltd. 
v. Hayman Co. General Contractors, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), judgment set aside 
''without reference to the merits," 848 SW.2d 84 (Tex. 1993)(Assignor initiated arbitration proceedings and 
respondent claimed that Assignor was "without standing to bring any claims under the contract" since the 
Assignee was the real party in interest; held, under "a broad arbitration clause, a dispute betvveen the parties 
to the contract concerning the ownership of a claim arising from the contract is just as arbitrable as a d\spute 
concerning the merits of the claim itself'; this was "not a case where [respondent] was forced into arbitration 
with a party with which it had not agreed to arbitrate"), with LS. Joseph Co., Inc. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 
F.2d 396 (811 ' Cir. 1986)(''whether a party to a commercial arbitration agreement can be compelled to arbitrate 
with the assignee of the entity with which it first agreed to arbitrate" is "a question of substantive arbitrability 
to be decided ~Y the courts," since the dispute "goes to the existence of a contract to arbitrate"). 
311 As one rnernber of the court suggested at the time of oral argument in First Options: 
Whenever you submit issues to arbitration, in effect you're consenting to a kind of rough-and-ready disposition 
of whatever your claims or disputes may be, and therefore there's no reason to sort of draw fine lines as to what 
you were rough and ready about. 
Oral Argument in First Options v. Kap!an, 1995 WL 242250 at *43-44. This suggestion took the form of one 
Justice's insistent attempt to be helpful to counsel for Mr. Kaplan: "Why don't you say that there is, in fact, a 
superior value to be served by making this distinction between subject and person, and the person agreement 
at least must be clear and unmistakable, regardless of what the subject agreement is?" ld. 
:m See text accompanying n.81 & n.81 supra. 
313 See Walt, supra n.46 at 410 ("the marginal cost [of having an arbitrator determine] the scope of the 
arbitration clause is low," while "[a]llocating the determination to a court, another decision maker, requires an 
additionai transaction and an extra cost"}. 
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to appreciate the submissions made by the parties in the course of the proceedings-submissions 
which if properly understood can define, alter, or expand the scope of actual consent. 3 14 
Now one often inconvenient feature of my "contractual" model of arbiqation is that 
any general approach we develop mu::>r ultimately yield to sufficient explicitness on the part of 
the contracting parties. Consider a recent case in which one partner agreed to buy out his 
partner's share in their business, with the final purchase price to be detem1ined by the company's 
longstanding accountants-whose determination was to be "final and binding on Seller and 
Buyer land not) subject to any appcaC arbitration, proceeding, adjustment or review of any 
nature whatsoever." The contract also contained a general arbitration clause, however, and 
when one partner was dissatisfied with the accountants' valuation, he sought review in 
arbitration. A fair reading would not allow arbitrators to find that the question of valuation 
would come within the scope of Lhe arbitration clause-and so an award in which arbitrators 
assumed jurisdiction of the dispute and then 11declared the accountants) determination flawed," 
would properly be subject to vacatur for excess of authority.315 
On the other hand, imar.,rine a cbuse that is drafted so as expressly to g1·am arbitrators 
the power to decide whether claims of fraudulent inducement are within their jurisdiction:3 16 
Such a provision goes considerably further even than Prima Paint itself-but it could not 
possibly prove problematical even to those still harboring doubts ;1bout that decision. In most 
cases, of course, appreciation of intention on the basis of contractual language is a delicate 
rnatter of judgment, involving dose reading and responsiveness to distinctions of degree. Still, 
one can find more familiar and prosaic arbitration clauses drawn from form books that seem 
quite dose to the clause just mentioned: What else to think of a contract that mandates 
arbitration 11 in the event of disagreernent between the parties,"317 or even, in the event of any 
314 See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. Runyon, 185 F.3d 832, 835-36 (Th Cir. 1999)(in interest 
arb'JtrafJon, "the arbitrator ·Interpreted the issue framed by the part1es as encompass'1ng more than a choice 
between [adopting one party's proposal in its entirety] and doing nothing"; "we give great deference to the 
arbitrator's understanding of the parameters of the issues presented for arbitration"}; cf. Pacific Development, 
LC. v. Orton, 982 P.2d 94 (Utah App. 1999), rev'd, 23 P.3d 1035 (Utah 2001 ). In Pacific Development a 
contractor did work on two plats in a subdivision. The arbitration agreement recited that all issues relating to 
Plat 8 "have been resolved," and that therefore the "arbitmtion will focus" on Plat C; the arbitrator nevertheless 
issued an award with respect to both Plats 8 and C. The lower court confirmed the award-noting that "given 
the degree of deference given to an arbitrator's award," it "accept[ed] the arbitrator's finding that the parties, 
by their conduct and mutual consent, submitted Plat B issues for resolution, expanding the scope of tile 
arbitrator's jurisdiction." Tile Supreme Court of Utah reversed: It was apparently under the impression that 
since under u·1e state arbitration act "only written arbitration agreements are enforceable" under the state 
statute, it followed that "the initial written agreement could [not] be modified by implication, that is, by the 
conduct of the parties in presenting evidence relating to a dispute outside the scope of the initial agreement." 
This is simply wrong. Having so held, though, ihe court naturally had no need to reach the question whether 
the conduct of the parties at the hearing could best be evaluated by a court or by an arbitrator. 
Jl~ Katz v. Feinberg, 290 F.3d 95 (2"d Cir. 2002). After first holding that "the district court, not the arbitration 
panel, should determine the arbitrabiiity of the valuation dispute," the Second Circuit went on to affirm the 
district court's conclusion that-given the specificity of the agreement-disputes over valuation were not in 
fact subject to arbitration. 290 F.3d at 98. 
316 Not, that is, whether the contract was in fact induced by fraud, but whether the scope of the arbitration 
clause encompasses such a claim. 
317 See ACEquip Ltd. v. American Engineering Corp., supra n. 310, 315 F.3d at 155. 
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controversy "arising in connection with or relating to this Agreement ... or any other matter or 
thing"?3 13 
By this point, we are down to the rather trivial assertion that the marginally less 
explicit but canonical ubroad clause" belongs to the same genus and calls for the same 
treatment. The Court's reliance in Howsam on the parties' drafting~in which the sweeping 
.f:,>rant to arbitrators of the power "to inte11Jret and detennine the applicability of all" contractual 
provisions319 appeated to reinforce their comparative advantage in being able to do exactly 
that320-is I think a further indication that this should suffice in the future. And finally, as 
institutional draftsmen respond to the uncertainties of First OfJtions, the revision of institutional 
rules will progressively make the individualized examination of particular clauses superfluous: 
ll1e AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, for example, have been amended to accomplish 
precisely this result of giving most determinations of scope to the arbitrators. 321 Other 
018 Bell v. Cendant Corp., 293 F.3d 563, 565, 568 (200 Cir. 2002)(emphasis added)(''[t]his clause is as broad an 
arbitration provision as one can imagine,fl and "clearly and unmistakably evidences the parties' intention to have 
the arbitrator determine its scope"). 
319 Howsam, supra n.263, 2002 WL 31746742 at *5. 
320 !d. 
321 Rule 7(a) of the AAA Commerdal Arbitration Rules was expressly "designed to address the Court's ho!ding" in 
First Options, and provides that. The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including 
any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement. See AAA Commerdal 
Arbitration Rules Revision Committee, Commentary on the Revisklns to the Commercia! Arbitration Rules of the 
APA, ADR Currents, Dec. 1998 at pp. 6, 7. 
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widely~used bodies of rules may have the same effect. 322 If the regime of contract is 
to mean anything) such provisions must end all further questioning323-I am quite 
322 The ICC Rules of Arbitration similarly provide that if either party contests the "existence, validity or scope" of the 
arbitration agreement, the Court of Arbitration may nevertheless direct the arbitration to proceed "if it is prima facie 
satisfied" that an arbitration agreement exists; in such case "any decision as to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal itself." Art. 6(2)(emphasis added). It seems obvious that such a 
provision is meant to restate the notion of competence/competence and as such is deeply rooted in the premises 
and presuppositions of European procedural law-that is, it is apparently not intended in any way to amount to 
a final allocation of decisionmaking authority. See text accompanying nn. 233~34 & n.234 supra; Pierre Mayer, 
L'autonomie de l'arbitre international dans !'appreciation de sa proper competence, in Academie de Droit 
!ntemational, 5 [1989] Recueil des Cours 319, 349~341 (my translation): 
We must make a distinction between, on the one hand, an agreement--quite commonplace today--by which 
an arbitrator may rule on his own jurisdiction [referring to the rules of the ICC], and on the other hand, an agreement 
by which the arbitrator's decision on this issue is shielded from any judicial control. The latter type of agreement 
must be explicit, and we practically never come across IT. See also Yves Derains & Eric A. Schwartz, A Guide to the 
New ICC Rules of Arbitration 80 n.131 (1998)("Uitimately, the Arbitral Tribunal's detennination will usually be the 
subject of judicial control once the tribunal has rendered its Award"}; Craig et al., supra n.48 at 162 (the effect of 
art. 6 of the ICC Rules, "subject to a posteriori control by national courts, is that the arbitrators rule on jurisdictional 
questions"). In an alien legal environment, seeing arbiTration primarily as an extension of contract law and having 
only First Options to look to, American courts and commentators seem regularly to miss the point. So they have 
tended to view art. 6 broadly as a grant to arbitrators-similar in effect to the new f.AA rules-of the power to make 
a binding detetmination of their own jurisdiction. E.g., The Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine lnt'l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 
118, 124~25 (200 Cir. 2003)(an agreement calling for ICC arbitration "clearly and unmistakably evidences the 
parties' intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrabHity''; "the arbitrability of [a] contract daim for attorneys' fees and costs 
was a question for the arbitrator rather than the court"); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1"1 Cir. 
1989)(respondent claimed that it could not be compelled to arbitrate dispute with assignees of the other 
contracting party, since there was no arbitration agreement with them; held, arbttration should not be stayed since 
by agreeing to the ICC rules, respondent had "contracted to submit issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator''); Sodete 
Generate de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Management & Systems Co., 643 F.2d 863 (1"1 Cir. 
1981)(Breyer, J.)(whether respondent is correct in contending that the parties' dispute over the testing of missles 
'Was meant to be outside the scope of the arbitrability clause is itself a matter for the [ICC] arbitrators"). To the same 
effect, see 4 Macneil et at., supra n.19 at§ 44.15.1 (1999 Supp.){arbitration pursuant to ICC rules "thus falls within 
the agreement of the parties exception of First Options"); Kreindler, supra n.132 at p. 20 (same); see also Dafmia 
Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Paklstan, [1978]2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 223,284 (1977)(C.A.)(Megaw, L.J.)(ICC 
rules do not merely provide for "provisional decisions"; "on their true construction" they provide instead, 'With 
complete width and generality, for the arbitrator to decide, so as to bind the parties--in so far as any decision of 
the arbitrator can bind the parties-any question that may be raised as to the arbitrator's jurisdiction"). 
323 E.g., Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kahn, Chalal & Musso, P A v. MedPartners, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 677 (S.D. 
Fla. 2001 ). After a respondent objected to the arbitration of a claim for "anticipatory breach"-arguing that it went 
beyond the scope of the contract's arbitration clause-the arbitrators disagreed, concluding that the agreement 
did give them the power to adjudicate the claim. Relying on the MA rules governing the arbitration, the court 
held that arbitration of the antidpatory breach claim "is warranted," and that courts "are obligated to give arbitrators' 
decisions regarding the arbttrability of a matter the same deference due an arbitrators' declsions on the merits." ld. 
at 685 n.S; see also Johnson v. Polaris Sales, Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d 300, 308~09 (D. Me. 2003). 
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unable to understand any suggestions to the contrary. 324 
1 7. The term u arbitrability 11 can easily be disfxnsed with. 
I have in fact written this piece without using the word at all-except when quoting 
hom other sources, or where a tone of irony or facetiousness should be evident. (The same is 
true for "void)) and "voidable," "clear and unmistakable''-and all the other detritus of our 
case law.) If I have made the slightest contribution here, it might simply be in encouras->ing us 
to renounce unnecessary 8nd incoherent fonnubtions that apparently serve only as obstacles 
to thought. While the Supreme Court continues to speak this Lmguage,325 there appears to be 
no particular link between the terminology it insists on using, and the sensible results it is 
nevertheless regularly able to reach. It can hardly be imagined that the term adds anything to 
our understanding of the problems of arbitration practice--while ''thinking things" rather 
than words"326 may be more calculated to do so. 
32~, Cf. Reuben, supra n.4 at 869, who suggesis that "IT the Court continues moving toward an actuai consent theory 
of arbitrabiiity, such strategies for accommodating First Options should be unavailing." Perhaps the point is that 
any such provision must be found in the actual text of the contract itself, rather than merely in the MA rules? But 
this suggestion s~s uneasily with Howsarn, see text accompanying nn. 318-319 supra; more to the point, neither 
First Options nor ordinary contract law requires any such thing--Bven if there were anything in particular to be 
gained by doing so. Cf. n.32 supra. I understand even less, though, the grotesque assertion that such a clause-
sanctioned by First Options---''purporting to invest the arbitrator with the threshold issues of arbitrability'' is in fact 
an "indicium of unconscionability." American General Finance, Inc. v. Branch, 793 So.2d 738, 749 (AJa 2001); 
cf. Rau, supra n.2 at 332 ('Perhaps it is oniy natural to tlnd the greatest confusion in tile opinions of those state courts 
that have only recently and reluctantly been dragged into the modern era of arbitration~and that have been 
gamely, if haplessly, struggling with what it all means''). 
Finally, is it still necessary to remind ourselves that even the most elegant and expert drafting is irrelevant 
when there has never been an agreement to arbitrate in the first place? Richard Kreind\er writes that under the 
ICC Rules, "even an aJJegation that fraud in the factum went to the torgery of the arbrtration agreement alone--
separately from any forgery of the main contract~might not suffice to oust the ICC tribunal of its competence-
competence." Kreindler, supra n.132 at p.9 (emphasis in original). Leaving aside the fact that fraud and forgery 
are quite different concepts, it is in any event inconceivable that an Americ.::m court-faced with an allegation of 
either forgery or fraud in the factum--would see a purported ruling by the ICC Court as posing any obstacle 
whatever to an application for a stay of the arbitration. See Bank of America, NA v. Diamond State Ins. Co., 38 
Fed. Appx. 687, 689 (2nd Cir. 2002)("While the arbitration provisions state that issues conceming the formation and 
validity' of the contracts 'shall be submitted to arbitration,' it is not clear that this includes the question of the very 
existence of the contracf')(emphasis in original); d. Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3'J Cir. 
1999)(clause provided for arbitration of disputes conceming "the validity of this arbitration clause or the entire 
contract," but the court nevertheless proceeded to evaluate, and uphold, the arbitration clause against attacks 
based on its alleged unconscionability). 
325 See Howsam, supra n.263, 2002 WL 31746742 at *3 ("Linguistic.:111y speaking, one might call any potentially 
dispositive gateway question a 'question of arbitrabiii!y,' for its answer will determine whether the underlying 
controversy wH! proceed to arbitration on the me~ts"); Paci!lcare Health Systems, supra n.273, 2003 WL 1791225 
at *4 n.2 (If the contractual ambiguity could itseJf be characterized as raising a 'gateway' question of arbitrability, 
then it would be appropriate for a court to answer it in the lirst instance"). The term seems mercifully absent from 
any of the opinions in Gt·een Tree Financial Corp., supra n. 278. 
026 
"How few people think accurately--and think things not words." Letter of May 9, 1925 from O.W. Holmes, Jr. to 
Harold Laski, in 1 Haimes-Laski Letters 738 (Howe ed. 1953). 
